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Abstract	  English	  
This	  work	  focuses	  on	  the	  persistent	  gender	  differences	  in	  economic	  life,	  such	  as	  the	  gender	  gap	  in	  top	  management	  positions	  as	  well	  as	  the	  glass	  ceiling	  effect.	  Evidence	  for	  the	  hypothesis	  that	  gender-­‐specific	  outcomes	  in	  the	  labor	  and	  goods	  markets	  are	  caused	  by	  different	  preferences	  of	  the	  genders	  is	  presented.	  	   	  
Systematic	   gender	   differences	   in	   risk	   behavior	   are	   observed	   in	   most	   laboratory	  experiments	   and	   field	   studies,	   with	   important	   exceptions	   for	   the	   managerial	  population.	  Women’s	  higher	   risk-­‐aversion	   thus	   is	  mirrored	   in	   all	   aspects	  of	   female	  decision-­‐making,	   such	   as	   the	   choice	   of	   profession	   (and	   thus	   earnings),	   investment	  decision,	  and	  what	  products	  to	  buy.	  	   	  
Gender	  differences	  in	  competition	  are	  examined	  and	  in	  the	  vast	  majority	  of	  studies,	  women	   are	   found	   to	   be	   less	   willing	   to	   compete	   than	   men,	   and	   as	   a	   consequence	  women	  may	  have	  to	  accept	  lower	  earnings	  as	  they	  often	  fail	  to	  initiate	  negotiations.	  Thus,	  the	  observed	  gender	  differences	  in	  behavior	  under	  tournament	  incentives	  may	  contribute	  to	  the	  explanation	  of	  gender	  disparities	  among	  top	  management	  in	  large	  corporations.	  	  
Evidence	   in	   favor	   of	   both,	   the	   nature	   and	   the	   nurture	   hypotheses	   are	   presented,	  however,	   the	   important	   question	   whether	   the	   observed	   gender	   differences	   in	  competitive	   behavior	   are	   ingrained	   (nature)	   or	   taught	   (nurture)	   could	   not	   be	  answered	  satisfactorily	  before	  the	  background	  of	  the	  state	  of	  research.	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Abstract	  German	  
Diese	   Arbeit	   behandelt	   geschlechtsspezifische	   Unterschiede	   im	   ökomischen	   Leben	  wie	  beispielsweise	  die	  unterproportionale	  Anzahl	  der	  Frauen	  in	  Führungspositionen	  sowie	  den	  sogenannten	  „Effekt	  der	  gläsernen	  Decke“.	  	  Argumente	  für	  die	  Hypothese,	  dass	   geschlechtsspezifische	   Ergebnisse	   in	   den	   Arbeits-­‐	   und	   Gütermärkten	   durch	  unterschiedliche	  Präferenzen	  	  von	  Männern	  und	  Frauen	  verursacht	  	  werden,	  werden	  vorgestellt.	  
Systematische	  Unterschiede	  zwischen	  den	  Geschlechtern	  im	  Risikoverhalten	  können	  in	   den	   meisten	   Laborexperimenten	   und	   Feldstudien	   beobachtet	   werden;	   eine	  wichtige	   Ausnahme	   stellt	   jedoch	   der	   Teil	   der	   Bevölkerung	   dar,	   der	   schon	  Führungsposition	  bekleidet.	  Die	  höhere	  Risikoaversion	  von	  Frauen	  kommt	   in	  (fast)	  allen	   Aspekten	   der	   Entscheidungsfindung	   zu	   tragen,	   so	  wie	   beispielsweise	   bei	   der	  Wahl	  des	  Berufs	  (und	  damit	  des	  Einkommens),	  bei	   Investitionsentscheidungen	  und	  bei	  Entscheidungen	  am	  Gütermarkt.	  
Geschlechtsspezifische	   Unterschiede	   im	   Wettbewerb	   werden	   untersucht	   und	   im	  Großteil	   der	   Studien	   erweisen	   sich	   Frauen	   als	   weniger	   wettbewerbsfreudig	   als	  Männer	  und	  verzichten	  öfter	  auf	  mögliches	  Konkurrieren.	  Als	  Folge	  müssen	  Frauen	  öfters	   schlechtere	   Ergebnisse	   akzeptieren;	   nicht	   zuletzt	   deshalb	   weil	   sie	   oft	   auf	  Verhandlungen	   verzichten.	   Die	   beobachteten	   geschlechtsspezifischen	   Unterschiede	  im	   Verhalten	   unter	   Wettbewerbsbedingungen	   tragen	   zur	   Erklärung	   der	  unterschiedlichen	  Geschlechterverteilung	   in	  Management-­‐	   und	  Führungspositionen	  in	  großen	  Unternehmen	  bei.	  
Argumente	   sowohl	   zu	   Gunsten	   der	   „Natur“(nature)-­‐	   als	   auch	   der	  „Erziehungs“(nurture)-­‐Hypothese	   werden	   präsentiert.	   Die	   wichtige	   Frage,	   ob	   die	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beobachteten	   Unterschiede	   zwischen	   den	   Geschlechtern	   im	  Wettbewerbsverhalten	  angeboren	  und	  somit	  verwurzelt	  (nature)	  oder	  gelehrt	  und	  anerzogen	  (nurture)	  sind,	  kann	   jedoch	   mit	   dem	   bisherigen	   Forschungsstand	   nicht	   zufriedenstellend	  beantwortet	  werden.	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1.	  Introduction	  
This	   work	   is	   concerned	   with	   the	   persistent	   gender	   differences	   in	   economic	   life.	  Gender	   differences	   have	   been	   observed	   in	   many	   different	   domains	   such	   as	  consumption	   and	   investment	   behavior,	   and	   in	  what	   is	  maybe	   the	  most	   interesting	  domain	   for	   policymakers	   and	   economists,	   the	   labor	   market	   (Blau	   &	   Kahn,	   2000).	  There	  is	  the	  strong	  hypothesis	  that	  gender-­‐specific	  outcomes	  in	  the	  labor	  and	  goods	  markets	  are	  caused	  by	  different	  preferences	  between	  the	  genders	  (Croson	  &	  Gneezy,	  2009).	  
Most	   studies	   find	   systematic	   gender	   differences	   in	   risk	   behavior.	   The	   question	  whether	  men	  and	  women	  differ	  systematically	   in	  their	  responses	  to	  risk	   is	  of	  great	  economic	   interest.	   If	  women	  are	   truly	  more	  sensitive	   to	  risk	   than	  men,	   this	  will	  be	  mirrored	   in	  all	   aspects	  of	   female	  decision-­‐making,	   such	  as	   the	   choice	  of	  profession	  (and	   thus	   earnings),	   investment	   decision,	   and	   what	   products	   to	   buy	   (Eckel	   &	  Grossman,	  2008).	  
As	   much	   modern	   economic	   life	   involves	   competition	   in	   some	   form	   or	   another,	  differences	   in	   the	   willingness	   to	   compete	   may	   have	   a	   large	   impact	   on	   economic	  outcomes.	  If	  women	  are	  really	  less	  willing	  to	  compete	  than	  men,	  women	  may	  have	  to	  accept	   lower	   earnings.	   Thus	   gender	   differences	   in	   behavior	   under	   tournament	  incentives	   may	   explain	   gender	   disparities	   among	   top	   management	   in	   large	  corporations	  (Vandegrift,	  Yavas,	  &	  Brown,	  2004).	  
Substantial	   vertical	   segregation	   between	  men	   and	  women	   can	   be	   observed	   across	  fields.	  A	  vastly	  overproportional	  number	  of	  senior	  positions	   in	  management	  and	   in	  the	  professions	  is	  held	  by	  men	  (Niederle	  &	  Vesterlund,	  2008).	  	   	  In	  most	  European	  Union	  countries,	   the	  gender	  wage	  gap	   increases	  across	  the	  wage	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distribution	  and	  accelerates	  in	  the	  upper	  tail	  –	  a	  phenomenon	  labeled	  “glass	  ceiling”	  effect.	  Identically	  qualified	  men	  and	  women	  receive	  different	  returns	  (Booth,	  2009).	  Only	  very	  few	  women	  are	  involved	  in	  the	  top-­‐level	  management	  of	  U.S.	  corporations	  –	  amounting	  to	  a	  mere	  2.4	  percent	  of	  the	  executives.	  Moreover,	  female	  managers	  are	  especially	  under-­‐represented	  in	   large	  corporations.	  Furthermore,	  the	  gender	  gap	  in	  compensation	   among	   top	   executives	   accounts	   for	   about	   45	   percent	   of	   mean	  managerial	  income	  (Bertrand	  &	  Hallock,	  2001).	  
The	   aim	   of	   this	   study	   is	   to	   find	   an	   explanation	   why	   women	   hold	   grossly	  underproportional	   shares	   of	   top	  management	   positions.	   By	   reviewing	   the	   existing	  literature	  on	  gender	  differences	  in	  preferences,	  and	  in	  risk	  and	  competition	  behavior	  this	   work	   tries	   to	   answer	   the	   question	   whether	   one	   of	   these	   differences	   can	   be	  identified	   as	   the	   main	   cause	   for	   the	   observed	   gender	   gap	   in	   top	   management	  positions.	  
The	   first	   part	   gives	   an	   idea	   of	   gender	   differences	   in	   preferences	   in	   general	  with	   a	  special	  focus	  on	  social	  preferences.	  The	  second	  provides	  a	  detailed	  account	  of	  gender	  differences	  in	  risk	  behavior	  observed	  in	  laboratory	  settings	  and	  in	  field	  the	  studies.	  The	   third	   section	   considers	   gender	   differences	   in	   competition	   in	   detail	   and	   offers	  several	   possible	   explanations	   for	   the	   observed	   differences.	   The	   final	   section	  concludes.	  	  
2.	  Gender	  Differences	  in	  Preferences	  
Gender	   Differences	   may	   be	   observed	   in	   various	   situations	   and	   domains.	  Experimental	  evidence	  on	  preference	  differences	  between	  men	  and	  women	  focuses	  on	  three	  domains:	  social	  preferences,	  risk	  preferences,	  and	  reaction	  to	  competition.	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Replicable	   economic	   experiments,	   allowing	   the	   researcher	   to	   isolate	   single	   factors	  (e.g.,	   risk	   preferences)	   of	   decisions	   and	   study	   them	   in	   isolation	   from	   other	   factors	  (e.g.,	  altruism),	  are	  used	  as	  the	  main	  source	  of	  data.	   In	  addition	  to	  this,	  researchers	  have	  tested	  the	  impact	  of	  various	  parameters,	  such	  as	  self-­‐selection	  and	  learning,	  on	  men	  and	  women.	  Their	  main	  findings	  are	  that	  women’s	  social	  preferences	  are	  more	  situationally	   specific	   than	   those	   of	   men,	   that	   women	   are	   neither	   more	   nor	   less	  socially	   oriented,	   but	   their	   social	   preferences	   are	  more	  malleable;	   that	  women	   are	  indeed	   more	   risk-­‐averse	   than	   men,	   and	   finally	   that	   women	   are	   more	   averse	   to	  competition	  than	  men	  are	  (Croson	  &	  Gneezy,	  2009).	  
The	  remainder	  of	  this	  section	  reviews	  evidence	  on	  gender-­‐specific	  social	  preferences	  focusing	  on	  ultimatum	  and	  dictator	  game	  experiments,	  whereas	  gender	  differences	  in	   risk	   behavior	   will	   be	   covered	   in	   section	   three.	   Section	   four	   reviews	   gender	  differences	  in	  preferences	  with	  regard	  to	  competition.1	  
2.1.	  Differences	  in	  Social	  Preferences	  
If	   the	  payoffs	   or	   the	  utilities	   of	   some	  other	   person	   enters	   into	   an	   individual’s	   own	  utility	   function,	   then	   this	   individual	   exhibits	   a	   social	   preference.	   There	   are	   various	  models	   describing	   how	   an	   individual	   may	   be	   other-­‐regarding:	   altruism,	   envy,	  inequality	   aversion	   or	   positive	   and	   negative	   reciprocity	   are	   used	   to	   model	   social	  preferences	  in	  the	  economic	  literature.	  Across	  genders	  the	  extent	  and	  the	  form	  of	  the	  social	  preference	  may	  differ	  (Croson	  &	  Gneezy,	  2009).	  
Croson	  &	  Gneezy	  (2009)	  review	  several	  studies	  to	  gain	  evidence	  how	  strongly	  and	  in	  which	  direction	  social	  preferences	  manifest	  themselves	  in	  men	  and	  women.	  Whereas	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  In	  the	  dictator	  game	  the	  proposer	  has	  to	  divide	  a	  pie	  or	  a	  sum	  of	  money	  between	  himself	  and	  the	  recipient.	  For	  detail	  see	  section	  2.1.3..	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ultimatum	   and	   dictator	   games	   studies	   are	   used	   to	   gain	   evidence	   on	   altruism	   and	  inequality	  aversion;	  trust	  and	  related	  games	  are	  used	  to	  test	  for	  reciprocity.	  Also	  the	  Prisoner’s	  Dilemma	  game	  and	  studies	  making	  use	  of	  social	  dilemmas	  and/or	  public	  goods	  provision	  games	  are	  useful	  to	  study	  social	  preferences.	  
2.1.1.	  Inconsistent	  Results	  A	  large	  number	  of	  attempts	  to	  test	  for	  differences	  in	  the	  behavior	  of	  men	  and	  women	  in	   economic	   situations	   in	   the	   laboratory	   have	   revealed	   mixed,	   even	   contradictory	  results.	  A	  possible	  explanation	  for	  these	  differing	  results	  may	  be	  caused	  by	  failure	  to	  control	  for	  important	  environmental	  factors	  that	  might	  confound	  gender	  differences.	  The	   resulting	  differences	   in	   outcomes	  may	  be	   explained	  by	  diversity	   in	   the	   stakes,	  information,	  social	  distance,	  decision	  options,	  and	  other	  aspects	  of	  the	  experimental	  design	  (Eckel	  &	  Grossman,	  1998).	  
Social	   dilemma	   and	   ultimatum	   experiments	   represent	   strategic	   environments	   in	  which	  subjects	  have	  to	  considerate	  the	  likely	  actions	  of	  their	  partners	  when	  making	  their	  own	  decisions;	  thus	  they	  both	  involve	  strategic	  risk.	  Whereas	  in	  social	  dilemma	  experiments	   players	   may	   choose	   a	   cooperative	   strategy	   carrying	   the	   risk	   of	   a	  particularly	  low	  payoff,	  an	  unequal	  proposal	  carries	  the	  risk	  of	  rejection	  in	  ultimatum	  game	   experiments.	   Still,	   both	   experiments	   should	   deliver	   consistent	   results	  indicating	   that	   women	   behave	   more	   generously	   in	   both,	   if	   men	   and	   women	   only	  differ	   in	   their	  degree	  of	   selfishness.	  However,	   if	   there	   is	   a	   gender	  difference	   in	   the	  degree	  of	  risk-­‐aversion,	  the	  results	  should	  differ:	  if	  women’s	  decisions	  really	  exhibit	  a	   greater	   degree	   of	   risk-­‐aversion,	   then	   their	   contributions	   in	   social	   dilemma	  experiments	  have	   to	  be	   less	   generous,	  whereas	   their	  offers	   in	   the	  ultimatum	  game	  have	  to	  be	  more	  generous.	  Therefore,	  observed	  differences	  between	  the	  behavior	  of	  men	   and	   women	   in	   these	   environments	   may	   illustrate	   either	   a	   basic	   gender	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difference	   in	   the	   selfishness,	   or	   a	   difference	   in	   their	   responses	   to	   risk	   (Eckel	   &	  Grossman,	  1998).	  
2.1.2.	  Ultimatum	  Games	  Ultimatum	  game	   experiments	   are	   designed	   to	   test	   the	   effect	   of	   gender	   pairings,	   in	  order	  to	  find	  out	  whether	  systematic	  differences	  in	  the	  behavior	  of	  men	  and	  women	  can	  be	  observed	  (Eckel	  &	  Grossman,	  2001).	  
In	  ultimatum	  games,	  two	  players	  are	  allocated	  a	  sum	  of	  money,	  which	  can	  be	  viewed	  as	  a	  pie,	  and	  the	  players	  have	  to	  divide	  this	  pie	  among	  them.	  The	  proposer	  offers	  to	  the	  responder	  how	  to	  divide	  the	  pie	  among	  them	  and	  the	  responder	  may	  accepts	  or	  rejects	   this	   offer.	   Only	   if	   the	   offer	   is	   accepted,	   each	   play	   receives	   the	   suggested	  amount;	  otherwise	  –	  if	  the	  offer	  is	  rejected	  –	  both	  players	  receive	  nothing.	  Assuming	  selfish	   players,	   this	   game	   has	   a	   continuum	   of	   Nash	   equilibria.	   However,	   there	   is	   a	  unique	   subgame	  perfect	   equilibrium	   in	  which	   the	  proposer	  offers	   the	   responder	   ε,	  and	  the	  responder	  accepts.	  The	  responder’s	  rejection	  of	  a	  positive	  offer	  represents	  a	  deviation	   from	   this	   equilibrium	   and	   can	   be	   interpreted	   as	   inequality-­‐aversion,	  negative	  reciprocity,	  or	  punishment.	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  proposer’s	  deviations	   from	  this	   equilibrium,	   namely	   making	   positive	   offers,	   can	   be	   interpreted	   as	   inequality	  aversion,	  altruism	  and	  risk-­‐aversion	  (Croson	  &	  Gneezy,	  2009).	  
Eckel	   &	   Grossman	   (2001)	   conduct	   a	   lab	   experiment	   examining	   gender	   effects	   in	  ultimatum	  games.	  They	  find	  that	  women’s	  proposals	  are	  on	  average	  more	  generous	  than	   men’s,	   regardless	   of	   the	   sex	   of	   the	   other	   player.	   In	   addition	   to	   this,	   female	  respondents	  are	  more	  likely	  to	  accept	  an	  offer	  of	  a	  given	  amount.	  The	  results	  indicate	  that	  women	  are	  significantly	  more	  cooperative	  then	  men.	  In	  addition	  to	  this,	  the	  sex	  of	  the	  other	  player	  seems	  to	  have	  a	  strong	  effect	  on	  the	  subject’s	  decision:	  offers	  are	  more	   likely	   to	   be	   accepted	   if	   coming	   from	   a	   woman.	  When	   female	   proposers	   and	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male	   respondents	   face	   each	   other,	   the	   authors	   term	   this	   result	   chivalry.	  Another	  important	  result	  is	  termed	  solidarity	  between	  women,	  meaning	  that	  women	  paired	   with	   women	   almost	   never	   fail	   to	   reach	   an	   agreement;	   cooperative	   players	  cooperate	  more	  with	  other	  cooperative	  players.	  	  
In	  S.	  Solnick’s	  (2001)	  ultimatum	  game	  experiment	  two	  different	  treatments	  are	  used	  to	   explore	   gender	   differences	   in	   bargaining	   behavior	   that	   might	   impact	   wage	  negotiations.	   While	   in	   one	   treatment	   players	   remain	   mutually	   anonymous,	   the	  players’	  gender	  is	  common	  knowledge	  in	  the	  second	  treatment.	  The	  outcomes	  of	  the	  experiment	  suggest	  that	  average	  offers	  do	  not	  differ	  based	  on	  the	  gender	  of	  player	  1,	  the	  proposer;	  however,	  offers	  are	  affected	  by	  the	  gender	  of	  player	  2,	  the	  respondent:	  men	   attract	   higher	   offers,	   particularly	   from	   female	   proposers.	   Furthermore,	  respondents	  of	  both	  genders	  choose	  a	  higher	  minimum	  acceptable	  offer	  when	  facing	  a	  woman	  as	  proposer.	  The	  outcomes	  do	  not	  show	  that	  women	  are	  content	  with	  less.	  Quite	   on	   the	   contrary,	   female	   respondents	   demand	   higher	   minimum	   acceptable	  amounts	  than	  male	  respondents.	  Yet	  players	  seem	  to	  expect	  women	  being	  satisfied	  with	   a	   smaller	   share,	   inducing	  men	   as	  well	   as	  women	   to	   offer	   smaller	   amounts	   to	  female	  respondents.	  When	  men	  and	  women	  are	  paired	  with	  a	  woman,	  they	  both	  set	  their	   minimum	   acceptable	   amount	   higher	   than	   when	   being	   paired	   with	   a	   man,	  seeming	   to	   expect	   women	   to	   give	   them	  more	   and	   keep	   less.	   Solnick’s	   results	   are	  consistent	  with	  the	  evidence	  that	  women	  are	  quoted	  higher	  prices	  for	  cars	  and	  that	  women	   obtain	   smaller	   increases	   in	   salary	   when	   they	   choose	   to	   bargain.	   These	  systematic	   differences	   in	   the	   expectations	   and	   decisions	   of	   men	   and	  women	   exist	  even	   in	   this	   stylized	   negotiating	   environment.	   Thus	   they	   may	   impact	   salary	  negotiations	  and	  other	  real-­‐world	  transactions	  so	  that	  part	  of	   the	  pay	  gap	  between	  men	  and	  women	  may	  be	  due	  to	  bargaining	  differences.	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Table	  1:	  Rejection	  Rates	  in	  Ultimatum	  Games	  (Croson & Gneezy, 2009)	  
Rejection	  Rates	  in	  Ultimatum	  Games	  
	   Eckel	  &	  Grossman	  (2001)	   Solnick	  (2001)	   |Difference|	   	  
Male	  Responders	   	   	   	   	  Male	  to	  Male	   18.8%	   4.5%	   14.3%	   	  Female	  to	  Male	   9.4%	   6,3%	   3.2%	   	  |Difference|	   9.4%	   1.7%	   8.7%	   Average	  	   	   	   	   	  Female	  Responders	   	   	   	   	  Male	  to	  Female	   17.2%	   0.0%	   17.2%	   	  Female	  to	  Female	   3.1%	   23.1%	   20.0%	   	  |Difference|	   14.1%	   23.1%	   18.6%	   Average	  	   	   	   	   	  Female	  -­‐	  Male	   4.7%	   21.4%	   	   	  
Controls	  included?	  	   Yes	   No	   	   	  
	  Table	   1	   shows	   the	   rejection	   rates	   under	   comparable	   conditions	   to	   facilitate	  comparison	  between	   the	   two	  studies.	  The	  rejection	  rates	  of	  male	  responders	  differ	  by	  an	  average	  of	  8.7	  percent,	  whereas	  female	  responders’	  rejection	  rates	  differ	  by	  an	  average	   of	   18.6	   percent.	   This	   indicates	   that	   female	   responding	   behavior	   is	   more	  sensitive	  to	  the	  experimental	  context	  (face-­‐to-­‐face,	  strategy	  vs.	  game	  methods)	  than	  male	  responding	  behavior	  (Croson	  &	  Gneezy,	  2009).	   	  	  	  	  	  A	  comparison	  within	  the	  two	  studies	  fortifies	  women’s	  greater	  context-­‐sensitivity.	  Whereas	  men’s	  rejection	  rates	  are	  not	  very	  sensitive	  to	  the	  gender	  of	  the	  proposer	  of	  the	  offers	  in	  both	  studies	  [a	  9.4	  percent	  difference	  in	  Eckel	  &	  Grossman	  (2001)	  and	  a	  1.8	  percent	  difference	  in	  Solnick	  (2001)],	  women’s	  rejection	  rates	  are	  quite	  sensitive	  to	  their	  counterpart’s	  gender	  [a	  14.1	  percent	  difference	  in	  Eckel	  &	  Grossman	  (2001)	  and	  a	  23.1	  percent	  difference	  in	  Solnick	  (2001)]	  (Croson	  &	  Gneezy,	  2009).	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W.	   Güth,	   C.	   Schmidt	   and	   M.	   Sutter	   (2007)	   conducted	   a	   newspaper	   experiment	   on	  bargaining,	  which	  was	  run	  in	  the	  German	  weekly,	  Die	  Zeit,	  in	  November	  2001.	  5,132	  individuals,	   ranging	   from	   8	   to	   96	   years	   and	   participating	   via	  mail,	   fax	   or	   internet.	  Several	   research	   questions	   were	   controlled	   for.	   First,	   do	   socio-­‐demographic	  variables	  as	  gender,	  age	  or	  education	  influence	  bargaining	  behavior?	  Second,	  has	  the	  chosen	   answer	  medium	   (mail,	   fax	   or	   Internet)	   an	   impact	   on	   bargaining	   behavior?	  And	  third,	  the	  most	  important	  question,	  does	  student	  behavior	  (in	  the	  lab	  and	  in	  the	  newspaper	  experiment)	  differ	   from	  the	  behavior	  of	  non-­‐students	   in	   the	  newspaper	  experiment,	  and,	  if	  so,	  how?	  	  	  	  	  	  As	  an	  experimental	  task,	  the	  authors	  have	  chosen	  a	  three-­‐person	  ultimatum	  game,	  in	  which	  the	  proposer	  (X)	  has	  to	  suggest	  how	  to	  divide	  a	  pie	  of	  DM2	  1,200	  between	  himself,	   the	  responder	  (Y),	  and	  a	  dummy	  player	  (Z)	  who	  has	  no	  decision	  authority.	  Only	  if	  the	  responder	  accepts	  the	  offer,	  all	  three	  players	  receiver	  their	  corresponding	  share;	   otherwise	   all	   players	   receive	   nothing.	   The	   instruction	   published	   in	  Die	   Zeit	  introduce:	  (i)	  the	  pie	  of	  DM	  1,200,	   	  (ii)	  the	  three	  players	  (or	  brothers)	  X,	  Y,	  and	  Z,	  and	   	  (iii)	  the	  rules:	  player	  X	  proposes	  a	  vector	  (x,	  y,	  z)	  which	  has	  to	  be	  x	  +	  y	  +	  z	  =	  1,200.	   	  	  	  	  	  The	  number	  of	  possible	  vectors	  is	  limited	  by	  assuming	  that	  x	  can	  only	  be	  {0,	  200,	  400,	  600,	  800,	  and	  1000}	  and	  y	  and	  z	  can	  only	  be	  {100,	  200,	  300,	  and	  400,	  500,	  600}.	  All	  participants	  have	  to	  decide	  for	  both	  roles	  X	  and	  Y.	  In	  the	  role	  of	  X	  the	  participants	  have	  to	  select	  one	  of	  the	  18	  possible	  proposals	  (x,	  y,	  z)	  and	  in	  the	  role	  of	  Y,	  for	  all	  18	  proposals	   (x,	   y,	   z)	   it	   has	   to	   be	   decided	   whether	   to	   accept	   or	   reject	   them.	  	  From	   a	   total	   of	   5,132	   submissions	   4,869	  were	   classified	   as	   valid.	   Responses	  were	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  2	  DM,	  the	  „Deutsche	  Mark“,	  was	  the	  official	  currency	  of	  Germany	  (1990–2002)	  and	  before	  of	  West	  Germany	  (1948–1990)	  until	  the	  adoption	  of	  the	  Euro	  in	  2002.	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only	  valid	  when	  subjects	  had	  given	  their	  full	  address,	  indicated	  the	  chosen	  proposal	  in	   the	   role	   of	  X,	   and	   had	   accepted	   or	   rejected	   all	   18	   proposals	   in	   the	   role	   of	  Y.	   In	  addition	   to	   this,	   participants	   were	   asked	   on	   a	   voluntary	   basis	   to	   state	   their	   age,	  profession	   and/or	   education.	   To	   avoid	   implicit	   demand	   effects	   it	   was	   not	   asked	  explicitly	   for	  gender;	  but	  still	   in	  96.4	  percent	  of	  valid	  submissions,	  gender	  could	  be	  determined	  from	  the	  first	  name	  of	  participants	  (Güth,	  Schmidt,	  &	  Sutter,	  2007).	  
Table	  2:	  Age,	  Profession,	  Gender,	  and	  Medium	  of	  Valid	  Submissions	  (Güth, Schmidt, & Sutter, 2007)	  
Age,	  Profession,	  Gender,	  and	  Medium	  (Valid	  Submissions	  Only)	  
Medium	   Internet	  	  (n	  =	  2,954)	   Mail	  (n	  =	  1,625)	   Fax	  (n	  =	  290)	   All	  (n	  =	  4,869)	  
Age	  Share	  of	  subjects	   	   	   	   	  
Under	  26	   21.7%	   11.0%	   6.3%	   17.2%	  26	  to	  45	   52.5%	   37.6%	   42.2%	   46.9%	  46	  to	  65	   23.7%	   36.8%	   39.5%	   29.0%	  over	  65	   2.1%	   14.6%	   12.1%	   6.9%	  Average	  age	  (Std.	  dev.)	   36.6%	  (13.2%)	  (n	  =	  2,329)	  	  
46.6%	  (16.6%)	  (n	  =	  1,292)	   48.2%	  (14.6%)	  (n	  =	  223)	   40.6%	  (15.3%)	  (n	  =	  3,844)	  	   	   	   	   	  Gender	  Share	  of	  male	  participants	   71.1%	  (n	  =	  2,912)	   63.2%	  	  (n	  =	  1,519)	   68.8%	  	  (n	  =	  263)	   68.4%	  	  (n	  =	  4,694)	  
	   	   	   	   	  Profession	   	   	   	   	  Share	  of	  Academic	   46.0%	   45.6%	   50.0%	   46.0%	  Non-­‐academic	   20.8%	   22.8%	   28.0%	   24.2%	  Retired	   3.2%	   14.8%	   14.0%	   7.6%	  Students	   23.8%	   11.2%	   5.4%	   18.5%	  Pupils	   6.2%	  (n	  =	  2,064)	   5.6%	  (n	  =	  1,114)	   2.7%	  (n	  =	  186)	   5.8%	  (n	  =	  3,364)	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The	  results	  show	  that	  56.8%	  of	  participants	  choose	  the	  equal	  split	  of	  (400,	  400,	  400)	  thus	  representing	  the	  most	  frequent	  choice.	  The	  second	  most	  frequent	  choice	  made	  by	   15.9%	   of	   participants	   is	   (600,	   500,	   100),	   which	   the	   authors	   title	   the	   power	  
coalition	  since	  the	  players	  with	  strategic	  power	  (X	  and	  Y)	  share	  the	  pie	  by	  exploiting	  the	  dummy	  player	  (Z).	  The	  third	  most	  frequent	  choice	  (1000,	  100,	  100)	  is	  the	  game	  
theoretic	  benchmark,	  which	   is	  chosen	  by	  8.3%	  of	  participants.	  So	   in	   total,	   the	   three	  most	   frequent	   proposals	   account	   for	   81	  percent	   of	   all	   proposals	   (Güth,	   Schmidt,	  &	  Sutter,	  2007).	  
This	   large-­‐scale	   newspaper	   experiment	   on	   bargaining	   can	   be	   summarized	   by	   two	  major	  findings:	  first,	  age,	  gender,	  education,	  and	  the	  medium	  of	  participation	  have	  a	  significant	   influence	   on	   bargaining	   behavior.	   Second,	   a	   rather	   high	   degree	   of	  parallelism	   between	   student	   data	   and	   non-­‐student	   data	   can	   be	   shown:	   aggregate	  behavior	   of	   students	   in	   the	   newspaper	   experiment	   is	   similar	   to	   the	   behavior	   of	  students	  in	  laboratory	  settings.	  When	  controlling	  for	  the	  age	  group	  of	  19	  to	  30	  years,	  students	   in	   the	   newspaper	   experiment	   do	   not	   act	   significantly	   differently	   from	  newspaper	  participants	  with	  another	  profession.	  Thus,	  the	  authors’	   finding	  support	  the	   claim	   that	   results	   from	   laboratory	   experiments	   with	   university	   students	   are	  representative	  enough.	   	  	  	  	  	  The	   authors	   find	   female	  participants	   to	   be	   significantly	  more	   likely	   to	  propose	   a	  three-­‐way	   equal	   split	   than	   men	   and	   this	   may	   be	   due	   to	   altruism	   or	   inequality	  aversion.	   Moreover,	   the	   medium	   is	   important,	   even	   when	   controlling	   for	   socio-­‐demographic	  data.	  Internet	  users	  propose	  an	  equal	  split	  less	  often	  and	  accept	  more	  proposals,	  which	  leads	  to	  the	  assumption	  that	  they	  act	  in	  a	  more	  opportunistic	  way	  than	  mail	  or	  fax	  participants	  do	  (Güth,	  Schmidt,	  &	  Sutter,	  2007).	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Women	   exhibit	   a	   greater	   generosity,	   which	   is	   also	   consistent	   with	   risk-­‐aversion:	  More	  generous	  offers	  are	  less	  likely	  to	  be	  rejected.	  However,	  generosity	  contradicts	  payoff-­‐maximizing	   behavior.	   Women	   are	   sacrificing	   greater	   earnings	   by	   offering	  more	  equal	  splits	  than	  male	  participants	  relative	  to	  their	  optimal	  offers.	  Still	  women	  are	   both	   less	   likely	   to	   reject	   and	   to	   be	   rejected,	   with	   the	   result	   that	   their	   overall	  earnings	  are	  still	  on	  average	  higher	  than	  men’s	  (Eckel	  &	  Grossman,	  2001).	  
Due	  to	  the	  structure	  of	  ultimatum	  games,	  the	  observed	  behavioral	  differences	  could	  also	   be	   induced	   by	   risk-­‐aversion.	   Dictator	   games	   enable	   us	   to	   tease	   apart	   these	  competing	  motivations	  (Croson	  &	  Gneezy,	  2009).	  
2.1.3.	  Dictator	  Games	  In	   the	  dictator	   game	   the	  proposer	  has	   to	  divide	   a	   pie	   or	   a	   sum	  of	  money	  between	  himself	  and	  the	  recipient.	  Neither	  strategic	  nor	  risk-­‐related	  concerns	  are	  relevant	  as	  the	   recipient	   does	   not	   take	   any	   decision	   as	   the	   offer	   is	   always	   accepted.	  However,	  inequality	   aversion	   and	   altruism	  may	   still	   influence	   the	  proposer’s	   behavior.	   Thus,	  the	  dictator	  game	  is	  rather	  an	  allocation	  exercise	  (Croson	  &	  Gneezy,	  2009).	   	  	  	  	  	  A	  dictator	  game	  experiment	  can	  be	  used	  to	  test	  whether	  men	  and	  women	  show	  the	  same	  inclination	  toward	  self-­‐interested	  behavior.	  The	  dictator	  game	  provides	  a	  very	  sharp	   test	  as	   the	  dictator	  unilaterally	  decides	  how	  to	  allocate	   the	  pie	  between	  self-­‐interest	  and	  beneficence.	  The	  amount	  of	  money	  allocated	  to	  the	  recipient	  can	  thus	  be	  interpreted	  as	  a	  measure	  of	  the	  dictator’s	  beneficence	  (Bolton	  &	  Katok,	  1995).	  
In	  order	  to	  examine	  the	  selfishness	  of	  men	  and	  women,	  Eckel	  &	  Grossman	  (1998)	  use	  a	   simple	   double-­‐anonymous	   dictator	   setting,	  which	   removes	   risk,	   possible	   gender-­‐related	   subject	   interactions,	   and	   the	   experimenter	   effect.	   Thus	   only	   individuals’	  selfishness	   is	   left	   as	   an	   explanation	   for	   donating	   money.	   In	   such	   conditions	   of	  anonymity	   the	   dictator	   has	   to	   split	   $10	   with	   an	   unknown	   recipient.	   Their	   results	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indicate	  that	  women	  are	  less	  selfish	  than	  men:	  women	  donate	  almost	  twice	  as	  much	  as	  men	  to	  their	  paired	  recipient.	  More	  precisely,	  60	  percent	  of	  men	  donate	  nothing,	  whereas	  only	  47	  percent	  of	  women	  do	  so.	  On	  average,	  women	  donate	  $1.60	  to	  their	  anonymous	  partner,	  men	  only	  give	  $0.82,	  which	   is	  statistically	  significant	  with	  a	  p-­‐value	  of	  less	  than	  0.01.	  
In	   Bolton	   &	   Katok	   (1995)	   another	   anonymous	   dictator	   game,	   where	   the	   dictator	  splits	   a	   pie	   of	   $10	   and	   each	   offer	   has	   to	   be	   under	   $5,	   is	   applied.	   They	   found	   that	  women	   donate	   slightly	   more	   than	  men;	   average	   donation	   for	   men	   was	   $1.13	   and	  $1.23	  for	  women,	  however,	  this	  difference	  was	  not	  statistically	  significant.	  
Croson	  &	  Gneezy	  (2009)	  conduct	  a	  comparison	  between	  these	  two	  studies	  and	  show	  that	   as	   the	   social	   conditions3	  of	   the	   experiment	   change,	  male	   donations	   change	   by	  $0.31	  while	  female	  donations	  change	  by	  $0.37.	  So	  they	  conclude	  that	  the	  behavior	  of	  women	  is	  at	  least	  somewhat	  more	  sensitive	  to	  the	  conditions	  of	  the	  experiment	  than	  that	  of	  men.	  
Andreoni	  &	  Vesterlund	   (2001)	  use	  a	  modified	  dictator	   game	  with	  varying	   incomes	  and	  prices	  to	  study	  gender	  differences	  in	  altruism.	  The	  authors	  find	  that	  it	  depends	  on	  the	  price	  of	  giving	  which	  sex	  can	  be	  found	  to	  be	  more	  altruistic.	  When	  altruism	  is	  cheap,	  men	  appear	  more	  altruistic	  than	  women,	  however,	  when	  altruism	  is	  expensive,	  women	   are	   more	   generous.	   Moreover,	   women	   seem	   to	   be	   more	   concerned	   with	  equalizing	  payoffs	  between	  the	  parties,	  meanwhile	  men	  are	  more	  likely	  to	  be	  either	  perfectly	  selfish	  or	  perfectly	  selfless	  and	  concerned	  with	  maximizing	  efficiency.	  Thus	  this	   leads	   to	   crossing	   demand	   curves	   for	   altruism	   with	   those	   of	   men	   being	   more	  price-­‐elastic.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  3	  Social	  conditions	  may	  be	  manifold,	  but	  here	  we	  refer	  to	  the	  experimental	  design	  and	  implementation	  such	  as	  information	  about	  the	  other	  party	  and	  the	  other	  party’s	  action,	  etc.	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Dickinson	   &	   Tiefenthaler	   (2002)	   execute	   similar	   laboratory	   dictator	   experiments	  where	   disinterested	   third-­‐party	   decision	   makers	   allocate	   resources	   between	   two	  beneficiaries.	   Third	   party	   decision	   makers	   are	   used	   to	   remove	   the	   confounding	  effects	  of	  self-­‐interest	  when	  fairness	  is	  examined	  in	  experiments	  with	  self-­‐interested	  decision	   makers.	   The	   only	   motivation	   for	   the	   decision	   maker’s	   behavior	   is	   the	  knowledge	  that	  the	  payoffs	  of	  each	  beneficiary	  depend	  upon	  his	  decision;	  hence,	  the	  decision	  maker’s	   concept	  of	   fairness	   should	   therefore	  determine	   the	  payoffs	  of	   the	  beneficiaries.	   The	   researchers	   focus	   exclusively	   on	   individual	   preferences	   over	  payoffs	   to	   other	   individuals,	   unlike	   the	   typical	   bargaining	   experiments	   games	   in	  which	  two	  participants	  have	  to	  bargain	  over	  how	  to	  divide	  a	  sum	  of	  money	  among	  them.	  	   	  	  	  	  	  Their	   results	   are	   largely	   consistent	   with	   results	   from	   survey	   and	   experimental	  research	  revealing	  significant	  gender	  differences	  in	  fairness	  perceptions.	  They	  found	  men	  to	  be	  significantly	   less	   likely	   than	  women	  to	  choose	  equal	  outcomes	  but	  more	  likely	  to	  choose	  the	  most	  efficient	  outcome.	  The	  authors	  also	  underline	  the	  fact	  that	  fairness	   concepts	  may	  not	   only	   differ	   across	   the	   sexes,	   but	   also	   across	   individuals.	  Culture,	   background,	   and	   other	   personal	   characteristics	  may	   influence	  morals	   and	  values,	   and	   thus	   ones	   notion	   of	   fairness.	   If	   men	   and	   women	   are	   found	   to	   have	  systematically	   different	   ideas	   about	   what	   is	   fair,	   this	   has	   important	   policy	  implications.	  Given	  different	  notions	  of	   fairness,	  men	  and	  women	  are	   likely	  to	  view	  the	   justice	  of	  court	  decisions,	   transfer	  policies,	  and	  even	  household	  distributions	  of	  resources	   differently.	   These	   results	  may	   impact	   business	   practices,	   court	   decision,	  intra-­‐household	  resource	  allocation,	  and	  government	  transfer	  policy.	  Men	  in	  position	  of	  decision	  authority	  of	  how	  to	  allocate	  resources,	  such	  as	  judges,	  legislators,	  fathers,	  and	  managers,	  may	  be	  more	  inclined	  to	  divide	  scarce	  resources	  in	  order	  to	  maximize	  efficiency.	  However,	  when	  women	  hold	   these	  positions,	   they	  may	  be	  more	   likely	   to	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allocate	  resources	  to	  equalize	  outcomes	  across	  the	  affected	  individuals	  (Dickinson	  &	  Tiefenthaler,	  2002).	  
Selten	  &	  Ockenfels	  (1998)	  use	  a	  variant	  of	  the	  dictator	  game,	  called	  solidarity	  game.	  In	   contrast	   to	   the	   dictator	   game,	   all	   participants	   have	   to	   decide,	   how	   much	   they	  would	  be	  willing	  to	  give	  to	  a	  single	  loser,	  and	  to	  each	  of	  two	  losers	  in	  their	  group	  in	  the	   case	   of	   winning.	   Thus,	   all	   of	   the	   players	   have	   to	   decide	   on	   conditional	   gifts	   –	  conditioned	   on	  winning	   and	   on	   the	   presence	   of	   losers	   –	   and	   all	   of	   them	   are	   both	  potential	  winners	  (donors)	  and	  potential	  losers	  (recipients).	  Ex	  ante	  everybody	  is	  in	  the	  same	  situation,	  but	  the	  ex	  post	  distribution	  of	  payoffs	  may	  be	  very	  uneven	  unless	  the	  resulting	  inequality	  is	  attenuated	  by	  positive	  conditional	  gifts.	  	   	  	  	  	  	  This	   experimental	   setup	   creates	   a	   situation	   in	   which	   participants	   can	   show	  solidarity	  in	  the	  sense	  that	  they	  are	  willing	  to	  help	  others,	  who	  by	  chance	  come	  to	  a	  much	   worse	   position	   than	   they	   themselves.	   Solidarity	   means	   willingness	   to	   help	  people	   in	   need	   who	   are	   similar	   to	   oneself	   but	   have	   become	   victims	   of	   outside	  influences	   such	   as	   unforeseen	   illness,	   natural	   catastrophes,	   etc..	   Reciprocity,	   a	  motivation	  urging	  you	  to	  give	  something	  in	  exchange	  for	  something	  you	  have	  already	  received,	  even	  if	  you	  are	  not	  obliged	  to	  give	  anything	  back,	  is	  similar	  to	  solidarity	  up	  to	  a	  certain	  extent.	  	   	  	  	  	  	  Subjects	  participate	  in	  a	  three-­‐person-­‐game	  in	  which	  each	  of	  them	  can	  either	  win	  DM	  10.00	  with	  a	  probability	  of	  2/3	  or	  zero	  with	  the	  converse	  probability	  of	  1/3.	  The	  results	   of	   this	   solidarity	   game	   show	   that	   women	   are	   once	   again	   more	   inequality-­‐averse	  than	  men.	  Egoistical	  behavior	  of	  giving	  nothing	  is	  much	  more	  common	  among	  males	   than	   among	   females;	   conditional	   gift	   behavior	   of	  men	   is	   less	   generous	   than	  that	  of	  women	  and,	  in	  this	  sense,	  women	  are	  found	  to	  show	  more	  solidarity	  than	  men	  (Selten	  &	  Ockenfels,	  1998).	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In	   Dufwenberg	   &	   Muren	   (2006a)	   gender	   effects	   in	   a	   team	   dictator	   game	   are	  examined.	   As	   experimental	   research	   so	   far	   has	   shown	   that	  men	   and	  women	   often	  take	   different	   decisions,	   and	   that	   group	   decisions	   often	   differ	   from	   those	  made	   by	  individuals.	  The	  authors	  have	  reason	  to	  believe	  that	  the	  gender	  composition	  matters	  for	  group	  decisions.	  In	  their	  experiment,	  groups	  of	  three	  are	  asked	  to	  sit	  together	  and	  to	   propose	   a	   split	   of	   a	   certain	   amount	   of	  money	  between	   themselves	   and	   a	   fourth	  recipient.	   The	   money	   allocated	   to	   the	   group	   then	   is	   divided	   equally	   between	   its	  members.	  The	   authors	   find	   evidence	  of	   a	   gender	   effect	   in	   group	  decisions:	   female-­‐majority	   groups	   donate	  more	   to	   the	   fourth	   party	   and	   the	   equalitarian	   donation	   is	  particularly	  frequent	  with	  a	  female	  majority.	  However,	  groups	  with	  two	  women	  and	  one	   man	   are	   found	   to	   be	   the	   most	   generous.	   The	   researches	   explain	   this	   quite	  puzzling	  result	  by	  the	  presence	  of	  a	  man,	  which	  may	  trigger	  an	  exaggerate	  generosity	  among	  the	  women	  in	  the	  group	  (Dufwenberg	  &	  Muren,	  2006a).	  
Many	  other	  studies	  do	  not	  only	  observe	  the	  main	  gender	  effects	  but	  also	  examine	  the	  interaction	  of	  the	  genders	  of	  the	  proposer	  and	  recipient	  in	  two-­‐player	  dictator	  games.	  Dufwenberg	   &	   Muren	   (2006b)	   examine	   experimentally	   how	   an	   individual’s	  generosity	  depends	  on	  the	  players’	  sexes	  and	  the	  degree	  of	  anonymity	  between	  the	  donor	   and	   the	   recipient.	   In	   their	   experiment,	   participants	   are	   told	   that	   their	  adversary	  is	  either	  a	  randomly	  selected	  male	  student	  or	  a	  randomly	  selected	  female	  student	  of	  the	  course.	  They	  use	  treatments	  with	  private	  payment	  of	  the	  dictators	  and	  with	  on	  stage	  payment,	  where	  dictators	  receive	  their	  payments	  in	  a	  lecture	  hall	  with	  a	  few	  hundred	  co-­‐students	  present.	  Recipients	  are	  always	  paid	  privately.	  Contrasting	  earlier	   studies	   in	   which	   selfishness	   increased	  with	   the	   degree	   of	   anonymity,	   their	  results	  go	  in	  the	  opposite	  direction:	  less	  is	  donated	  when	  the	  dictator	  is	  paid	  on	  stage	  rather	  than	  in	  private.	  Moreover,	  men	  receive	  less	  than	  women,	  and	  fewer	  men	  than	  women	  give	  positive	  donations	  (Dufwenberg	  &	  Muren,	  2006b).	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Ben-­‐Ner,	   Kong,	   &	   Putterman	   (2004)	   conduct	   dictator	   game	   experiments	   in	   which	  women	   and	  men	   have	   to	   split	   $10	  with	   either	   a	   completely	   unknown	   person	   or	   a	  person	  of	  known	  gender.	  They	  find	  no	  gender	  difference	  in	  giving	  when	  the	  gender	  of	  the	  other	  player	   is	  not	  known	  (females	  give	  $3.29	  while	  males	  give	  $3.41)	  or	  male	  (females	  give	  $3.81	  and	  males	  give	  $3.50).	  However,	  gender	  information	  significantly	  affects	  donations	  only	   in	  the	  case	  of	  women:	  women	  give	  significantly	   less	  to	  other	  women	   ($2.185)	   than	   to	   men	   ($3.81)	   or	   to	   a	   person	   of	   unknown	   gender	   ($3.29)	  (Ben-­‐Ner,	  Kong,	  &	  Putterman,	  2004).	  
In	  a	  nutshell,	  these	  studies	  find	  that	  men	  are	  more	  likely	  to	  choose	  efficient	  allocation	  whereas	   women	   tend	   to	   be	   more	   inequality	   averse	   than	  men.	   In	   addition	   to	   this,	  women’s	  decisions	  seem	  to	  be	  more	  context-­‐specific	  than	  those	  of	  men.	  
2.1.4.	  Trust	  and	  Reciprocity	  In	   laboratory	  experiments,	   trust	   can	  be	  viewed	  as	  sending	  resources	   to	   the	  second	  player	  and	  reciprocity	  or	  trustworthiness	  as	  the	  returning	  of	  resources	  to	  player	  one.	  Croson	   &	   Gneezy	   (2009)	   offer	   a	   broad	   literature	   review	   about	   studies	   examining	  trust	  and	  reciprocity.	  They	  come	  to	  the	  conclusion	  that	  women	  trust	  less	  than	  or	  the	  same	  as	  men;	  and	  that	  women’s	  trust	  levels	  are	  more	  context-­‐sensitive	  than	  those	  of	  men.	   Regarding	   reciprocal	   behavior,	   there	   are	   inconsistent	   results:	   some	   find	   no	  gender	  differences	  in	  reciprocity;	  others	  find	  women	  more	  reciprocal	  than	  men	  and	  in	  one	   study	  men	  are	   found	   to	  be	  more	   reciprocal	   than	  women	   (Croson	  &	  Gneezy,	  2009).	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2.1.5.	  The	  Prisoners’	  Dilemma,	  Social	  Dilemmas,	  and	  Public	  Goods	  Provision	  Croson	  &	  Gneezy	  (2009)	  review	  a	  large	  number	  of	  prisoners’	  dilemma	  settings	  –	  and	  again	  mixed	  results	  are	  found:	  one	  early	  study4	  shows	  that	  men	  cooperate	  more	  than	  women,	  some	  other	  studies	  reveal	  women	  as	  more	  cooperative	  than	  men,	  and	  others	  do	  not	  find	  any	  significant	  gender	  differences	  at	  all.	  	   	  	  	  	  	  In	  social	  dilemma	  games	  in	  the	  field	  of	  public	  goods	  provision	  gender	  differences	  in	  the	  voluntary	  contribution	  mechanism	  are	   investigated.	   Individuals	  have	  resources,	  which	  they	  can	  either	  allocate	   towards	  their	  private	  consumption	  or	   to	   the	  group’s	  public	   consumption.	   When	   privately	   consumed,	   resources	   are	   worth	   more	   to	   the	  individual,	  but	  they	  generate	  more	  social	  value	  when	  used	  to	  provide	  public	  goods.	  Equilibrium	   contributions	   towards	   the	   public	   good	   are	   zero	   in	   these	   settings,	   thus	  any	  positive	  deviations	  from	  this	  benchmark	  are	  viewed	  as	  altruistic.	  Again,	  Croson	  &	  Gneezy	   (2009)	   describe	   inconsistent	   results	   in	   this	   field	   of	   studies.	   Still,	   a	  comparison	   between	   studies	   shows	   that	   male	   contributions	   are	   more	   stable	   than	  those	  of	  females.	  	  
Croson	  &	  Gneezy	  (2009)	  finally	  conclude	  that	  women’s	  increased	  context-­‐sensitivity	  of	  the	  situation	  is	  the	  cause	  of	  inconsistent	  gender	  differences	  in	  social	  preferences.	  Players	   of	   both	   genders	   are	   likely	   to	   maximize	   their	   underlying	   utility	   function,	  however,	   these	   functions	   differ	   across	   the	   sexes:	  male	   utility	   functions	   seem	   to	   be	  less	  sensitive	  to	  the	  conditions	  of	  the	  experiment,	  information	  about	  the	  other	  party	  and	  the	  other	  party’s	  action	  than	  those	  of	  women.	  Therefore,	  inconsistent	  results	  are	  observed;	   sometimes	   men	   appear	   more	   altruistic	   than	   women	   and	   other	   times,	  women’s	  behavior	  is	  more	  other-­‐regarding,	  but	  primarily,	  women’s	  behavior	  is	  more	  context-­‐dependent	  than	  that	  of	  men.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  4	  For	  detail	  see	  A.	  Rapoport & A. Chammah, 1965.	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3.	  Gender	  Differences	  in	  Risk	  Preferences	  
In	   many	   situations,	   decisions	   involve	   risk	   or	   uncertainty.	   Risk	   is	   commonly	  understood	  as	  a	  complex	  mixture	  of	  facts,	  values,	  and	  fears.	  Risk	  assessment	  is	  often	  tainted	  by	  misinformation	  and	  unreliable	  heuristics	  (Cross,	  1998).	  
Women	   are	   found	   to	   be	   more	   risk-­‐averse	   in	   most	   studies,	   however,	   the	   question	  whether	  men	   and	  women	   systematically	   differ	   in	   their	   responses	   to	   risk	   contains	  economic	   importance.	   A	   large	   number	   of	   studies	   in	   sociology	   and	   psychology	  support	   the	   hypothesis	   that	  men	   and	  women	   respond	   to	   risk	   differently.	   The	   risk	  associated	  with	   the	   use	   of	   alcohol	   and	  drugs;	   the	   catastrophic	   potential	   of	   nuclear	  war,	   technology,	   radioactive	   waste,	   industrial	   hazards,	   and	   environmental	  degradation;	   and	   the	   risk	   associated	  with	   various	   recreational	   and	   social	   activities	  are	  perceived	  differently	  across	  the	  sexes.	  There	  is	  also	  evidence	  that	  women	  are	  less	  likely	   to	   adopt	   risky	   behavior	   such	   as	   engaging	   in	   criminal	   activities	   or	   the	   use	   of	  illicit	  drugs	  (Eckel & Grossman, 2008).	  
3.1.	  Abstract	  Gamble	  Experiments:	  Objective	  Probability	  Lotteries	  
In	  objective	  probability	  lotteries	  with	  known	  probabilities	  and	  dollar	  outcomes,	  risk-­‐taking	   behavior	   can	   be	   observed.	   After	   a	   comparison	   between	   ten	   papers	  investigating	  gender	  differences	  in	  risk	  preferences	  in	  real	  and	  hypothetical	  gambles,	  Croson	  &	  Gneezy	   (2009)	   come	   to	   the	   robust	   finding	   that	  men	  are	  more	   risk-­‐prone	  than	  women.	  	  	  
In	   a	   previous	   survey,	   Eckel	   &	   Grossman	   (2008)	   review	   the	   results	   from	   field	   and	  laboratory	   experiments	   for	   evidence	   of	   gender	   differences	   in	   risk-­‐taking	   behavior	  and	   they	   also	   conclude	   that	   women	   are	   more	   risk-­‐averse	   than	   men	   in	   field	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experiment	   in	   the	  vast	  majority	  of	   settings.	  Though,	   in	   laboratory	  experiments,	   the	  findings	  are	  less	  conclusive	  (Eckel	  &	  Grossman,	  2008).	  
In	   a	   notable	   paper	   Finucane	   et	   al.	   (2000)	   find	   that	  men	   and	  white	   people	   tend	   to	  judge	  risk	  lower	  than	  people	  of	  color.	  The	  authors	  examine	  how	  gender	  and	  race	  are	  related	   to	   a	   range	   of	   sociopolitical	   factors	   which	   are	   thought	   to	   influence	   risk	  perceptions	   using	   data	   collected	   as	   part	   of	   a	   national	   telephone	   survey	   which	  contained	   questions	   about	   worldviews,	   trust,	   and	   various	   demographic	   variables.	  Traditionally,	   differences	   in	   rationality	   and	   education	   served	   as	   a	   possible	  explanation	   for	   gender	   differences	   in	   risk	   perceptions.	   However,	   research	   indicates	  that	  discrepancies	   in	  risk	  perceptions	  of	  men	  and	  women	  may	  not	  only	  result	   from	  differences	  in	  rationality	  or	  education.	  	   	  	  	  	  	  Their	  survey	  finds	  men	  to	  rate	  most	  hazards	  as	  lower	  in	  risk	  than	  women;	  and	  that	  whites	  are	  likely	  to	  rate	  risks	  lower	  than	  nonwhites;	  whereas	  nonwhite	  females	  often	  mention	  the	  highest	  risk	  ratings.	  Many	  females	  and	  nonwhite	  males	  are	  likely	  to	  be	  in	  positions	   of	   less	   power	   and	   less	   control,	   and	   thus	   benefit	   less	   from	   many	  technologies	  and	  institutions,	  so	  that	  they	  are	  more	  vulnerable	  to	  discrimination,	  and	  therefore	  see	  the	  world	  as	  more	  dangerous	  and	  perceive	  greater	  risks.	  	  	  	  	  	  From	   their	   results,	   the	   authors	   come	   to	   the	   hypothesis	   that	   white	   males	   may	  perceive	  less	  risk	  than	  others	  as	  they	  are	  more	  engaged	  in	  creative,	  managerial	  and	  controlling	   processes	   and	   thus	   benefit	   more	   from	   technology.	   In	   contrast,	   women	  and	  nonwhite	  males	  may	  perceive	   greater	   risk	   as	   they	   are	  more	   likely	   to	   be	  more	  vulnerable,	  have	  less	  control	  over	  their	  social	  environment,	  and	  benefit	  less.	  	   	  	  	  	  	  The	   results	   do	   not	   support	   the	   view	   that	   differences	   can	   solely	   be	   explained	   by	  	  biological	   factors	   as	   this	  would	   require	  men	   and	  women	   to	   show	  discrepancies	   in	  their	   risk	   perceptions	   regardless	   of	   race,	   which	   is	   not	   the	   case	   in	   this	   study.	  	  In	   addition	   to	   this,	   risk	   perception	   varies	   considerably	   across	   African,	   American,	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Asian,	   and	   Hispanic	   males	   and	   females.	   This	   heterogeneity	   denotes	   that	   risk	  perceptions	   are	   strongly	  dependent	   on	   the	   characteristics	   of	   the	   individuals	   facing	  the	  risk	  (Finucane,	  Slovic,	  Mertz,	  Flynn,	  &	  Satterfield,	  2000).	  
Schubert	  et	  al.	  (1999)	  run	  an	  experiment	  designed	  to	  examine	  gender-­‐specific	  risk-­‐propensity	  in	  decisions	  relevant	  for	  managers	  and	  investors.	  The	  authors	  implement	  contextual	  decisions	  to	  be	  able	  to	  study	  gender-­‐specific	  risk	  propensities	  in	  contexts,	  which	  may	  be	  relevant	  to	  financial	  and	  labor	  markets.	  Their	  experiment	  includes	  two	  treatments:	  in	  the	  first	  treatment,	  participants	  have	  to	  make	  risky	  choices	  in	  the	  form	  of	  investment	  and	  insurance	  decisions;	  in	  the	  control	  treatment	  participants	  have	  to	  take	   the	   same	   risky	   choice,	   however,	   they	   are	   presented	   as	   abstract	   gambling	  decisions.	   The	   gambling	   treatment	   contains	   both	   a	   gain-­‐gambling	   and	   a	   loss-­‐gambling	   frame,	   in	  order	  to	  measure	  the	  risk-­‐attitudes	   in	   the	  gain	  and	   loss	  domain	  respectively.	   The	   choice	   behavior	   in	   first	   treatment	   is	   used	   to	   gain	   insight	   in	   risk	  behavior	   in	  contextual	   financial	  decisions,	  whereas	  the	  second	  treatment	   is	  used	  to	  validate	  the	  risk	  behavior	  in	  the	  light	  of	  gambling-­‐evidence.	  	   	  	  	  	  	  Prior	  to	  the	  experiment,	  participants	  of	  both	  treatments	  were	  informed	  that	  their	  experimental	   earnings	   would	   be	   determined	   by	   one	   of	   their	   choices.	   In	   order	   to	  exclude	  possible	  wealth	  effects	  due	  to	   income	  differences	  outside	  the	   laboratory	  as	  an	   explanation	   of	   gender-­‐specific	   choice	   behavior,	   all	   subjects	   have	   to	   complete	   a	  post-­‐experimental	  questionnaire	  including	  information	  on	  each	  subject’s	  disposable	  income.	  	  	  	  	  Schubert	   et	   al.	   (1999)	   find	   that	   comparative	   risk-­‐propensity	   of	  male	   and	   female	  participants	   in	   financial	   choices	   are	   strongly	   dependent	   on	   the	   decision	   frame.	   In	  contextual	   situations,	   female	   participants	   do	   not	   generally	   take	   less	   risky	   decision	  than	   male	   subjects,	   so	   that	   no	   gender	   difference	   is	   observed.	   In	   the	   abstract	  treatment,	  however,	  women	  display	  systematically	  lower	  certainty	  equivalents	  in	  the	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gain-­‐gambling	   frame,	   while	   females	   seem	   to	   be	   more	   risk-­‐seeking	   in	   the	   loss-­‐gambling	   frame	   than	  males.	   The	   estimated	   coefficient	   on	   income	   is	   insignificant	   in	  the	   context	   treatment,	   while	   wealth	   effects	   appear	   to	   bear	   a	   meaning	   in	   abstract	  gambling	  decisions,	  with	  higher	  income	  increasing	  risk	  tolerance.	  	   	  	  	  	  	  As	   financial	   decisions	   in	   real	   world	   settings	   are	   always	   contextual,	   the	   results	  suggest	   that	   the	   gender	   stereotype	   of	   women	   being	   less	   risk-­‐prone	   and	   more	  conservative	   than	   men,	   may	   not	   reflect	   true	   male	   and	   female	   attitudes	   towards	  financial	   risk.	   The	   authors	   suggest	   that	   gender-­‐specific	   risk	   behavior	   found	   in	  previous	   studies	  may	   result	   from	   differences	   in	  male	   and	   female	   opportunity	   sets	  rather	   than	   stereotypic	   risk-­‐attitudes.	   Thus,	   the	   authors	   suppose	   that	   abstract	  gambling	  experiments	  may	  not	  be	  suitable	   for	   the	  analysis	  of	  gender	  differences	   in	  risk-­‐attitudes	   toward	   financial	   decisions	   (Schubert,	   Brown,	   Gysler,	   &	   Brachinger,	  1999).	  
With	  the	  goal	   to	   fill	  a	  substantial	  gap	   in	   literature	   linking	  risk-­‐attitudes	  to	  personal	  socio-­‐economic	  and	  demographic	  characteristics	  such	  as	   income,	   type	  of	  work,	  and	  gender,	   J.	   Hartog,	   A.	   Ferrer-­‐i-­‐Carbonell	   and	   N.	   Jonker	   (2002)	   conduct	   a	   survey	   in	  which	   participants	   have	   to	   state	   their	   reservation	   price	   for	   a	   lottery	   ticket	   while	  knowing	  the	  probability	  of	  winning	  a	  prize	  of	  fixed	  magnitude.	  Form	  the	  answers	  the	  researchers	  deduce	  each	  participant’s	  individual	  measure	  of	  risk-­‐aversion	  as	  defined	  by	  Arrow	  and	  Pratt5	  by	  using	  expected	  utility	  theory	  and	  then	  they	  relate	  individual	  risk-­‐aversion	   to	   personal	   characteristics.	   The	   researchers	   use	   three	   completely	  different	   and	   independent	   sources	   to	   derive	   their	   results:	   the	   Brabant	   Survey,	   the	  Accountants	  Survey,	  and	  the	  GPD	  Newspaper	  Survey.	   	  	  	  	  	  The	  authors	  face	  a	  special	  problem	  concerning	  non-­‐response	  and	  response	  with	  a	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  5	  A	  standard,	  twice	  differentiable,	  concave	  utility	  function	  U(W)	  in	  wealth	  W	  is	  assumed.	  The	  value	  of	  the	  Arrow-­‐Pratt-­‐measure	  of	  absolute	  risk-­‐aversion	  is	  ρ=-­‐U’’(W)/U’(W).	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reservation	  price	  of	  zero.	  Some	  participants	  affiliate	  to	  a	  certain	  religion	  or	  ideology	  and	  thus	  consider	  gambling	  as	  morally	  objectionable,	  so	  that	  they	  will	  not	  participate	  in	   this	   lottery.	   However,	   these	   participants	   cannot	   avoid	   choices	   involving	   risk	  completely,	  so	  that	  each	  of	  them	  has	  his/her	  own	  personal	  risk-­‐attitude.	  Hence,	  this	  makes	   the	   zero-­‐answers	   a	  mixed	   bag:	   the	   answer	   either	   truly	   reflects	   strong	   risk-­‐aversion	  or	   it	   signals	   that	   the	   question	   is	   not	   suitable	   to	   gain	   information	  on	   risk-­‐attitude.	   Thus,	   non-­‐response	   may	   reflect	   both,	   systematic	   moral	   objection	   or	   the	  usual	  variety	  of	  reasons	  for	  not	  answering.	  	   	  	  	  	  	  The	   results	   reveal	   that	   risk-­‐aversion	   is	   the	   most	   frequent	   situation,	   still	  accountants,	  who	  earn	  substantially	  higher	  incomes,	  exhibit	  risk	  neutral	  or	  even	  risk-­‐loving	   behavior	   much	   more	   frequently.	   This	   suggests	   that	   increasing	   income	   and	  wealth	  reduce	  individuals’	  absolute	  risk-­‐aversion.	  Still	  it	  is	  not	  clear	  whether	  the	  high	  scores	  for	  risk	  neutrality	  among	  accountants	  may	  derive	  from	  a	  professional	  habit	  of	  valuing	   a	   risky	   prospect	   at	   its	   expected	   value.	   The	   type	   of	   family	   in	   which	   the	  respondent	  grew	  up	  as	  a	  child	  was	  not	   found	  to	  have	  any	  significant	  effect	  on	  risk-­‐attitudes.	  Moreover,	   neither	  marriage	   status,	   IQ,	   having	   impaired	   health	   condition,	  being	  unemployed,	   disabled,	   or	   not	   being	   active	   in	   the	   labor	   force	   are	   found	   to	  be	  related	  to	  the	  risk-­‐aversion	  coefficient.	  Risk-­‐aversion	  is	  only	  found	  to	  be	  significantly	  lower	  for	  the	  self-­‐employed	  participants.	  Schooling	  level	  is	  identified	  to	  significantly	  reduce	   risk-­‐aversion,	   especially	   for	   university	   education	   relative	   to	   lower	   levels	   of	  education.	   Referring	   to	   gender	   differences	   in	   risk-­‐aversion,	   women	   exhibit	   a	  substantially	  higher	  degree	  of	  risk-­‐aversion	  than	  men.	  The	  researches	  could	  not	  find	  an	  obvious	  explanation	  for	  the	  fact	   that	   females	  and	  self-­‐employed	  participants	  are	  significantly	  less	  inclined	  to	  respond	  to	  the	  given	  lottery.	   	  	  	  	  	  The	  results	  from	  the	  GPD	  survey	  –	  a	  two-­‐page	  questionnaire	  published	  in	  a	  Dutch	  newspaper	  –	  indicate	  that	  women	  once	  again	  appear	  more	  risk-­‐averse	  than	  men,	  that	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risk-­‐aversion	  diminishes	  with	  income	  and	  education,	  and	  that	  it	  is	  lower	  for	  the	  self-­‐employed	  respondents.	  As	  the	  GPD	  survey	  also	  includes	  information	  on	  family	  status,	  age,	   and	   church	   attendance,	   new	   results	   could	  be	  drawn.	   Single	  parents	   as	  well	   as	  single	   individuals,	  and	  couples	   living	  together	  without	  a	  formal	  marriage	  status	  are	  less	   risk-­‐averse	   than	  married	   couples.	   Frequent	   church	  visitors	   appear	   to	  be	  more	  risk-­‐averse	  as	  compared	  to	  the	  other	  participants.	  A	  possible	  explanation	  once	  again	  may	  be	  possible	  moral	  objections	   to	  gambling,	  or	   that	   religiously	  active	  people	  are	  just	   more	   prudent,	   or	   one	   might	   interpret	   their	   religious	   activity	   as	   a	   form	   of	  insurance	  premium	  fostering	  their	  chances	  for	  a	  good	  afterlife.	   	  	  	  	  	  Given	  the	   three	  different	  datasets	  consistency	  checks	  are	  derived	  and	  substantial	  empirical	  support	  is	  found:	  women	  and	  civil	  servants	  display	  higher	  risk-­‐aversion,	  in	  contrast	   to	   the	   self-­‐employed,	   and	   risk-­‐aversion	   is	   falling	   with	   declining	   income,	  wealth	  and	  education	  (Hartog,	  Ferrer-­‐i-­‐Carbonell,	  &	  Jonker,	  2002).	  
3.2.	  Contextual	  Environment	  Experiments	  
3.2.1.	  Financial	  Decision-­‐making	  Gysler,	   Kruse	   &	   Schubert	   (2002)	   examine	   the	   valuations	   of	   risky	   and	   ambiguous	  lotteries	   in	   a	   financial	   context.	   Their	   experiment	   brings	   together	   laboratory	  economic	   measures	   of	   individual	   valuation	   of	   uncertainty	   with	   psychological	  measures	   of	   competence	   and	   overconfidence.	   Competence	   is	   the	   perception	   of	  feeling	  knowledgeable	  or	  competent	  in	  an	  area,	  whereas	  overconfidence	  is	  the	  level	  to	   which	   individuals	   overestimate	   their	   own	   ability.	   The	   authors	   examine	   an	  individual’s	  willingness	  to	  pay	  under	  different	  formats	  of	  uncertainty	  with	  a	  special	  focus	  on	  the	  influence	  of	  competence,	  overconfidence	  and	  gender	  effects.	  	   	  	  	  	  	  The	  researches	  find	  two	  important	  variables	  for	  the	  explanation	  of	  the	  willingness	  to	   pay	   for	   ambiguous	   or	   risky	   lotteries:	   overconfidence	   and	   objective	   knowledge.	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Moreover,	  gender	  seems	  to	  play	  an	  important	  role	  for	  the	  prediction	  of	  choice	  when	  individuals	  are	  confronted	  with	  uncertainty.	  Remarkably,	  men	  become	  more	  risk-­‐	  or	  ambiguity-­‐averse	   with	   increasing	   objectively	   measured	   knowledge,	   whilst	   women	  become	  more	  risk-­‐	  or	  ambiguity-­‐prone.	  Thus,	  among	  individuals	  of	   low	  knowledge,	  women	  are	  more	  risk-­‐	  or	  ambiguity-­‐averse	  than	  men;	  and	  among	  individuals	  of	  high	  knowledge,	  women	  are	  more	  risk-­‐	  or	  ambiguity-­‐prone.	  	   	  	  	  	  	  Gysler,	   Kruse	   &	   Schubert	   (2002)	   suppose	   that	   an	   increase	   in	   knowledge	   in	   a	  financial	   decision-­‐making	   context	   may	   has	   the	   potential	   to	   nearly	   reverse	   roles	  between	   men	   and	   women	   in	   attitudes	   towards	   uncertainty.	   They	   conclude	   that	  rating	   individual	   contextual	   knowledge	   may	   partly	   explain	   some	   of	   the	   puzzles	  concerning	  gender	  differences	   in	   labor	  market	  and	  financial	  market	  outcomes.	  Men	  with	  low	  knowledge	  will	  gain	  the	  knowledge	  –	  sometimes	  by	  “hard	  knocks”	  –	  if	  the	  acquisition	  of	  knowledge	  is	  a	  “learning-­‐by-­‐doing”	  process,	  however,	  women	  will	  not	  learn	   the	   same	   lessons	   due	   to	   their	   more	   conservative	   approach.	   Consequently,	  women	  may	  keep	  their	  risk-­‐	  or	  ambiguity-­‐averse	  behavior.	  
M.	  Powell	  and	  D.	  Ansic	   (1997)	  aim	  to	  assess	   the	  degree	   to	  which	  women	  display	  a	  common	  trait	  of	  more	  risk-­‐averse	  behavior	  than	  men	  in	  financial	  decision	  processes.	  	  The	   researchers	   examine	   whether	   gender	   differences	   are	   largely	   determined	   by	  contextual	   instance	   factors	   rather	   than	   trait	   factors.	   In	   the	   existing	   literature	   the	  authors	   find	  only	   little	   support	   for	   the	  view	   that	  male	   and	   female	  decision-­‐makers	  exhibit	  different	  personality	  profiles	  or	  abilities,	  while	  they	  find	  consistent	  evidence	  of	  gender	  differences	   in	  risk	  preferences	   in	  business	  and	  financial	  decision-­‐making.	  However,	   when	   these	   gender	   differences	   are	   interpreted	   as	   results	   from	   general	  traits,	  the	  stereotypical	  attitudes	  about	  women	  as	  less	  able	  managers	  is	  supported.	  	   	  	  	  	  	  Their	   study	   uses	   two	   computerized	   experiments	   with	   subjects	   drawn	   from	   the	  population	  of	  undergraduate	  and	  post-­‐graduate	  business	  school	  students	  in	  order	  to	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avoid	   that	   any	   gender	   differences	   found	   would	   be	   associated	   with	   non-­‐specialist	  populations.	   The	   participants	   are	   familiar	   with	   financial	   decisions	   and	   have	  experience	  of	  viewing	  information	  on	  a	  computer	  screen	  so	  that	  the	  gender	  effects	  of	  familiarity	  with	  the	  general	  context	  and	  with	  the	  use	  of	  information	  technology	  and	  keyboard	   skills	   would	   be	   minimized.	   In	   the	   first	   experiment,	   participants	   have	   to	  choose	  the	  degree	  of	   insurance	  cover	  which	  represents	  a	  financial	  decision	  familiar	  to	  both	  men	  and	  women,	  and	  for	  which	  most	  participants	  have	  some	  prior	  real	  world	  experience.	  In	  the	  second	  experiment,	  participants	  have	  to	  decide	  about	  entering	  or	  leaving	  a	  currency	  market	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  information	  about	  exchange	  rates	  and	  the	  costs	   of	   re-­‐entering	   the	  market,	   which	   represents	   an	   unfamiliar	   financial	   decision	  about	   which	   most	   participants	   do	   not	   have	   any	   experience.	   The	   degree	   of	   risk	  preference	   is	   measured	   by	   the	   frequency	   of	   actual	   choices	   in	   each	   experiment,	  whereas	  difference	   in	  decision	  strategies	  are	  measured	  by	  decision	   latencies	  or	  the	  time	   used	   to	   take	   a	   decision.	   Subjects	   know	   that	   the	   aim	   is	   to	   maximize	   wealth	  holdings	  in	  each	  decision	  separately	  and	  that	  for	  each	  decision	  either	  the	  wealth,	  the	  insurance	   premium,	   or	   the	   nature	   of	   risk	  would	   change.	   Afterwards,	   they	   have	   to	  	  complete	  a	  post-­‐experiment	  questionnaire.	  	   	  	  	  	  	  For	   the	   insurance	   study,	   the	   results	   from	   the	   post-­‐experiment	   questionnaire	  revealed	   that	  male	   decisions	   are	   affected	   by	   prices	   and	   risk	  more	   frequently	   than	  female	  decisions,	  whereas	  women	  report	  wealth	  as	  the	  major	  influencing	  factor	  more	  frequently	   than	   men.	   Both,	   male	   and	   female	   strategies	   involve	   the	   observation	   of	  numerical	   information	   and	   patterns	   of	   change,	   yet	   men	   state	   to	   consider	   more	  sources	   of	   information	   more	   often.	   In	   addition	   to	   this,	   no	   significant	   gender	  differences	   in	   self-­‐reported	  perception	  of	  performance	   (irrespective	  of	   earnings)	   is	  found,	   however,	   women	   feel	   significantly	   less	   confident	   at	   the	   beginning	   of	   the	  experiment	   and	   significantly	   luckier	   during	   the	   experiment.	   	   Regarding	   prior	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experience,	   no	   significant	   difference	   between	   males	   and	   females	   is	   found;	   and	  participants	  consider	  the	  task	  and	  environment	  equally	  acceptable.	   	  	  	  	  	  For	   the	   currency	  market	   study,	   the	   results	   show	   that	  women	   stay	   in	   the	  market	  less	  on	  average	  across	  all	  levels	  of	  cost	  than	  men,	  which	  suggests	  that	  women	  feature	  a	  lower	  risk	  preference	  independent	  of	  the	  level	  of	  sunk	  costs.	  Still,	   in	  this	  financial	  decision	  instance,	  no	  gender	  differences	  emerge	  in	  the	  ability	  to	  achieve	  results.	  As	  in	  the	  insurance	  experiment,	  the	  mean	  female	  payment	  is	  greater	  than	  the	  mean	  male	  payment,	  but	  the	  difference	  is	  not	  significant.	  	   	  	  	  	  	  The	   results	   reveal,	   that	  women	   exhibit	   significantly	   lower	   preference	   for	   risk	   in	  both	  environments,	   irrespectably	  of	   the	  degree	  of	   familiarity,	   frame	  or	  cost.	  Hence,	  the	   view	   that	   gender	  differences	   are	   context	   related	   in	   these	   instances	   of	   financial	  decision-­‐making,	   is	   not	   supported.	  Males	   and	   females	   adopt	   different	   strategies	   in	  financial	   decision-­‐making,	   irrespective	   of	   ambiguity,	   framing	   or	   familiarity	   in	   both	  experiments.	  Due	  to	  women’s	  lower	  risk	  preference,	  they	  tend	  to	  focus	  on	  strategies	  avoiding	  the	  worst	  situation	  to	  gain	  security.	  Thus,	  women	  chose	  a	  larger	  insurance	  cover	   and	   select	   loss	   avoiding	   strategies	   in	   the	   currency	  decisions,	   such	   as	   staying	  out	  of	  the	  market	  longer.	  Males,	  being	  more	  risk	  propensive,	  are	  more	  likely	  to	  focus	  on	  strategies	  which	   they	  consider	   to	  achieve	   the	  highest	  gains,	   such	  as	  selection	  of	  the	   lowest	  cost	  cover	   in	  the	   insurance	  framing,	  and	  staying	   in	  the	  market	   longer	   in	  the	  currency	  framing.	  	   	  	  	  	  	  The	  authors	  conclude	  that	  gender	  differences	  in	  financial	  risk	  preference	  do	  exist	  in	   management	   populations,	   and	   that	   these	   differences	   are	   not	   explained	   by	   the	  context	   instance	   of	   familiarity,	   ambiguity	   or	   gains	   and	   loss	   framing.	   Moreover,	  gender	   differences	   in	   risk-­‐propensity	   are	   associated	   with	   different	   decision	  strategies,	   which	   may	   be	   evoked	   by	   underlying	   differences	   in	   motivation.	   These	  differences	   may	   affect	   choices	   and	   opportunities	   in	   the	   labor	   market,	   domestic	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decisions	  in	  financial	  planning,	  and	  the	  purchase	  and	  marketing	  of	  financial	  products	  (Powell	  &	  Ansic,	  1997).	  
3.2.2.	  Portfolio	  Selection:	  High	  Stakes	  Decisions	  The	   highest-­‐stakes	   decisions	   taken	   by	   individuals,	   for	   themselves	   or	   as	   agents	  working	   for	   others,	   are	   often	   of	   special	   economic	   interest.	   The	   question	   whether	  laboratory	  experiments	  with	  small	  stakes	  can	  be	  used	  to	  draw	  conclusions	  for	  high-­‐stakes	  settings	   remains	  unsolved.	  Croson	  &	  Gneezy	   (2009)	  argue	   that	  one	  possible	  solution	  would	  be	  to	  conduct	  experiments	  in	  poor	  countries	  where	  modest	  payments	  by	   Western	   standards	   have	   high	   purchasing	   power	   to	   gain	   insight	   in	   high-­‐stakes	  decision	   processes.	  Most	   comparisons	   between	   low-­‐	   and	   high-­‐stakes	   data	   indicate	  that	  conclusions	  gained	  from	  modest	  stakes	  do	  generalize.	  In	  the	  domain	  of	  financial	  risk-­‐taking,	   direct	   evidence	   can	   often	   be	   generated	   so	   that	   there	   is	   quite	   a	   large	  number	  of	  studies	  in	  which	  high	  stakes	  decisions	  from	  men	  and	  women	  are	  directly	  compared.	   This	   literature	   shows	   –	   consistent	   with	   the	   results	   from	   laboratory	  experiments	  –	  that	  there	  are	  strong	  gender	  differences	  (Croson	  &	  Gneezy,	  2009).	  
Both,	  common	  wisdom	  and	  the	  predominant	  economic	  model	  of	  household	  behavior	  have	  typically	  identified	  household	  savings	  and	  investment	  decisions	  as	  the	  domain	  of	  men	  in	  the	  household.	  Specific	   individual	  and	  household	  financial	  decisions	  such	  as	   investment	   and	   retirement	   plan	   allocations	   are	   used	   to	   gain	   insight	   in	   gender	  differences	  in	  investing.	  As	  these	  decisions	  are	  important	  for	  economic	  well-­‐being	  in	  the	  future,	  especially	  in	  retirement,	  and	  as	  women	  face	  a	  greater	  probability	  of	  being	  poor	   in	   their	   older	   age;	   it	   is	   important	   to	   understand	   the	   factors	   making	   women	  more	  likely	  to	  be	  involved	  in	  those	  decisions.	  	  It	  is	  assumed	  that	  greater	  involvement	  in	   financial	   decision-­‐making	   implies	   greater	   influence	   on	   financial	   outcomes,	   and	  since	  women	  exhibit	  different	  attitudes	  and	  behavior	  toward	  risk	  than	  men,	  gender	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differences	  in	  investment	  behavior	  are	  an	  area	  of	  increasing	  importance	  as	  we	  strive	  for	  income	  security	  in	  the	  evening	  of	  life	  (Bernasek	  &	  Bajtelsmit,	  2002).	  
Bajtelsmit	   &	   Bernasek	   (1996)	   review	   the	   existing	   literature	   regarding	   gender	  differences	  in	  investment	  and	  conclude	  that	  several	  previous	  studies	  provide	  strong	  evidence	  that	  women	  allocate	  their	  portfolios	  differently	  than	  men,	  and	  that	  women	  may	  differ	  in	  their	  attitudes	  toward	  risk-­‐taking.	  	  
A.	  Sundén	  and	  B.	  Surette	  (1998)	  examine	  the	  allocation	  of	  defined	  contribution	  (DC)	  plan	  assets.	  Usually,	  workers	  can	  choose	  how	  their	  assets	  are	  invested	  in	  such	  a	  DC	  plan.	  The	  authors	  use	  data	  from	  the	  1992	  and	  1995	  Surveys	  of	  Consumer	  Finances	  to	  examine	   whether	   there	   are	   systematically	   gender	   differences	   in	   the	   allocation	   of	  assets	   in	  DC	   plans.	   Information	   on	   households'	   assets,	   liabilities,	   and	   demographic	  characteristics	  as	  well	  as	  on	  pension	  coverage,	  pension	  plan	  characteristics,	  and	  the	  allocation	   of	   assets	   in	   DC	   plans	   are	   included	   in	   the	   data.	   A	   detailed	   analysis	   of	  investment	   choices	   in	   DC	   plans	   is	   conducted	   and	   then	   related	   to	   individual	   and	  household	  characteristics.	  	   	  	  	  	  	  The	   results	   show	   that	   gender	   and	  marital	   status	   have	   significant	   effects	   on	   how	  individuals	  allocate	  assets	   in	  their	  DC	  plans.	  Consistently	   to	   lab	  experiments,	  single	  women	   are	   found	   to	   be	   less	   risk-­‐prone	   than	   single	   men.	   Moreover,	   the	   authors	  conclude	   that	   demographic,	   financial,	   and	   attitudinal	   factors	   seem	   to	   be	   of	  importance,	  however,	   the	   results	   indicate	   that	   controls	   for	   these	   characteristics	  do	  not	  fully	  explain	  gender	  and	  marital	  effects	  (Sundén	  &	  Surette,	  1998).	  
Hinz,	   McCarthy,	   &	   Turner	   (1997)	   use	   data	   from	   a	   1990	   survey	   of	   the	   federal	  government’s	  Thrift	  Savings	  Plan	  (TSP)	  for	  federal	  employees,	  which	  represents	  the	  largest	   pension	   fund	   in	   the	   United	   States	   accounting	   two	  million	   participants.	   The	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TSP	   contains	   three	   different	   funds	   of	   varying	   risk,	   and	   participants	   can	   choose	   in	  which	  of	  the	  three	  funds	  to	   invest.	  The	  survey	  includes	  economic	  and	  demographic	  variables	   such	   as	   salary,	   other	   family	   income,	   age,	   gender,	   and	   martial	   status	  (married/not	  married).	  The	  results	  show	  that	  women	  are	  more	  likely	  to	  invest	  their	  pension	   assets	   more	   conservatively	   than	   men,	   and	   a	   large	   percentage	   of	   females	  choose	  to	  invest	  in	  the	  minimum-­‐risk	  portfolio.	  This	  pattern	  may	  be	  partly	  explained	  by	   women’s	   lower	   salaries;	   however,	   the	   result	   still	   persists	   after	   controlling	   for	  economic	   and	   demographic	   characteristics.	   Married	   women	   also	   appear	   to	   invest	  less	   in	   common	   stock	   than	   married	   men,	   given	   constant	   income	   and	   age	   (Hinz,	  McCarthy,	  &	  Turner,	  1997).	  
V. Bajtelsmit,	  A.	  Bernasek	  and	  N.	  Jianakoplos	  (1999)	  consider	  gender	  differences	  in	  allocation	   of	   household	   wealth	   to	   defined	   contribution	   pensions.	   The	   researches	  employ	   data	   from	   the	   1989	   Survey	   of	   Consumer	   Finances	   (SCF89)	   to	   examine	  whether	   gender	   difference	   can	   be	   observed	   in	   defined	   contributions	   to	   pension	  allocation	   decisions.	   Their	   study	   goes	   beyond	   previous	   research	   by	   analyzing	  pension	   decisions	   within	   the	   broader	   context	   of	   the	   household	   portfolio.	   	   Their	  results	  show	  that	  there	  are	  significant	  gender	  differences	  in	  the	  allocation	  of	  wealth	  into	   defined	   contribution	   pensions:	  women	   reveal	   greater	   relative	   risk-­‐aversion	   in	  their	   allocation	   of	   wealth	   into	   defined	   contribution	   pension	   assets.	   Important	  implications	   for	   public	   policy	   can	   be	   drawn:	   despite	   increasing	   pension	   coverage	  rates	  for	  women	  in	  the	  last	  two	  decades	  as	  the	  number	  of	  women	  in	  the	  workforce	  has	   increased,	   women	   allocate	   a	   smaller	   proportion	   of	   their	   total	   wealth	   to	  retirement	   vehicles.	   As	   women	   seem	   to	   be	   very	   risk-­‐averse	   with	   respect	   to	   the	  pension	  allocation	  decision,	  it	  is	  likely	  that	  women	  will	  retire	  with	  significantly	  lower	  pension	  wealth	   compared	   to	  men.	   In	   addition	   to	   this,	  women’s	   smaller	  wealth	  will	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have	   to	   be	   spread	   over	   a	   longer	   retirement	   due	   to	   their	   greater	   average	   longevity	  (Bajtelsmit,	  Bernasek,	  &	  Jianakoplos,	  1999).	  
A.	   Bernasek	   and	   V.	   Bajtelsmit	   (2002)	   report	   empirical	   results	   from	   a	   survey	   of	  household	   finances,	   in	   which	   the	   participants	   have	   to	   specify	   their	   degree	   of	  involvement	  in	  financial	  decision-­‐making	  for	  the	  household.	  Their	  aim	  is	  to	  examine	  female	   involvement	   in	   savings	   and	   investment	   decisions	   within	   married	   and	  cohabitating	  couple	  households.	  Previous	  research	  on	  gender	  differences	  in	  financial	  decision-­‐making	  has	  been	  limited,	  as	  most	  datasets	  for	  household	  financial	  offer	  no	  information	  about	  the	  household	  decision-­‐maker.	   	  	  	  	  	  Bernasek	  and	  Bajtelsmit’s	  (2002)	  empirical	  analysis	  is	  based	  on	  survey	  data	  taken	  from	   a	   sample	   of	   academics	   employed	   at	   universities	   in	   Colorado.	   All	   participants	  had	   to	   give	   information	   about	   the	   household's	   financial	   position,	   the	   financial	  decision-­‐making	   process	   within	   the	   household,	   attitudes	   toward	   financial	   risk	   of	  household	  members,	  and	  demographic	  characteristics	  of	   the	  household.	  Since	  all	  of	  the	  respondents	  are	  employed,	  the	  majority	  has	  PhDs,	  and	  the	  majority	  is	  white	  and	  reasonably	  wealthy,	   some	   caution	   is	   required	   in	   attempts	   to	   generalize	   from	   these	  results.	   More	   research	   may	   be	   needed	   to	   confirm	   these	   findings	   among	   the	  population	  more	  generally.	   	  	  	  	  	  Their	   results	   reveal	   that	   female	   involvement	   in	   household	   financial	   decisions	  increases	  with	  their	  share	  of	  household	  income	  and	  their	  formal	  financial	  education;	  while	   it	   decreases	   with	   their	   husbands’	   share	   of	   income	   and	   formal	   financial	  education,	   and	  with	   the	   total	  wealth	  of	   the	  household.	  Thus	   female	   involvement	   in	  household	  finances	  is	  significantly	  positively	  related	  to	  their	  share	  of	  total	  household	  income.	   Hence,	   the	   researches	   conclude	   that	   female	   contribution	   to	   the	   total	  household	  income	  may	  be	  a	  workable	  proxy	  for	  female	  decision-­‐makers	  in	  married	  couples	  and	  that	  women	  are	  more	  likely	  to	  have	  an	  influence	  on	  financial	  decisions	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when	  they	  contribute	  a	   larger	  share	   to	   the	  household	  earnings.	  Considered	   that	  on	  an	  aggregate	  level,	  women’s	  salaries	  are	  smaller	  than	  men's	  on	  average,	  so	  that	  these	  results	   suggest	   that	   women	   are	   less	   likely	   on	   average	   to	   be	   heavily	   engaged	   in	  deciding	  about	  household	  level	  savings	  and	  investment.	  As	  women	  complete	  formal	  financial	   education	   less	   frequent	   than	   men,	   this	   result	   also	   suggests	   a	   smaller	  involvement	  of	  women	  in	  the	  household	  finances	  on	  average	  (Bernasek	  &	  Bajtelsmit,	  2002).	  
3.3.	  Evidence	  from	  Field	  Studies	  
The	   evidence	   from	   abstract	   gambling	   as	   well	   as	   from	   contextual	   environment	  experiments	   of	   women’s	   greater	   risk-­‐aversion	   is	   consistent	   with	   non-­‐laboratory	  studies	  of	  behavioral	  gender	  differences	  (Eckel	  &	  Grossman,	  2008).	   	  
J.E.V.	   Johnson	   and	   P.L.	   Powell	   (1994)	   draw	   together	   the	   disparate	   literature	   on	  decision-­‐making	   and	   gender.	   Moreover,	   they	   review	   two	   additional	   pieces	   of	  empirical	   evidence	   on	   betting	   and	   financial	   modeling:	   both	   studies	   conclude	   that	  men	   and	  women	   do	   not	   differ	   in	   the	   quality	   of	   their	   decision-­‐making,	   which	   is	   in	  contrast	  to	  much	  of	  the	  earlier	  literature.	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  The	  betting	  shop	  study	  examines	  actual	  betting	  decisions	   in	  horse	  and	  dog	  races	  placed	  in	  50	  betting	  offices	  in	  the	  entire	  United	  Kingdom	  over	  the	  period	  of	  one	  week.	  Measured	  by	  the	  propensity	  to	  win,	  no	  significant	  gender	  differences	  in	  the	  decision	  quality	   are	   found;	   however,	   reinforcing	   the	   findings	   of	   earlier	   research,	   men	   who	  have	   not	   undergone	   formal	   management	   education	   are	   found	   to	   be	   more	   risk	  propensive	  than	  women	  in	  their	  betting	  habits.	   	  	  	  	  	  The	  financial	  modeling	  study	  indicates	  that	  the	  observed	  differences	  may	  be	  rather	  caused	   by	   experience,	   information	   access,	   formal	   management	   education	   and	  managerial	  personality	  types	  than	  by	  gender.	  This	  study	  does	  not	  find	  any	  significant	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differences	  in	  male	  and	  female	  decision	  quality	  or	  risk-­‐attitudes.	  	   	  The	  conclusions	  of	  both	  studies	  are	  drawn	  by	  a	   simply	  examination	  of	   the	  average	  performance	   of	   groups	   of	   male	   and	   female	   decision	   makers.	   Thus,	   there	   is	   no	  implication	   that	   an	   individual	   man	   or	   woman	   can	   be	   viewed	   as	   a	   qualitatively	  superior	  or	  more	  risk-­‐averse	  decision-­‐maker.	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  The	  researchers	  underline	  the	   fact	   that	  current	   finding	   indicate	  that	   there	  are	  no	  differences	   in	  risk-­‐propensity	  and	  decision	  quality	  between	  men	  and	  women	  in	  the	  “managerial”	   sub-­‐population.	  This,	  however,	   clearly	  contradicts	   the	  commonly	  held	  stereotypes	   identified	   in	   previous	   research	   suggesting	   that	   there	   are	   gender	  differences	   in	   decision-­‐making	   ability.	   This	   study	   suggests	   that	   these	   stereotypes	  may	   have	   been	   established	   by	   observation	   of	   the	   “non-­‐managerial”	   population	   in	  which	   formal	   management	   education	   is	   likely	   to	   be	   minimal.	   Previous	   research	  indicates	  that	  women	  are	  often	  excluded	  from	  managerial	  positions	  of	  authority	  and	  leadership	   within	   organizations	   because	   of	   such	   stereotypes.	   The	   current	   study	  signifies	  that	  formally	  educated	  managers	  –	  women	  and	  men	  –	  are	  equally	  capable	  to	  contribute	   to	   organizational	   decision	   processes.	   Thus,	   the	   authors	   deduce	   that	  gender	   stereotypes	   may	   not	   apply	   to	   managers	   because	   men	   and	   women	   exhibit	  similar	  risk-­‐propensity	  and	  make	  decisions	  of	  equal	  quality	  in	  the	  “managerial”	  sub-­‐population	  (Johnson	  &	  Powell,	  1994).	  
V.	   Bajtelsmit	   and	   J.	   VanDerhei	   (1997)	   examine	   defined	   contribution	   pension	  allocation	   decisions	   of	   20,000	   management	   employees	   of	   a	   large	   United	   States	  employer	   and	   their	   results	   offer	   further	   evidence	   supporting	   the	   hypothesis	   of	  women’s	  greater	  risk-­‐aversion.	  	  
By	   using	   data	   from	   the	   1989	   Survey	   of	   Consumer	   Finances,	   N.	   Jianakoplos	   and	   A.	  Bernasek	   (1998)	   seek	   to	   empirically	   verify	   the	   popularly	   perceived	   prospect	   of	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existing	   gender	   differences	   in	   risk-­‐taking	   behavior.	   	   Their	   study	   compares	   single	  women	  with	  single	  men	  and	  married	  couples	  including	  an	  estimate	  of	  the	  impact	  of	  household	   wealth	   and	   other	   socioeconomic	   variables	   on	   the	   proportion	   of	   risky	  assets	  held.	   	  	  	  	  	  Based	  on	   the	   survey	   responses,	   the	  authors	   find	  women	   to	  be	   significantly	  more	  risk-­‐averse	   in	   financial	   decision-­‐making	   than	   men.	   Their	   results	   confirm	   previous	  studies	   finding	   relative	   risk-­‐aversion	   to	   decrease	   as	   household	   wealth	   increases,	  given	  wealth	  is	  measured	  excluding	  human	  capital	  and	  residential	  housing.	  Though,	  for	  single	  women,	  relative	  risk-­‐aversion	  does	  not	  decrease	  as	  much	  as	  for	  single	  men,	  supposing	  that	  single	  women	  are	  relatively	  more	  risk-­‐averse.	  	   	  	  	  	  	  Holding	   other	   factors	   constant,	   single	   women	   over	   most	   age	   ranges	   possess	   a	  smaller	   proportion	   of	   risky	   assets	   than	   either	   single	   men	   or	   married	   couples.	  Moreover,	  holding	  other	  factors	  constant,	  single	  women	  even	  reduce	  the	  proportion	  of	   risky	   assets	   as	   the	  number	   of	   children	   in	   their	   household	   increases,	   contrasting	  the	   behavior	   of	   single	   men	   and	   married	   couples.	   Furthermore,	   the	   results	   reveal	  single	  black	  women	  to	  be	  more	  likely	  to	  hold	  a	   larger	  proportion	  of	  risky	  assets	  on	  average	   than	   single	   white	   women,	   single	   men	   and	   married	   couples.	   The	   authors	  conclude	   that	  age,	   race,	   and	   the	  number	  of	   children	   influence	   the	  observed	  gender	  differences	  in	  financial	  risk-­‐taking	  behavior.	   	  	  	  	  	  The	  researchers	  find	  evidence	  of	  gender	  differences	  in	  financial	  risk-­‐taking	  in	  the	  allocation	   of	   total	   household	   wealth,	   which	   has	   several	   important	   implications.	  Individuals	   with	   greater	   risk-­‐aversion	   may	   chose	   asset-­‐allocation	   resulting	   in	  relatively	   lower	   levels	   of	   wealth.	   Women’s	   greater	   financial	   risk-­‐aversion	   may	  provide	  an	  explanation	  for	  women’s	   lower	   levels	  of	  wealth.	  Moreover,	  greater	  risk-­‐aversion	   featured	   by	   women	   may	   significantly	   impact	   the	   resources	   available	   to	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them	  in	  retirement	  as	  there	  is	  an	  increasing	  tendency	  towards	  self-­‐directed	  pensions	  and	  as	  women	  typically	  live	  longer	  (Jianakoplos	  &	  Bernasek,	  1998).	  
Eckel	  &	  Grossman	  (2008)	  conclude	  that	  the	  findings	  from	  field	  studies	  reveal	  women	  as	  more	  risk-­‐averse	   than	  men.	  Concerning	   laboratory	  experiments,	   the	  researchers	  report	   the	   findings	   as	   somewhat	   less	   conclusive.	   In	   large	   parts,	   results	   form	  laboratory	   experiments	   are	   consistent	   with	   those	   of	   field	   experiments,	   however,	  there	   is	   also	  enough	  counter-­‐evidence	   so	   that	  one	  has	   to	  be	   careful	   in	   interpreting	  the	  results.	  Field	  studies	  as	  well	  as	  laboratory	  experiments	  typically	  fail	  to	  control	  for	  knowledge,	  wealth,	  martial	  status,	  and	  other	  demographic	  factors,	  which	  might	  bias	  measures	  of	  gender	  differences	  in	  risk	  behavior.	  
In	  a	  nutshell,	  women	  are	  found	  to	  be	  more	  risk-­‐averse	  than	  men	  in	  both	  laboratory	  settings	  and	   investment	  decisions	   in	   the	   field.	  The	  observed	  gender	  differences	  are	  relatively	  constant,	  still	  few	  explanations	  are	  supplied.	  The	  remainder	  of	  this	  section	  will	   identify	   some	   possible	   explanations	   and	   the	   evidence	   supporting	   each	  will	   be	  discussed.	   Moreover,	   exceptions	   to	   the	   general	   result	   in	   particular	   tasks	   and	   by	  special	  subject	  pools	  will	  be	  identified.	  
3.4.	   Explanations	   for	   the	   observed	   Gender	   Differences	   in	   Risk	  
Behavior	  
3.4.1.	  Explanations	  for	  Gender	  Differences	  in	  Investment	  Behavior	  Bajtelsmit	  &	  Bernasek	  (1996)	  attempt	  to	  offer	  explanations	  for	  the	  observed	  gender	  differences	  in	  investment	  behavior.	  This	  is,	  however,	  a	  difficult	  question	  as	  only	  the	  outcomes	  of	  decisions	  rather	  than	  the	  decision-­‐making	  processes	  themselves	  can	  be	  observed.	   Gender	   differences	   in	   investment	   and	   risk-­‐taking	   behavior	   may	   root	   in	  discrimination	   and/or	   differences	   in	   individual	   preferences.	   Thus	   risk-­‐aversion	   is	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either	   influenced	   directly	   or	   through	   the	   outcomes	   such	   as	   gender	   differences	   in	  wealth,	  income	  and	  employment.	  	  
3.4.2.	  Risk	  Perception	  P.	   Gustafson	   (1998)	   discusses	   how	   and	   why	   men	   and	   women	   differ	   in	   their	  perceptions	   of	   risk	   by	   reviewing	   a	   number	   of	   existing	   empirical	   studies	   of	   risk	  perception.	   The	   way	   men	   and	   women	   may	   differ	   is	   somehow	   problematic,	   as	  different	  methodological	  approaches	  give	  different,	  or	  even	  contradictory	  pictures,	  of	  such	  gender	  differences.	  	   	  	  	  	  	  Quantitative	   approaches,	   such	   as	   the	   psychometric	   approach,	   generally	   use	  questionnaires	  and	  statistical	  methods	  to	  examine	  a	  number	  of	  risks	  selected	  by	  the	  researcher.	  Thereby,	  the	  focus	  is	  more	  often	  on	  differences	  between	  risks	  than	  on	  the	  differences	   among	   those	   who	   perceive	   these	   risks.	   After	   reviewing	   a	   number	   of	  quantitative	   studies,	   Gustafson	   (1998)	   concludes	   that	   men	   and	   women	   seem	   to	  worry	  about	  the	  same	  risks,	  but	  women	  constantly	  seem	  to	  worry	  a	  bit	  more.	  	   	  	  	  	  	  Qualitative	   approaches	   use	   open-­‐ended	   questions	   about	   risk,	   which	   allows	   the	  respondents	  to	  tell	  what	  risks	  they	  perceive	  themselves.	  Qualitative	  and	  quantitative	  approaches,	  however,	  draw	  a	  different	  picture	  of	  men’s	  and	  women’s	  risk	  perception.	  Gustafson	   (1998)	   reviews	   the	   existing	   literature:	   one	   survey	   finds	   women	   to	   be	  concerned	   about	   accident	   risks,	   health	   risks,	   the	   risk	   of	   death,	   whilst	   men	   stated	  greater	  concern	  about	  their	  working	  life.	  In	  another	  survey	  concerning	  health,	  safety	  and	   environmental	   risks,	   women	  mentioned	   environmental	   risks	  more	   frequently,	  whereas	  men	  mentioned	  health	  and	  safety	  risks	  more	  often.	  Regarding	   the	  risks	  of	  violence	  in	  the	  urban	  environment,	  males	  primarily	  express	  concern	  about	  physical	  violence,	  while	  females	  are	  much	  concerned	  about	  sexual	  assault.	   	  	  	  	  	  In	  addition	  to	  this,	  the	  meanings	  attributed	  to	  risk	  differ	  across	  the	  sexes.	  One	  and	  the	  same	  risk	  may	  not	  always	  mean	  the	  same	  thing	   to	  men	  and	  women.	  Regarding	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people’s	  fear	  of	  crime,	  women’s	  perception	  of	  risk	  is	  different	  than	  men’s:	  women	  are	  primarily	   worried	   about	   rape	   or	   other	   forms	   of	   sexual	   assault,	   whereas	  men	   fear	  physical	  violence.	  	   	  	  	  	  	  Gustafson	   (1998)	   concludes	   that	   gender	   differences	   in	   risk	   perception	   may	   be	  considered	  from	  three	  different	  perspectives:	  firstly,	  quantitative	  approaches	  reveal	  that	   men	   and	   women	   often	   convey	   different	   levels	   of	   concern	   of	   the	   same	   risks.	  Secondly,	  qualitative	  studies	   indicate	  that	  men	  and	  women	  perceive	  different	  risks.	  Thirdly,	  the	  use	  of	  qualitative	  methods	  also	  finds	  gender	  differences	  in	  the	  meanings	  attributed	  to	  one	  and	  the	  same	  risk.	  
Cutter,	  Tiefenbacher	  &	  Solecki	  (1992)	  also	  examine	  risk	  perceptions	  based	  on	  gender	  and	   find	  some	  minor	  differences	  between	   the	  views	  of	  men	  and	  women,	  especially	  concerning	   distrust,	   perceived	   catastrophic	   potential,	   and	   perceived	   potential	   for	  death	  of	  various	  technologies	  and	  activities.	  Women	  are	  likely	  to	  be	  more	  pessimistic	  about	  technology	  than	  men	  and	  seem	  to	  fear	  hazards	  that	  are	  societal	  in	  nature,	  such	  as	   nuclear	   weapons	   or	   commercial	   nuclear	   power.	   According	   to	   these	   authors	  shortcomings	   in	   the	   design	   of	   their	   research	   instrument	   produce	   some	   of	   the	   few	  observed	  slight	  gender	  differences.	  
3.4.3.	  Emotions	  Another	  commonly	  used	  explanation	  for	  gender	  differences	  in	  risk	  behavior	  is	  based	  on	  differences	  in	  emotional	  reactions	  to	  risky	  situations	  (Croson	  &	  Gneezy,	  2009).	  	   	  G.	  Loewenstein	  et	  al.	  (2001)	  develop	  the	  risk-­‐as-­‐feelings	  hypothesis,	  highlighting	  the	  role	  of	  affect	  experienced	  at	  the	  moment	  of	  decision-­‐making.	  Reviewing	  the	  research	  from	  clinical,	  psychological,	  and	  other	  subfields	  of	  psychology	  the	  authors	  conclude	  that	   emotional	   reactions	   to	   risky	   situations	   often	   diverge	   from	   the	   cognitive	  assessment	   of	   these	   risks.	   People	   react	   to	   risk	   at	   both	   the	   cognitive	   and	   the	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emotional	   level.	   Both	   reactions	   are	   interrelated,	   but	   still	   these	   two	   reactions	   have	  different	   determinants.	   While	   cognitive	   evaluations	   of	   risk	   are	   influenced	   by	   the	  variables	  of	  decision	   theory,	  namely	  probabilities	  and	  outcome	  valences;	  emotional	  
reactions	  are	  sensitive	  to	  the	  vividness	  of	  associated	  imagery,	  proximity	  in	  time,	  and	  a	   number	   of	   other	   variables	   also	   play	   a	   minimal	   role	   in	   cognitive	   evaluation.	  Emotions	   respond	   to	   cognitive	   evaluations,	   however,	   they	   can	   also	   arise	  without	   a	  profound	  cognitive	  evaluation	  process,	   so	   that	  people	  may	  experience	   fear	  without	  knowing	  what	  they	  are	  afraid	  of	  (Loewenstein,	  Weber,	  Hsee,	  &	  Welche,	  2001).	   	  	  	  	  	  Research	   from	   psychology	   suggests	   that	   women	   experience	   emotions	   more	  intensively	  than	  men.	  A	  stronger	  emotional	  experience	  may	  influences	  an	  individuals’	  utility	   function	   and	   thus	   one’s	   risk	   behavior.	   F.	   Fujita,	   E.	   Diener,	   and	   E.	   Sandvik	  (1991)	  find	  women	  to	  report	  more	  negative	  affect	  than	  men,	  but	  equal	  happiness	  as	  men.	  Their	   study	  reveals	   that	   individuals	  who	  experience	  strong	  positive	  emotions	  also	  experience	  strong	  negative	  emotions.	  In	  their	  results,	  women	  score	  significantly	  higher	  on	  almost	  all	  of	  the	  intensity	  measures.	  Thus,	  if	  researches	  only	  collect	  data	  on	  the	   perception	   of	   negative	   emotions,	   women	   will	   be	   found	   to	   experience	   more	  negative	  affect	  than	  men.	  	  However,	  if	  data,	  which	  balances	  the	  positive	  affect	  against	  the	  negative	  affect	  is	  collected,	  these	  gender	  differences	  will	  disappear.	  The	  authors	  point	  out	  that	  the	  paradox	  of	  the	  past	  is	  replicated:	  women	  score	  higher	  on	  negative	  affect	   and	   still	   they	   are	   not	   lower	   on	   global	   happiness	   (Fujita,	   Diener,	   &	   Sandvik,	  1991).	  	  	  	  	  Based	   on	   these	   findings,	   Croson	   &	   Gneezy	   (2009)	   conclude	   that	   women	  will	   be	  more	   risk-­‐averse	   in	   risky	   situations,	   if	   they	   really	   experience	   negative	   outcomes	  worse	  than	  men	  do.	  These	  underlying	  gender	  differences	  in	  emotional	  perception	  of	  outcomes	   lead	   to	   lower	   utility	   resulting	   from	   bad	   outcomes	   and	   thus	   offers	   one	  possible	  explanation	  for	  increased	  risk-­‐aversion	  of	  women.	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In	   M.	   Grossman	   and	   W.	   Wood’s	   (1993)	   experiment,	   women	   report	   to	   experience	  more	   intense	  and	  more	   frequent	  emotions	  of	   love,	   joy,	   sadness	  and	   fear	   than	  men;	  with	  the	  exception	  of	  anger.	  Anger	  seems	  to	  be	  slightly	  different	  from	  the	  other	  four	  emotions	   the	   researches	   assess:	   anger	   is	   the	   only	   emotion	   which	   men	   report	   to	  experience	  more	  intensively	  than	  women.	  	   	  	  	  	  	  In	   addition	   to	   this,	   the	   authors	   show	   that	   sex	   differences	   in	   emotional	   intensity	  derive	   from	   sex-­‐differentiated	   normative	   pressures	   specifying	   women	   to	   be	   more	  emotionally	   responsive	   than	  men.	  Their	   results	   provide	   support	   for	   the	   social	   role	  interpretation	  of	  sex	  differences	  in	  emotions:	  the	  self-­‐reports	  of	  emotional	  response	  correspond	  to	  an	   individual’s	  stereotypic	  beliefs.	  Women	  endorsing	   the	  stereotypic	  belief	   that	   typical	  women	   are	  more	   intensely	   sad,	   fearful,	   joyous,	   and	   in-­‐love	   than	  men,	  report	  experiencing	  heightened	  emotions	  themselves.	  Also	  men	  confirming	  the	  stereotypic	  sex	  differences	  in	  these	  domains	  report	  having	  experienced	  subdued	  and	  attenuated	  emotional	  responses.	  	   	  	  	  	  	  In	   the	   case	   of	   anger,	   men	   reported	   stronger	   emotions	   than	   women,	   however,	  subjects	   held	   the	   stereotypic	   view	   that	   typical	   men	   experience	   and	   express	   anger	  more	  intensely	  than	  typical	  women	  (Grossman	  &	  Wood,	  1993).	  	  
Lerner	  et	  al.	  (2003)	  conduct	  a	  national	  field	  experiment	  in	  the	  United	  States	  in	  order	  to	  examine	  the	  effect	  of	  fear	  and	  anger	  on	  perceived	  risks	  of	  terrorism.	  Their	  results	  also	   reveal	   that	  men	  hold	   less	  pessimistic	   risk	   estimates	   than	  women	  do,	  whereby	  emotion	   differences	   explain	   sixty	   to	   eighty	   percent	   of	   that	   gender	   difference.	   In	  addition	   to	   this,	   the	   researchers	   find	   that	   fear	   and	   anger	   alter	   the	   beliefs	   and	  attitudes	   concerning	   matters	   of	   national	   interest.	   The	   experience	   of	   more	   anger	  triggers	  more	  optimistic	  beliefs,	  whereas	  the	  experience	  of	  more	  fear	  triggers	  greater	  pessimism.	   Across	   all	   risks	   that	  were	   assessed	  males	   express	   less	   pessimism	   than	  females.	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Based	  on	  these	  results	  Croson	  &	  Gneezy	  (2009)	  conclude	  the	  following:	  if	  females	  are	  more	  likely	  to	  be	  afraid	  of	  losing	  (e.g.	  to	  overrate	  the	  probability	  of	  losing),	  relative	  to	  males,	  females	  will	  consider	  a	  given	  gamble	  as	  more	  risky	  and	  thus	  will	  behave	  in	  a	  more	  risk-­‐averse	  way	  than	  men.	  	   	  
H.	   Fehr-­‐Duda,	   M.	   de	   Gennaro,	   and	   R.	   Schubert	   (2006)	   conduct	   a	   laboratory	  experiment	  with	  monetary	  incentives	  to	  examine	  whether	  the	  stereotype	  of	  women	  being	   more	   risk-­‐averse	   than	   men	   in	   financial	   decision-­‐making	   reflects	   gender	  differences	  in	  actual	  risk-­‐taking	  behavior.	  The	  authors	  find	  that	  gender	  differences	  in	  risk-­‐taking	  behavior	  crucially	  depend	  on	  probabilities:	  they	  can	  safely	  conclude	  that	  there	   are	   no	   strong	   gender	   differences	   in	   the	   valuations	   of	   monetary	   outcomes,	  however,	   they	   find	   convincing	   evidence	   that	   men	   and	   women	   weight	   the	  probabilities	  differently.	  Their	  experiment	  yields	  three	  important	  conclusions:	  Firstly,	  women	   seem	   to	  be	   less	   sensitive	   to	   changes	   in	  probabilities	   than	  men	   are,	   so	   that	  women’s	   probability	   weighting	   curves	   are	   more	   curved	   than	   those	   of	   men,	  irrespective	   of	   the	   context	   and	   the	   domain.	   Secondly,	   female	   reaction	   to	   gains	   is	  strongly	   different	   to	   their	   reaction	   to	   losses.	   In	   the	   gain	   domain	  women	   are	  more	  likely	   to	   underweight	   large	   probabilities,	   whereas	   in	   the	   loss	   domain	   probability	  weights	   lie	  much	   closer	   to	   the	   identity	   line.	   Thirdly,	   females	   are	  more	   likely	   to	   be	  especially	  pessimistic	  when	  winning	  gambles	  are	  framed	  in	  investment	  terms.	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  These	   results	   suggest	   that	   women	   are	   more	   risk-­‐averse	   in	   the	   domain	   of	  investment	  decisions	  when	  probabilities	  of	  winning	  are	  of	  medium	  or	  large	  size.	  As	  a	  consequence,	   females	   seem	   to	   be	   more	   risk-­‐averse	   than	   males	   are	   in	   specific	  circumstances	  (Fehr-­‐Duda,	  De	  Gennaro,	  &	  Schubert,	  2006).	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3.4.4.	  Overconfidence	  Besides	  gender	  differences	  in	  risk-­‐attitudes	  and	  in	  the	  evaluation	  of	  risk,	  confidence	  represents	  another	  possible	  source	  for	  gender	  differences	  in	  risk-­‐attitudes	  (Croson	  &	  Gneezy,	  2009).	  Overconfidence	  can	  be	  observed	  when	  someone	  says	  to	  be	  X	  percent	  sure	  about	  a	  fact,	  however,	  this	  person	  is	  right	  less	  than	  X	  percent	  of	  the	  time	  (Soll	  &	  Klayman,	  2004).	  
M.	  Lundeberg,	  P.	  Fox,	  and	   J.	  Punćochaŕ	  (1994)	  examine	  gender	  differences	   in	   item-­‐specific	   confidence	   judgments.	   The	   researchers	   find	  only	   little	   evidence	   to	   support	  the	  notion	   that	  women	  have	   low	  confidence.	  Both,	  men	  and	  women,	  but	  especially	  undergraduate	   men,	   state	   higher	   levels	   of	   confidence	   than	   the	   accuracy	   of	   their	  answers	  justified.	  Furthermore,	  their	  results	  reveal	  that	  men	  and	  women	  report	  very	  different	  confidence	  scores	  regarding	  estimates	  of	  general	  feelings	  of	  confidence	  than	  they	   do	   in	   estimating	   their	   confidence	   in	   the	   accuracy	   to	   their	   answer	   to	   specific	  items.	  A	  very	  important	  finding	  is	  that	  gender	  differences	  depend	  on	  the	  content	  of	  the	  question.	   In	  certain	  domains,	   such	  as	  mathematics,	  men	  report	  higher	   levels	  of	  confidence	   than	  women,	  while	   in	  other	  domains,	   such	  as	   learning	  and	  memory,	  no	  such	   gender	   differences	   are	   observed.	   The	   data	   indicates	   that	   performance	   alone	  does	   not	   account	   for	   difference	   in	   confidence,	   especially	   confidence	   in	   incorrect	  answers.	   Regarding	   their	   results,	   the	   authors	   conclude	   that	   women	   may	   not	  necessarily	  lack	  confidence,	  but	  in	  some	  cases	  men	  simply	  have	  too	  much	  confidence,	  especially	  when	  they	  are	  wrong.	  The	  typical	  perception	  that	  women	  lack	  confidence,	  rather	   than	  men	  are	  overconfident,	  may	  arise	   from	  comparing	  prospective	   general	  confidence	  rather	  than	  retrospective	  and	  task	  or	  item-­‐specific	  confidence.	  This	  study	  uses	  an	  objective	  standard,	  namely	  the	  accuracy	  of	  the	  answers,	  to	  assess	  confidence,	  so	  that	  the	  problem	  of	  using	  men’s	  level	  of	  confidence	  as	  the	  norm	  is	  eliminated.	  In	  many	  situations,	  being	  overconfident	  when	  wrong,	  may	  not	  be	  a	  desirable	  trait	  –	  just	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as	  the	  American	  humorist	  Josh	  Billings	  put	  it	  more	  than	  a	  century	  ago:	  "It	  ain't	  what	  a	  
man	  don't	  know	  that	  makes	  him	  a	  fool,	  but	  what	  he	  does	  know	  that	  ain't	  so."	  6	  
R.	  Estes	  and	  J.	  Hosseini	  (1988)	  experimentally	  examine	  the	  personal	  characteristics	  influencing	   confidence	   in	   investment	   decisions.	   Their	   experiment	   included	   1,359	  participants	  nationwide.	  By	  the	  use	  of	  multiple	  regressions	  they	  control	  statistically	  for	   variation	   among	   participants	   and	   then	   the	   researchers	   develop	   a	   model	   of	  investment	   decision	   confidence.	   The	   most	   notable	   result	   reveals	   women	   to	   be	  substantially	  less	  confident	  in	  their	  investment	  decisions	  than	  men,	  even	  after	  having	  controlled	  for	  other	  relevant	  variables	  such	  as	  the	  amount	  of	  the	  investment	  decision	  itself	  (Estes	  &	  Hosseini,	  1988).	   	  
J.	   Soll	   and	   J.	   Klayman	   (2004)	   conduct	   a	   study	   in	   which	   participants	   are	   asked	   to	  provide	  estimates	  of	  a	  quantity	  in	  terms	  of	  ranges	  or	  boundaries	  corresponding	  to	  a	  given	  degree	  of	  confidence	  so	  that	  they	  were	  X	  percent	  sure	  that	  the	  correct	  answer	  for	   a	   given	   question	   lay	   between	   their	   chosen	   boundaries.	   The	   authors	   find	  participants	   to	   be	   substantially	   overconfident:	   80	   percent	   intervals	   contained	   the	  correct	  answer	  48	  percent	  of	  the	  time.	  Both,	  men	  and	  women	  exhibit	  overconfidence,	  however,	  men	  are	  almost	  twice	  as	  overconfident	  as	  women.	  Women	  do	  not	  estimate	  more	  precisely,	  but	  their	  intervals	  are	  more	  than	  50	  percent	  wider	  than	  those	  of	  men.	  Concerning	  the	  domain	   in	  which	  the	  participants	  have	  to	  specify	   their	   intervals,	  no	  interaction	  between	  gender	  and	  domain	  can	  be	  found,	  although	  two	  of	  the	  domains	  –	  automobiles	  and	  basketball	   –	  might	  be	  viewed	  as	   stereotypically	  masculine	   (Soll	  &	  Klayman,	  2004).	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M.	   Niederle	   and	   L.	   Vesterlund	   (2007)	   use	   a	  mathematical	   problem-­‐solving	   task	   to	  examine	  whether	  men	  and	  women	  of	  the	  same	  ability	  differ	  in	  their	  selection	  into	  a	  competitive	  environment.	  The	  researchers	  can	  not	  observe	  any	  gender	  differences	  in	  performance,	  however,	  males	   select	   the	   tournament	   twice	  as	  much	  as	   their	   female	  counterparts:	  73	  percent	  of	  the	  men	  choose	  the	  tournament,	  and	  only	  35	  percent	  of	  the	   women	   do.	   The	   resulting	   gender	   gap	   in	   tournament	   entry	   does	   not	   root	   in	  performance	  or	  other	  factors	  such	  as	  risk	  and	  feedback	  aversion.	  Their	  results	  reveal	  that	   the	  gender	  gap	   in	  tournament	  entry	   is	  primarily	  caused	  by	  two	  factors:	   firstly,	  men	   are	   substantially	   more	   overconfident	   about	   their	   relative	   performance	   than	  women,	  and	  secondly,	  men	  and	  women	  differ	  in	  their	  preferences	  for	  performing	  in	  a	  competition.	  Thus,	  gender	  differences	  in	  overconfidence	  seem	  to	  play	  a	  considerable	  role	   in	   the	   explanation	   of	   the	   gender	   gap	   in	   tournament	   entry,	   however,	   these	  differences	   only	   account	   for	   a	   share	   of	   the	   gap.	   Other	   general	   factors,	   such	   as	  overconfidence,	   risk,	   and	   feedback	   aversion	   by	   themselves	   also	   generate	   a	   gap	   in	  choices	   of	   compensation	   scheme.	   The	   combination	   of	   such	   factors	   cause	   equal	  performing	   men	   and	   women	   to	   choose	   different	   compensation	   schemes.	   Gender	  differences	   in	   overconfidence	   largely	   explain	   this	   difference,	   whereas	   risk	   and	  feedback	   aversion	   seem	   to	   play	   a	   negligible	   role.	   The	   researchers	   interpret	   their	  results	   that	   women	   shy	   away	   from	   competition	   whilst	   men	   seem	   to	   embrace	   it	  (Niederle	  &	  Vesterlund,	  2007).	  
3.4.5.	  Risk	  as	  Challenge	  or	  Threats	  Another	  remaining	  explanation	  for	  the	  observed	  risk	  preference	  differences	  between	  men	   and	  women	   is	   the	   interpretation	   of	   a	   risky	   situation.	   E.	   Arch	   (1993)	   tries	   to	  explain	  the	  persistence	  of	  difference	  between	  the	  public	  achievement	  of	  women	  and	  men	  by	  gender	  differences	  in	  the	  responses	  of	  men	  and	  women	  to	  situations	  that	  are	  perceived	  as	  risky.	  Whilst	  men	  are	  more	  likely	  to	  view	  a	  risky	  situation	  as	  a	  challenge	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calling	  for	  participation,	  women	  consider	  risky	  situations	  as	  threats	  so	  that	  they	  are	  encouraged	   to	  avoid	   these	   situations.	  The	  author	  argues	   that	  gender	  differences	   in	  risk-­‐taking	  behavior	  do	  not	  root	  in	  differences	  in	  ability,	  persistence,	  or	  eagerness	  to	  perform	   a	   task	   well,	   but	   they	   do	   result	   from	   different	   underlying	   motivations	  between	  men	   and	  women.	   The	   section	   on	   competitive	   behavior	  will	   focus	   on	   this	  topic	  in	  detail.	  	   	  
J.	  Block	   (1983)	  underlines	   the	   fact	   that	  men	  and	  women	  are	  motivated	  differently.	  Male	   achievement	   is	   stimulated	   under	   challenging,	   ego-­‐involving	   situations,	   while	  these	   same	   situational	   factors	  do	  not	   facilitate,	   and	   eventually	   even	   impair,	   female	  performance.	   Moreover,	   women	   express	   less	   confidence	   in	   problem-­‐solving	   tasks	  and	  tend	  to	  underestimate	  their	  level	  of	  ability	  or	  performance	  compared	  to	  men.	  	   	  	  	  	  	  The	  author	  also	  points	  out	  that	  there	  is	  appreciable	  sex-­‐differentiated	  socialization	  of	  girls	  and	  boys	  at	  home	  as	  well	  as	  at	  school.	  Boys	  are	  usually	  granted	  more	  freedom	  to	   explore	   and	   encourage	   curiosity,	   independence,	   and	   testing	   of	   oneself	   in	  achievement	   and	   other	   competitive	   settings.	   This	   socialization	   pattern	  may	   extend	  the	  experience	  of	  males	  relative	  to	  females.	  For	  girls,	  the	  socialization	  process	  often	  discourages	   exploration,	   constrains	   spheres	   of	   activity,	   stresses	   proprieties,	   and	  emphasizes	   close	   supervision,	   so	   that	   female	   experiences	   are	   restricted.	   Such	   sex-­‐differentiated	   socialization	   practices	   influence	   the	   cognitive	   and	   personality	  development	  of	  males	  and	  females	  and	  thus	  may	  lead	  to	  sex	  differences	  in	  risk	  and	  competition	  behavior	  (Block,	  1983).	   	  
3.5.	  Exceptions	  to	  the	  Rule:	  Mangers	  and	  Professional	  Population	  
The	   better	   part	   of	   the	   studies	   discussed	   above	   used	   members	   of	   the	   general	  population,	   or	   the	   convenient	   university	   population,	   as	   participants.	  Notwithstanding,	   there	  are	  also	  studies	   focusing	  on	  a	   subsample	  of	   the	  population,	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namely	  managers	  and	  professionals.	  Among	   this	   subpopulation,	   gender	  differences	  in	   financial	   risk	   preferences	   are	   not	   that	   distinctive	   compared	   to	   the	   general	  population,	  or	  even	  nonexistent	  (Croson	  &	  Gneezy,	  2009).	  
S.	  Atkinson,	  S.	  Baird,	  and	  M.	  Frye	  (2003)	  compare	  the	  performance	  and	  investment	  behavior	  of	   female	   fixed-­‐income	  mutual	   fund	  managers	  compered	  with	  male	   fixed-­‐income	  mutual	  fund	  managers.	  Professional	  fund	  managers	  as	  study	  object	  allow	  the	  authors	   to	   overcome	   the	   shortcomings	   of	   prior	   research	   suggesting	   that	   gender	  influences	  investment	  behavior	  and	  risk-­‐aversion.	  The	  examination	  of	  female	  mutual	  fund	   managers	   enables	   the	   researchers	   the	   control	   for	   wealth	   and	   knowledge	  differences	  between	  men	  and	  women.	  Their	   results	   suggest	   that	   these	  controls	  are	  important	  as	  male	  and	  female	  managers	  seem	  similar	  in	  terms	  of	  performance,	  risk,	  and	  other	  fund	  characteristics,	  so	  that	  male-­‐	  and	  female-­‐managed	  funds	  do	  not	  differ	  significantly.	   The	   researchers	   interpret	   their	   results	   in	   the	  way	   that	   differences	   in	  investment	  behavior,	  which	  are	  often	  attributed	  to	  gender,	  may	  be	  related	  to	  wealth	  constraints	  and	  investment	  knowledge.	   	  	  	  	  	  However,	   gender	   is	   found	   to	   influence	   the	   decision-­‐making	   of	   mutual	   fund	  investors:	   the	  net	   asset	   flows	   into	   female-­‐managed	   funds	   are	   lower	   than	   for	  male-­‐managed	  funds.	  This	  is	  especially	  the	  case	  in	  the	  manager’s	  first	  year	  of	  managing	  the	  fund,	  irrespective	  of	  whether	  she	  is	  replacing	  another	  manager	  or	  starts	  managing	  a	  new	   fund.	  This	   finding	  may	  explain	  why	   there	  are	   relatively	   few	  women	  managing	  mutual	   funds,	   given	   they	   perform	   as	  well	   as	  men.	   Thus,	  mutual	   fund	   families	  may	  hesitate	   to	   hire	   female	   fund	   managers	   if	   they	   fear	   that	   investors	   prefer	   male-­‐managed	  funds	  (Atkinson,	  Baird,	  &	  Frye,	  2003).	  
The	  paper	  of	  J.E.V.	  Johnson	  and	  P.L.	  Powell	  (1994)	  comparing	  the	  differences	  in	  the	  nature	   of	   decisions	   taken	   by	   men	   and	   women	   has	   already	   been	   discussed	   in	   the	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previous	   section.	   This	   section	   only	   offers	   a	   very	   brief	   overview	   of	   their	   results	  concerning	  managers.	   The	   authors	   find	   that	   the	   decision-­‐making	   characteristics	   of	  men	   and	   women	   in	   a	   non-­‐managerial	   population,	   in	   which	   subjects	   have	   not	  undergone	   a	   formal	   management	   education,	   contrast	   those	   of	   the	   managerial	  population	   of	   potential	   and	   actual	   managers	   who	   have	   a	   formal	   management	  education.	   Johnson	   and	  Powell	   (1994)	   argue,	   that	  women	   are	   often	   excluded	   from	  managerial	  positions	  of	  authority	  and	  leadership	  due	  to	  the	  stereotypes,	  which	  have	  come	   to	   existence	  by	   the	  observation	  of	   non-­‐managerial	   population.	  However,	   this	  stereotypical	  view	  may	  not	  apply	  to	  the	  managerial	  sub-­‐population,	  which	  consists	  of	  men	   and	   women	   displaying	   similar	   risk-­‐propensity	   and	   taking	   decisions	   of	   equal	  quality	  (Johnson	  &	  Powell,	  1994).	   	  
R.	  Masters	  and	  R.	  Meier	  (1988)	  examine	  whether	  men	  and	  women	  owning	  or	  owning	  and	  managing	  a	  small	  business,	  the	  entrepreneurs,	  differ	  from	  men	  and	  women	  not	  owning	   but	   managing	   a	   small	   business,	   the	   managers.	   Their	   findings	   reveal	   that	  contrary	  to	  the	  popular	  opinion,	  entrepreneurs	  and	  managers	  do	  not	  differ	   in	  their	  risk-­‐taking	   propensity.	   Moreover,	   the	   researchers	   find	   no	   differences	   in	   the	   risk-­‐taking	  propensity	  of	  male	  vs.	  female	  entrepreneurs	  (Masters	  &	  Meier,	  1988).	   	  
S.	   Birley	   (1989)	   also	   studies	   the	   entrepreneurial	   sector	   and	   finds	   a	   growth	   of	  women-­‐owned	   businesses	   reflecting	   a	   changing	   society	   in	   which	   women	   are	  beginning	   to	   feel	   more	   confident	   about	   their	   own	   skills	   and	   to	   build	   their	   own	  commercial	  networks.	  Thus,	  the	  author	  concludes	  that	  differences	  between	  the	  sexes	  in	  skills	  and	  motivation	  have	  diminished	  since	  the	  World	  War	  II	  (Birley,	  1989).	   	  
The	   above	   leads	   to	   the	   conclusion	   that	   gender	   differences	   in	   risk	   preferences	  observed	  among	  the	  general	  population	  do	  not	  extend	  to	  the	  managerial	  population.	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This	  may	  also	  be	  a	  result	  of	  self-­‐selection,	  and	  with	  regard	  to	  the	  nature	  and	  nurture	  debate,	  we	  now	  focus	  on	  nature:	   	  People	  with	  a	  more	  risk-­‐averse	  behavior	  may	  not	  choose	   managerial	   occupations	   frequently.	   While	   fewer	   women	   select	   managerial	  positions,	  those	  who	  do,	  exhibit	  similar	  risk	  preferences	  as	  men.	  	   	  	  	  	  	  Another	  possible	  explanation	  may	  be	  adaptive	  behavior	  to	  the	  job:	  once	  a	  woman	  has	  become	  a	  manager,	  she	  starts	  behaving	   in	  a	   less	  risk-­‐averse	  way.	  Nevertheless,	  the	   existing	   evidence	   indicates	   that	   managers	   and	   professionals	   embody	   import	  exceptions	  to	  the	  rule	  that	  men	  are	  less	  risk-­‐averse	  than	  women	  (Croson	  &	  Gneezy,	  2009).	  
P.	  Dwyer,	  J.	  Gilson,	  and	  J.	  List	  (2002)	  tie	  together	  these	  exceptions	  to	  a	  general	  rule.	  They	  use	  data	  from	  nearly	  2000	  mutual	  fund	  investors	  to	  examine	  whether	  investor	  gender	   is	   related	   to	   risk-­‐taking	   behavior,	   which	   is	   revealed	   in	   mutual	   fund	  investment	   decisions.	   According	   to	   the	   existing	   literature	   the	   researchers	   find	  women	  to	  display	  less	  risk-­‐taking	  than	  men	  in	  their	  most	  recent,	  largest,	  and	  riskiest	  mutual	   fund	   investment	   decisions.	   However,	   the	   impact	   of	   gender	   on	   risk-­‐taking	  behavior	   is	   significantly	   attenuated	  when	   investor	   knowledge	   of	   financial	  markets	  and	   investments	   is	  controlled	   for	   in	   the	  regression.	  Thus,	   their	   results	  suggest	   that	  women’s	   greater	   level	   of	   risk-­‐aversion,	   which	   is	   frequently	   documented	   in	   the	  literature,	   is	   partly	   explained	   by	   knowledge	   disparities	   between	   men	   and	   women	  (Dwyer,	  Gilkeson,	  &	  List,	  2002). 
3.6.	  Conclusion	  
A	   large	   part	   of	   the	   existing	   literature	   documents	   gender	   differences	   in	   risk-­‐taking	  behavior:	  women	  are	  more	  risk-­‐averse	  than	  men.	  Croson	  &	  Gneezy	  (2009)	  highlight	  some	  factors,	  which	  they	  believe	  to	  cause	  this	  gender	  differences.	  Affective	  reaction	  to	   risk	   is	   one	  major	   factor:	  men	   and	  women	   differ	   in	   their	   emotional	   reactions	   to	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risky	   or	   uncertain	   situations	   and	   these	   different	   emotional	   reactions	   lead	   to	  differences	   in	   risk	   preferences.	   Moreover,	   emotions	   influence	   both,	   evaluations	   of	  outcomes	  and	  evaluations	  of	  probabilities;	  and	  yet	  emotions	  are	  not	  the	  only	  reason	  for	   gender	   differences	   in	   risk-­‐taking	   behavior.	   In	   addition	   to	   this,	   men	   are	   more	  confident	   than	   women,	   which	   results	   in	   men	   having	   a	   different	   perception	   of	   the	  probability	   distribution	   underlying	   a	   specific	   risk	   than	  women.	   Furthermore,	   men	  are	   more	   likely	   to	   consider	   risky	   situations	   as	   a	   challenge	   rather	   than	   as	   threat,	  which	  results	  in	  men’s	  increased	  risk	  tolerance.	   	  	  	  	  	  These	  differences	  can	  be	  observed	  in	  most	  domains	  of	  risk-­‐taking.	  It	   is	   important	  to	   point	   out	   that	   these	   differences	   are	   weakened	   by	   experience	   and	   profession:	  studies	  with	  managers	  and	  entrepreneurs	  find	  no	  significant	  or	  even	  not	  any	  gender	  differences	  in	  risk	  preferences	  of	  the	  subjects.	  	  
Future	  research	  should	  address	  these	  two	  driving	  forces	  behind	  these	  exceptions	  to	  the	   rule	   and	   try	   to	   disentangle	   them:	   self-­‐selection	  meaning	   that	  more	   risk-­‐loving	  people	   select	   and	   remain	   in	   professional	   careers,	   and	   learning,	   which	   means	   that	  people	   learn	   from	   their	   professional	   environment	   and	   thus	   adopt	   less	   risk-­‐averse	  behavior	  	  (Croson	  &	  Gneezy,	  2009). 
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4.	  Gender	  Differences	  in	  Competition	  Preferences	  
This	   section	   is	   concerned	   with	   an	   important	   gender	   difference,	   which	   has	   been	  identified	   in	  experiments	  as	  well	  as	   in	   field	  studies:	  differences	   in	  attitudes	  toward	  competition.	  Recent	  findings	  indicate	  that	  women	  are	  more	  disinclined	  than	  men	  to	  participate	  in	  competitive	  interactions	  such	  as	  tournaments,	  bargaining,	  and	  auctions.	  Moreover,	  male	  performance	  seems	  to	  improve	  under	  competition	  relative	  to	  female	  performance.	  As	  a	  result,	  the	  performance	  and	  participation	  of	  men	  increase	  relative	  to	  that	  of	  women	  as	  the	  competitiveness	  of	  a	  certain	  environment	  increases	  (Croson	  &	  Gneezy,	  2009).	  
4.1.	  Gender	  Differences	  in	  the	  Response	  to	  Competition	  
This	   section	   tries	   to	   answer	   what	   happens,	   when	   people	   find	   themselves	   in	  competition.	   Moreover,	   this	   section	   provides	   evidence	   whether	   men	   and	   women	  react	   differently	   to	   competitive	   incentives.	   Croson	  &	  Gneezy	   (2009)	   point	   out	   that	  recent	   findings	   suppose	   that	   men’s	   performance	   is	   more	   affected	   by	   the	  competiveness	   of	   the	   environment	   than	   women’s	   performance.	   The	   remainder	   of	  this	  section	  presents	  findings	  from	  several	  laboratory	  experiments	  and	  field	  studies.	  
4.1.1.	  Lab	  Experiments	  U.	  Gneezy,	  M.	  Niederle,	  and	  A.	  Rustichini	  (2003)	  conduct	  a	  laboratory	  experiment	  to	  test	   for	   the	   hypothesis	   that	   men	   and	   women	   react	   differently	   to	   competitive	  incentive	   schemes	  when	   competing	   against	   one	   another.	   They	   use	   groups	   of	   three	  men	   and	   three	   women	   and	   the	   participants	   have	   to	   perform	   the	   task	   of	   solving	  computerized	   mazes.	   In	   the	   benchmark	   treatment,	   participants’	   payoff	   depends	  solely	   on	   their	   own	   performance:	   each	   participant	   receives	   a	   fixed	   piece-­‐rate	   for	  every	   maze	   solved	   in	   a	   given	   time	   period	   of	   fifteen	   minutes.	   Male	   participants	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perform	  slightly	  better	  solving	  11.2	  mazes	  on	  average,	  compared	  with	  9.7	  for	  women.	  In	   this	   treatment,	   the	   researchers	   do	   not	   find	   any	   statistically	   significant	   gender	  differences	  in	  performance.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  In	   the	  second	  treatment,	  a	   tournament	   is	  used	  to	  study	  the	  effect	  of	  competition:	  the	   group	   has	   the	   same	   size	   and	   composition	   as	   in	   the	   benchmark	   treatment,	   but	  only	  the	  participant	  solving	  the	  largest	  number	  of	  mazes	  is	  paid	  proportionally	  to	  the	  output.	   As	   a	   result	   to	   the	   new	   competitive	   environment,	   men’s	   performance	  increases,	   while	   women’s	   performance	   is	   not	   affected.	   When	   being	   paid	   on	   a	  competitive	  basis,	  men’s	  mean	  performance	   increases	   significantly	   to	  15	  mazes	  on	  average,	  whilst	  women’s	  performance	   remains	   statistically	   the	   same	  at	  10.8	  mazes	  on	  average.	  Hence,	  when	  only	  the	  best	  participant	  is	  rewarded	  in	  such	  a	  competitive	  situation,	   men	   do	   react	   with	   an	   extra	   effort,	   whereas	   women	   do	   not.	   Thus,	   men	  outperform	   women	   on	   average	   –	   in	   the	   noncompetitive	   environment	   not	  significantly,	   however,	   in	   the	   competitive	   environment,	   the	   gender	   gap	   in	   average	  performance	  is	  significant.	  	   	  	  	  	  	  The	   tournament	   treatment	   differs	   from	   the	   piece-­‐rate	   treatment	   in	   two	   ways:	  firstly,	   payment	   is	   uncertain,	   and	   the	   payment	   depends	   on	   the	   other	   participants’	  performance.	   Hence,	   a	   possible	   explanation	   of	   the	   resulting	   gender	   difference	   is	  women’s	   higher	   risk-­‐aversion,	   so	   that	   if	   effort	   is	   costly,	   the	   introduction	   of	  uncertainty	  into	  payments	  will	  affect	  men	  and	  women	  differently.	  In	  order	  to	  control	  for	   this	   assumption,	   the	   authors	   also	   include	   a	   third	   treatment,	   introducing	  uncertainty	  without	  competition.	  Again,	  as	  in	  the	  tournament	  only	  one	  participant	  is	  paid,	  however,	  this	  participant	  is	  chosen	  at	  random.	  In	  this	  treatment,	  no	  significant	  gender	  differences	  are	  found,	  and	  thus	  the	  gender	  gap	  in	  performance	  is	  lower	  than	  in	  the	  tournament	  treatment.	  	   	  	  	  	  	  All	   these	   three	  experiments	  are	  conducted	   in	  groups	  of	  mixed	  gender	  with	   three	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men	   and	   three	   women	   each.	   As	   the	   question	   whether	   women	   might	   perform	  differently	  in	  single-­‐sex	  groups	  than	  in	  mixed	  groups	  has	  not	  been	  answered	  yet,	  the	  researchers	   include	  single-­‐sex	  tournaments	  to	  discern	  the	  effect	  of	  competition	  per	  se	  on	  women’s	  performance.	  The	  tournament	  treatment	  is	  conducted	  a	  second	  time,	  but	  now	  the	  groups	  consist	  of	  either	  six	  men	  or	  six	  women.	  The	  results	  reveal	   that	  women’s	   performance	   significantly	   increases	   in	   the	   single-­‐sex	   tournament	   as	  compered	   to	   the	  non-­‐competitive	   treatment.	  So	  whilst	   single-­‐sex	   tournaments	   lead	  to	  an	  increase	  in	  women’s	  mean	  performance,	  the	  gender	  gap	  in	  mean	  performance	  is	   decreased.	   Thus,	   competitive	   environments	   in	   which	   women’s	   performance	  increase	  do	  exist.	  Overall,	  the	  performance	  of	  the	  winners	  of	  single-­‐sex	  tournaments	  is	  not	  worse	  than	  that	  of	  the	  winners	  of	  mixed-­‐sex	  tournaments.	  	   	  	  	  	  	  The	  researchers	  show	  that	  the	  significant	  gender	  gap	  in	  tournaments	  is	  not	  caused	  by	  the	  uncertainty	  of	   the	  payments	   in	  tournaments	  through	  sex	  differences	   in	  risk-­‐aversion.	  Furthermore,	  the	  authors	  find	  a	  significant	  increase	  in	  mean	  performance	  when	  noncompetitive	   schemes,	   such	  as	   the	  piece-­‐rate	  or	   the	   random	  payment,	   are	  replaced	   by	   competitive	   schemes,	   such	   as	   single-­‐sex	   and	   mixed-­‐sex	   tournaments.	  Single-­‐sex	  tournaments	  and	  mixed-­‐sex	  tournaments	  are	  equally	  effective	  in	  eliciting	  performance	   of	   all	   participants	   and	   in	   terms	   of	   eliciting	   high	   performance	   of	   the	  tournament’s	  winners.	  (Gneezy,	  Niederle,	  &	  Rustichini,	  2003).	  
N.	   Datta	   Gupta,	   A.	   Poulsen,	   and	  M.	   Villeval	   (2005)	   set	   up	   a	   laboratory	   experiment	  based	  on	  Gneezy,	  Niederle,	  and	  Rustichini’s	  (2003)	  task	  of	  solving	  mazes	  for	  fifteen	  minutes.	  The	  authors	  adopt	  this	  task	  as	  no	  gender	  differences	  in	  performance	  under	  a	   piece-­‐rate	   scheme	   were	   found	   in	   Gneezy,	   Niederle,	   and	   Rustichini’s	   (2003).	  Participants	  are	  matched	  with	  a	  co-­‐participant	  before	  performing	  the	  task	  and	  then	  have	   to	   choose	   between	   being	   paid	   by	   a	   piece-­‐rate	   payment	   scheme	   or	   by	   a	  tournament	   payment	   scheme.	   Under	   the	   piece-­‐rate	   payment	   scheme,	   participants’	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payoff	   depends	   solely	   on	   their	   on	   performance	   as	   they	   are	   paid	   per	   unit	   output.	  Under	   the	   tournament	  payment	  scheme,	  participants	  receive	  a	  higher	  payment	  per	  unit	   of	   output,	   however,	   unless	   they	  perform	  better	   than	   their	   co-­‐participant,	   they	  only	  receive	  a	  low	  payment.	  Once	  subjects	  have	  chosen	  their	  payment	  scheme,	  they	  learn	  his	  co-­‐participant’s	  payment	  scheme	  choice.	  The	  researchers’	  design	  captures	  the	  main	  properties	  of	  many	  competitive	  situations,	  such	  as	  choosing	  between	  a	  low-­‐pay-­‐low-­‐risk	  or	  a	  high-­‐pay-­‐high-­‐risk	   job	  or	  occupation,	  the	  decision	  whether	  or	  not	  to	  work	  hard	  in	  order	  to	  be	  promoted	  or	  to	  apply	  for	  a	  better	  job,	  and	  the	  decision	  whether	  or	  not	  to	  participate	  in	  a	  contest	  or	  election	  in	  order	  to	  obtain	  a	  prize	  or	  a	  mandate.	  	   	  	  	  	  	  The	   authors	   provide	   the	   participants	  with	   information	   about	   his	   co-­‐participant’s	  gender	  in	  order	  to	  observe	  whether	  men	  and	  women	  hold	  different	  beliefs	  about	  the	  relative	   ability	   and	   about	   other	   people’s	   payment	   scheme	   decision,	   and	   whether	  these	  beliefs	  depend	  on	  the	  co-­‐participant’s	  gender.	  	   	  	  	  	  	  In	   the	   experiment,	   60	   percent	   of	   men	   and	   40	   percent	   of	   women	   opt	   for	   the	  tournament	   payment	   scheme.	   When	   the	   expected	   monetary	   payoff	   from	   the	  tournament	  relative	  to	  the	  piece-­‐rate	  is	  increased,	  both	  men	  and	  women	  choose	  the	  tournament	  more	  frequently,	  yet	  men	  still	  choose	  the	  tournament	  significantly	  more	  often	   than	  women.	   Hence,	  men	   and	  women	   react	   to	   economic	   incentives.	  Women	  also	  like	  to	  compete,	  however,	  a	  substantial	  gender	  gap	  in	  competitiveness	  persists.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Furthermore,	   the	   results	   show	   that	   risk	  does	  not	  matter	   for	  men	  when	   choosing	  their	  payment	  scheme,	  however,	  women	  opting	  for	  the	  tournament	  payment	  scheme	  are	  less	  risk-­‐averse	  than	  those	  who	  opt	  for	  the	  piece-­‐rate.	  	  In	  addition	  to	  this,	  beliefs	  about	   the	   co-­‐participant’s	   payment	   scheme	   choice	   do	   not	   influence	   women’s	  payment	  scheme	  choice,	  whilst	  they	  do	  affect	  men’s	  decision,	  and	  the	  effect	  depends	  on	  the	  opponent’s	  gender:	  men	  are	  more	  likely	  to	  choose	  the	  tournament	  when	  their	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co-­‐participant	   is	   a	   man	   than	   when	   it	   is	   a	   women.	   When	   males	   are	   matched	   with	  females,	  those	  who	  believe	  that	  the	  woman	  chooses	  the	  tournament	  option	  are	  more	  likely	  to	  choose	  it	  themselves.	  Men	  as	  well	  as	  women	  are	  found	  to	  believe	  that	  males	  perform	   the	   task	   better	   than	   females,	   and	   the	   typical	   man	   and	   women	   view	  themselves	  as	   superior	  performing	   the	   task	   than	   the	  average	  participant,	  however,	  neither	  men	  nor	  women	  condition	  their	  own	  payment	  scheme	  choice	  on	  these	  beliefs	  about	  their	  relative	  ability.	  	   	  	  	  	  	  Interesting	   gender	   differences	   are	   revealed	   in	   the	   analysis	   how	   well	   men	   and	  women	  perform	   the	   task	   itself.	   In	   general,	  men	   are	   slightly	   better	   at	   the	   task	   than	  women,	  but	  this	  difference	  is	  only	  significant	  when	  a	  subject	  is	  the	  only	  one	  to	  have	  chosen	   the	   tournament	   (meaning	   that	   the	  co-­‐participant	  has	  decided	   for	   the	  piece-­‐rate).	  Moreover,	  women’s	  performance	  does	  not	  vary	  significantly	  with	  the	  payment	  scheme	  chosen,	  whereas	  men’s	   effort	   increases	   as	   soon	  as	   they	  have	  opted	   for	   the	  tournament	  option.	  Furthermore,	  when	  a	  man	  and	  his	  co-­‐participant	  decide	  for	  the	  tournament,	  if	  the	  co-­‐participant	  is	  female	  the	  man	  works	  significantly	  less	  than	  if	  he	  faces	   a	   man	   as	   competitor.	   The	   researchers	   interpret	   this	   as	   an	   expression	   of	  
chivalry.7	  Thus,	  men	  do	  not	  only	  condition	  their	  decision	  of	  payment	  scheme	  on	  other	  people’s	  gender,	  but	  also	  when	  actually	  performing	  the	  task.	  	   	  	  	  	  	  The	   results	   show	   that	   men	   and	   women	   base	   their	   choices	   on	   different	  considerations:	   women	   are	   primarily	   “internally”	   oriented	   when	   they	   chose	   their	  payment	   scheme;	   their	   choice	   depends	   on	   their	   own	   attitude	   to	   risk.	   Quite	   on	   the	  contrary,	  men	  are	  “externally”	  oriented	  and	  they	  appear	  to	  be	  influence	  by	  a	  norm	  or	  convention	  according	  to	  which	  they	  “have	  to”	  or	  “should”	  compete	  against	  other	  men	  and	  against	  other	  women,	  when	  the	   latter	  are	   thought	   to	  compete.	  Despite	   the	   fact	  that	  men	  and	  women	  in	  the	  sample	  do	  not	  differ	  in	  their	  risk-­‐attitudes,	  women	  seem	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  7	  	  See	  also	  Eckel	  &	  Grossman,	  Chivalry	  and	  Solidarity	  in	  Ultimatum	  Games,	  2001.	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to	   condition	   their	   payment	   scheme	   choice	   on	   this	   variable.	   Another	   possible	  explanation	   for	   the	  observed	  differences	   in	  behavior	   is	  biological:	   in	  our	  ancestors’	  life,	   males	   competed	   for	   females,	   and	   those	   males	   performing	   best	   had	   the	   most	  offspring.	   In	   contrast,	   the	   optimal	   behavior	   for	   childbearing	  women	  was	   based	   on	  cautiousness,	  selectivity,	  and	  avoidance	  of	  dangerous	  situations	  or	  risks.	  However,	  if	  males	   believe	   that	   a	   woman	   will	   compete	   and	   choose	   the	   tournament	   payment	  scheme,	   then	  according	   to	   this	  gender	  norm,	   the	  woman	  behaves	   like	  a	  man	   in	   the	  male’s	  eyes	  and	   thus	   the	  male	   is	  more	   likely	   to	  compete	  as	  well	  and	   to	  opt	   for	   the	  tournament	  payment	  scheme	  (Datta	  Gupta,	  Poulsen,	  &	  Villeval,	  2005).	  	  
D.	   Vandegrift,	   A.	   Yavas,	   and	   P.	   Brown	   (2004)	   examine	   the	   outcomes	   when	   agents	  have	   the	  choice	  between	  a	  payment	  scheme,	  where	  rewards	  are	  based	  on	  absolute	  performance,	   such	   as	   piece-­‐rate,	   and	   a	   scheme,	   where	   relative	   performance	   is	  rewarded,	   such	   as	   in	   a	   tournament.	   Their	   participants	   are	   students	   from	   the	  Pennsylvania	  State	  University	  who	  have	  to	  complete	  a	  forecasting	  task	  with	  reward	  depending	  on	  the	  accuracy	  of	  their	  forecasts.	  Primarily,	  the	  subjects	  have	  to	  choose	  between	   entering	   the	   piece-­‐rate	   option	   and	   the	   tournament	   option,	   and	   then	   they	  have	  to	  make	  their	  forecasts.	  Three	  different	  payment	  schemes	  are	  used.	  Firstly,	  the	  piece-­‐rate	   scheme,	   where	   the	   piece-­‐rate	   is	   based	   on	   the	   participant’s	   absolute	  forecasting	   error	   so	   that	   participants	   with	  more	   accurate	   forecasts	   receive	   higher	  payments.	  The	  second	  payment	  scheme,	  the	  tournament,	  pays	  the	  participants	  based	  on	  their	  forecasting	  error	  relative	  to	  other	  participants	  who	  opt	  for	  the	  tournament	  option.	   Participants	   placing	   more	   accurate	   forecasts	   earn	   higher	   payments	   once	  again.	  In	  the	  tournament	  payment	  scheme,	  two	  conditions	  are	  used:	  the	  winner-­‐take-­‐all	  condition,	  whereby	  the	  most	  accurate	  forecaster	  receives	  a	  payment	  of	  $4.50	  and	  all	  other	  participants	  who	  chose	  this	  option	  do	  not	  earn	  any	  payment.	  In	  the	  second	  condition,	  the	  graduated	  tournament,	  the	  same	  $4.50	  payment	  is	  divided	  among	  the	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first,	   second,	   and	   third	   finisher	   in	   the	   tournament	   and	   again,	   all	   other	   finishers	  receive	  nothing.	  	   	  	  	  	  	  The	   researchers	   test	   for	   the	   presence	   of	   gender	   differences	   in	   the	   participants’	  forecasting	  accuracy,	  the	  rate	  of	  entry	  into	  the	  tournament	  option,	  and	  whether	  these	  differences	   are	   related	   to	   the	   structure	   of	   the	   tournament	   rewards.	  	  Their	  results	  reveal	  that	  women	  do	  not	  avoid	  the	  tournament,	  however,	  women	  do	  not	  respond	  to	  changes	  in	  the	  structure	  of	  the	  incentives	  for	  the	  tournament	  option,	  whereas	   men	   produce	   more	   accurate	   forecasts	   in	   both	   the	   winner-­‐take-­‐all	   and	  graduated	   tournament	   conditions.	  The	  gender	  gap	   is	  greater	   in	   the	  winner-­‐take-­‐all	  condition.	  Women	  do	  no	  show	  a	   statistically	   significant	   response	   to	   changes	   in	   the	  structure	  of	   the	  payoffs	   in	  the	  tournament	  option,	  whilst	  men	  reduce	  their	   forecast	  errors	  by	  about	  20	  percent	   in	  response	  changes	   in	  the	  structure	  of	   the	  tournament	  payoff	   option.	   Moreover,	   men	   respond	   statistically	   significantly	   to	   changes	   in	   the	  gender	  composition	  of	  the	  other	  experiment	  participants.	  	   	  	  	  	  	  Gender	   does	   not	   predict	   entry	   into	   the	   tournament	   for	   the	   winner-­‐take-­‐all	  condition,	   however,	   forecasting	   skill	   seems	   to	   have	   a	   large	   impact	   on	   the	   subjects’	  decision	  whether	  to	  enter	  the	  tournament	  or	  not.	  Whereas	  weak	  forecasters	  tend	  to	  avoid	  the	  tournament,	  the	  situation	  is	  reversed	  in	  the	  graduated	  tournament.	  	   	  	  	  	  	  The	   study	   finds	   no	   evidence	   that	  men	   are	  more	   likely	   than	  women	   to	   enter	   the	  tournament	  too	  frequently	  and	  lower	  their	  returns	  relative	  to	  their	  next	  best	  option.	  Considering	   the	   results,	   the	   authors	   conclude	   that	  men	   respond	   to	   the	   option	   of	   a	  more	  competitive	  environment,	  such	  as	  the	  winner-­‐take-­‐all	  condition,	  by	  increasing	  their	  effort	  and	  thus	  increasing	  their	  performance	  significantly.	  Yet,	  these	  increases	  in	  performance	  do	  not	  lead	  men	  to	  enter	  the	  tournament	  at	  higher	  rates.	  Quite	  on	  the	  contrary,	  a	  higher	  degree	  of	  competition	  in	  the	  tournament	  option	  causes	  men	  to	  opt	  for	  the	  tournament	  option	  less	  frequently.	  Such	  a	  response	  may	  be	  explained	  by	  risk-­‐
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aversion,	   as	   the	   variance	   in	   returns	   for	   the	   graduated	   tournament	  option	   is	   lower.	  Women	   do	   not	   show	   any	   significant	   response	   to	   changes	   in	   the	   structure	   of	   the	  payoffs	  in	  the	  tournament	  option	  (Vandegrift,	  Yavas,	  &	  Brown,	  2004).	  
4.1.2.	  Field	  Studies	  U.	  Gneezy	  and	  A.	  Rustichini	  (2004)	  extend	  Gneezy‘s	  work	  (2003),	  which	  reports	  the	  results	   of	   a	   laboratory	   experiment	   of	   solving	   computerized	   mazes,	   along	   a	   few	  important	  dimensions.	  First,	  this	  paper	  is	  based	  on	  an	  experimental	  field	  study	  with	  140	  children	  from	  an	  elementary	  school	  in	  Israel.	  The	  children	  are	  familiar	  with	  the	  task	   and	   procedure	   from	   previous	   experience	   in	   the	   class.	   They	   perform	   the	   task	  without	  knowing	  that	  they	  are	  part	  of	  an	  experiment,	  and	  they	  are	  not	  promised	  any	  compensation.	  Every	  child	  has	  to	  run	  twice	  over	  a	  track	  forty	  meters	  long,	  with	  their	  teacher	  measuring	  their	  speed,	  representing	  the	  dependent	  variable	  studied.	  	  Second,	  all	  participants	  are	  in	  the	  fourth	  grade,	  and	  nine	  or	  ten	  years	  old.	  Third,	  the	  authors	  observe	  an	  open	  competition	  as	  the	  children	  watch	  the	  two	  competitors	  as	  they	  run,	  and	   the	   competitors	   themselves	   receive	   feedback	   concerning	   their	   relative	  performance	   during	   the	   race,	   as	   opposed	   to	   receiving	   feedback	   only	   at	   the	   end.	  Finally,	   the	   children	   are	   not	   offered	   any	   compensation,	   so	   that	   the	   competition	   is	  based	  on	  intrinsic	  motivation.	  	   	  	  	  	  	  The	  precise	  procedure	  is	  the	  following:	  first,	  each	  child	  runs	  once	  by	  him/herself;	  then,	  in	  the	  second	  round,	  children	  are	  matched	  in	  pairs	  independent	  of	  their	  gender,	  starting	  with	   the	   two	   fastest	   children	   in	   the	   previous	   race,	   followed	   then	  with	   the	  next	  two	  fastest	  children	  and	  so	  forth.	  This	  way,	  children	  having	  the	  same	  speed	  are	  matched	  into	  pairs.	  A	  separate	  group	  of	  children	  runs	  alone	  a	  second	  time	  in	  order	  to	  provide	  a	  control	   for	  unobservable	  additional	   factors	   that	  may	  cause	  differences	   in	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the	   outcome.8	  Children	   are	   told	   their	   own	   speed	   in	   the	   first	   round,	   as	   well	   as	   the	  speed	  of	  their	  competitor	  in	  the	  second	  race.	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  In	  the	  first	  round,	  no	  gender	  differences	  can	  be	  observed	  –	  boys	  and	  girls	  run	  at	  the	  same	  speed	  achieving	  and	  average	  time	  of	  7.672	  seconds	  for	  girls	  and	  7.693	  for	  boys.	  Children	  running	  alone	  in	  the	  first	  and	  the	  second	  rave	  improve	  -­‐0,037	  on	  average;	  whereby	  the	  difference	  in	  the	  improvement	  of	  performance	  between	  genders	  is	  not	  significant.	  In	  the	  second	  round,	  there	  are	  116	  children	  in	  the	  competition	  subgroup,	  consisting	  of	  63	  boys	  and	  53	  girls.	  The	  average	  change	  in	  time	  from	  the	  first	  to	  the	  second	  race	  is	  -­‐0.081.	  Whilst	  boys	  improve	  -­‐0.163	  on	  average,	  girls	  run	  slower	  with	  a	  time	   increase	   of	   0.015	   on	   average,	   representing	   a	   significant	   difference.	   Regarding	  the	   change	   in	   performance	   in	   the	   competitive	   environment	   to	   the	   gender	  composition	   of	   the	   pairs,	   the	   results	   reveal	   that	   boys’	   speed	   is	   not	   affected	   by	   the	  gender	  composition	  of	  the	  group,	  whilst	  girls	  perform	  worse	  when	  competing	  against	  girls	  than	  against	  boys.	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  The	   main	   result	   in	   this	   study	   concerning	   reaction	   to	   competitive	   incentives	  replicates	   the	   results	   in	  Gneezy	  et	  al.	   (2003).	  Yet	   it	   is	  notable,	   that	  girls	   competing	  against	  girls	  do	  not	  improve	  their	  performance	  in	  the	  second	  race	  relative	  to	  the	  first	  in	   this	   study,	   which	   contrasts	   the	   results	   from	   the	   maze	   experiment,	   in	   which	  women’s	   performance	   in	   homogenous	   groups	   improves	   relative	   to	   the	  noncompetitive	  environment.	  The	  authors	  provide	  a	  possible	  explanation	  as	  follows:	  even	  when	  two	  girls	  compete	  against	  each	  other,	  the	  rest	  of	  their	  class,	  consisting	  of	  boys	  and	  girls,	  observes	  the	  competition.	  The	  researchers	  find	  support	  for	  the	  claim	  that	  competition	  increases	  males’	  performance	  relative	  to	  females’	  performance.	  It	  is	  notable	   that	   this	   effect	   appears	   in	   two	   very	   different	   environments	   –	   the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  8	  For	  instance,	  one	  gender	  may	  get	  tired	  faster	  than	  the	  other,	  or	  one	  gender	  may	  recover	  	  more	  slowly	  and	  thus	  run	  more	  slowly	  in	  the	  second	  race.	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computerized	  maze-­‐solving	  task	  and	  the	  running	  competition	  –	  indicating	  that	  some	  strong,	  robust	  and	  general	  factors	  are	  involved (Gneezy	  &	  Rustichini,	  2004).	  
J.	   Price	   (2008)	   examines	   the	   outcomes	   of	   the	   Mellon	   Foundation’s	   Graduate	  Education	  Initiative	  (GEI),	  a	  competitive	  fellowship	  program	  found	  in	  1991	  with	  the	  goal	  of	   increasing	  of	  graduation	  rates	  and	  decreasing	  the	  time	  to	  degree.	  The	  study	  investigates	   whether	   there	   are	   gender	   differences	   in	   response	   to	   competition	   and	  whether	   these	   responses	   depend	   in	   the	   gender	   mix	   of	   the	   group.	  	  Ten	  institutions	  at	  the	  Andrew	  Mellon	  Foundation	  participate	  in	  the	  GEI,	  and	  each	  of	  these	  institutions	  selects	  four	  to	  six	  students	  of	  its	  departments	  to	  participate	  in	  the	  GEI.	   Additional	   47	   control	   departments,	   some	   of	   these	   GEI	   departments	   and	   some	  from	   other	   universities,	   were	   selected	   after	   the	   program	   was	   implemented.	   GEI	  awards	   are	   competitive	   and	   the	   primary	   criterion	   is	   student’s	   progress	   toward	   a	  degree.	  The	  implementation	  of	  the	  GEI	  in	  1991	  sent	  three	  signals	  to	  the	  students	  in	  the	  participating	  departments:	   obtaining	   a	   reward	  would	   significantly	   increase	   the	  student’s	  funding;	  only	  a	  small	  fraction	  of	  students	  were	  getting	  the	  awards;	  and	  the	  awards	  were	   accorded	   to	   the	   students	   advancing	   to	   candidacy	   the	   quickest.	   Thus,	  entering	  students	  perceived	  the	  GEI	  as	  a	  very	  competitive	  program.	  	   	  	  	  	  	  The	   results	   reveal	   that	  male	   graduate	   students	   experienced	   a	   relative	   7	   percent	  decrease	  in	  time	  to	  candidacy	  in	  response	  to	  the	  introduction	  of	  the	  competitive	  GEI	  program,	  whilst	  women	  on	  average	  experienced	  no	  change.	  Men	  as	  well	  as	  women	  responded	  in	  a	  more	  positive	  way	  to	  the	  program	  when	  a	  larger	  part	  of	  their	  group	  was	  female.	  The	  impact	  on	  male	  students’	  performance	  was	  greatest	  in	  departments	  having	  a	   larger	  fraction	  of	   female	  students;	  thus	  men	  perform	  better	  when	  more	  of	  their	   competitors	   are	   women.	   For	   female	   students,	   the	   results	   suppose	   that	  competition	  may	  have	  had	  a	  slightly	  positive	  effect	  in	  cohorts	  largely	  consisting	  out	  of	  women,	  whilst	  a	  negative	  impact	  could	  be	  determined	  in	  male-­‐dominated	  cohorts.	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According	  to	  Gneezy,	  Niederle,	  and	  Rustichini’s	  (2003)	  hypothesis	  that	  if	  participants	  hold	  the	  view	  that	  women	  are	   less	  capable	  than	  men,	  an	   increase	   in	  the	   fraction	  of	  one’s	  female	  competitors	  will	  raise	  the	  expectation	  of	  winning	  and	  hence	  one’s	  effort.	  The	  results	  reported	  in	  Price	  (2008)	  are	  quite	  similar	  and	  suggest	  that	  both	  men	  and	  women	  perceived	   female	   students	   as	   less	   capable	   than	  male	   students,	   indicating	   a	  possible	  negative	  relationship	  between	  effort	  exerted	  and	  the	  perceived	  strength	  of	  one’s	  competitors.	  	   	  	  	  	  	  Moreover,	   Price’s	   (2008)	   results	   suppose	   that	   the	   fellowship	   program	   had	   a	  stronger	   and	   more	   positive	   impact	   on	   single	   rather	   than	   married	   students,	  irrespective	  of	   the	  student’s	  gender.	  One	  possible	  explanation	  may	  be	   that	  married	  students	  face	  tighter	  time	  constraints	  more	  frequently,	  so	  that	  when	  competition	  is	  introduced,	  married	  students	  have	  less	  excess	  capacity	  with	  which	  to	  increase	  effort.	  Single	  men	  were	   also	   found	   to	   have	  more	   to	   gain	   through	  winning	   the	   GEI	   award	  than	  women	  or	  married	  men:	  winning	  the	  GEI	  award	  offers	  an	  additional	  benefit	  to	  those	  willing	  to	  attract	  a	  spouse.	   	  	  	  	  	  The	  authors	  point	  out	  that	  policy	  makers	  and	  administrators	  need	  to	  be	  aware	  of	  an	  inherent	  tradeoff	  between	  an	  increase	  in	  aggregate	  outcomes	  through	  the	  use	  of	  competition	   and	   the	   achievement	   of	   gender	   equity.	   Thus,	   increasing	   the	   level	   of	  competition	   within	   a	   certain	   group	   potentially	   increases	   average	   performance,	  however,	  it	  may	  also	  increase	  the	  achievement	  gap	  between	  men	  and	  women,	  and	  as	  a	  consequence	  may	  also	  increase	  the	  gender	  wage	  gap	  within	  a	  certain	  occupation	  or	  industry	  (Price,	  2008).	  
R.	   Garratt,	   C.	  Weinberger,	   and	  N.	   Johnson	   (2011)	   provide	   evidence	   of	   competition	  aversion	   in	   a	   natural	   setting	   somewhere	   between	   the	   simplicity	   of	   a	   laboratory	  experiment	  and	  the	  full	  complexity	  and	  ambiguity	  of	  a	  labor	  market.	  The	  researchers	  study	  the	  behavior	  of	  male	  and	  female	  runners	  participating	  at	  the	  “State	  Street	  Mile”	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race.	  In	  this	  race,	  participants	  can	  chose	  between	  two	  different	  levels	  of	  competition:	  those	   believing	   to	   have	   superior	   ability	   relative	   to	   their	   competitors	   of	   the	   same	  gender	  are	  encouraged	  to	  enter	  a	  highly	  competitive	  race	  with	  cash	  prizes	  for	  the	  top	  three	  times	  in	  each	  race.	  The	  other	  participants,	  namely	  those	  who	  believe	  to	  be	  slow	  runners	  or	  simply	  preferring	  a	  lower	  level	  of	  competition,	  have	  to	  pay	  the	  very	  same	  entrance	   fee	   and	   run	   the	   same	   course	   in	   age-­‐group	   races	  without	   any	   cash	  prizes.	  Four	  highly	  competitive	  “elite”	  races	  take	  place:	  Women’s	  and	  men’s	  “elite”	  race	  for	  those	   expecting	   to	   run	   the	  mile	   faster	   than	   the	   qualifying	   standard	   (QS),	   which	   is	  4:30	  for	  men	  and	  5:30	  for	  women.	  And	  the	  “elite	  masters”	  races	  for	  athletes	  over	  the	  age	  of	  forty,	  in	  which	  the	  actual	  mile	  times	  are	  converted	  to	  age-­‐grade	  times	  in	  order	  to	  determine	  the	  finishing	  place,	  allowing	  runners	  slowing	  down	  with	  age	  to	  enter	  in	  an	  adaptive	  competition.	  	   	  	  	  	  	  The	   results	   show,	   that	   young	  men	   sort	   themselves	   almost	   perfectly	   according	   to	  their	   times	   relative	   to	   the	   QS,	   whilst	   other	   groups	   do	   not.	   In	   order	   to	   test	   the	  hypothesis	  that	  a	  substantial	  proportion	  of	  young	  women	  underestimate	  their	  ability	  and	   thus	   do	   not	   enter	   the	   competitive	   race,	   the	   authors	   create	   a	   subsample	   of	  runners,	  who	   have	   already	   participated	   in	   the	   “State	   Street	  Mile”	   race.	   If	  women’s	  lack	   of	   information	   on	   their	   running	   times	   were	   responsible	   for	   the	   women’s	  frequent	   absence	   in	   the	   “elite”	   race,	   then	   the	   more	   informed	   subsample	   would	  exhibit	   smaller	   gender	  differentials	   in	   the	   tendency	   to	   enter	   the	   competitive	   races.	  Though,	   quite	   to	   the	   contrary,	   the	   more	   informed	   runners	   in	   the	   experienced	  subsample	   exhibit	   nearly	   identical	   patterns	   of	   entry.	   The	   younger	   women	   in	   the	  experienced	  subsample	  are	  even	  slightly	  less	  likely	  to	  enter	  the	  “elite”	  races	  than	  the	  typical	   young	   woman	   in	   the	   full	   sample.	   Thus,	   the	   gender	   differences	   in	   entry	   to	  competition	  seem	  to	  be	  the	  result	  of	  preferences	  rather	  than	  lack	  of	  information.	  The	  researchers	   find	   the	   fastest	   men	   and	   the	   fastest	   women	   are	   very	   similar	   in	   their	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decision	   to	   enter	   competition.	   The	   largest	   difference	   in	   behavior	   can	   be	   observed	  among	  those	  who	  meet	   the	  QS	  but	  are	  unlikely	   to	  win.	  Whereas	  young	  men	   in	   this	  range	  are	  very	  likely	  to	  enter	  the	  competition,	  young	  women	  are	  not.	  This	  proposes	  that	   young	   men	   expect	   to	   enjoy	   the	   competition	   for	   its	   own	   sake,	   whilst	   young	  women	  prefer	  not	  to	  compete	  unless	  they	  are	  likely	  to	  win	  the	  race.	  Among	  runners	  having	   a	   greater	   than	   fifty	   percent	   chance	   of	  winning	   a	   prize,	   namely	   those	   being	  above	  the	  median	  third	  place	  time,	  each	  and	  every	  young	  men	  and	  young	  women	  do	  enter	   the	   competitive	   race.	   The	   participation	   in	   the	   competitive	   race	   is	   nearly	  universal	  among	  young	  women	  who	  are	  likely	  to	  win,	  however,	  then	  it	  drops	  off	  very	  quickly	  among	  those	  who	  are	  comfortable	  above	  the	  QS	  but	  unlikely	  to	  win.	  Hence,	  if	  competition	  aversion	  affects	  behavior	  among	  those,	  who	  are	  unlikely	  to	  win,	  it	  may	  not	  be	  costly	  to	  either	  men	  or	  women.	  	   	  	  	  	  	  The	  authors	  conduct	  a	  comparable	  analysis	  for	  the	  older	  runners.	  The	  results	  show	  that	   the	   participation	   patterns	   among	   older	   men	   are	   similar	   to	   those	   of	   younger	  women.	  Older	  women	  reveal	  the	  most	  competition	  aversion	  of	  all	  groups:	  even	  many	  of	   the	   fastest	   age-­‐adjusted	  women	   avoid	   the	   competitive	   race.	   Only	   38	   percent	   of	  those	  who	  have	  a	  greater	  than	  50	  percent	  chance	  of	  winning	  a	  prize	  enter	  the	  “elite”	  race	  with	  the	  consequence,	  that	  five	  of	  the	  eighteen	  cash	  prizes	  remained	  unclaimed	  as	  only	  very	  few	  women	  entered	  the	  “elite	  masters”	  race	  for	  women	  aged	  over	  forty.	  Thus,	  this	  field	  experiment	  offers	  strong	  evidence	  that	  women	  aged	  40-­‐75	  exhibit	  a	  strong	  preference	  to	  avoid	  competition.	  	   	  	  	  	  	  Those	  who	   are	  most	   likely	   to	  win	   are	   the	  most	   likely	   to	   enter	   the	   race	   in	   all	   for	  groups,	  and	  the	  largest	  difference	  in	  competition-­‐avoidance	  behaviors	  are	  observed	  among	  those	  who	  meet	  the	  QS	  but	  are	  unlikely	  to	  win.	  In	  this	  field	  experiment,	  young	  women’s	  tendency	  to	  avoid	  competition	  is	  not	  too	  costly,	  as	  the	  observed	  pattern	  of	  choices	  does	  not	  reduce	  expected	  payoffs	  drastically.	  However,	  among	  older	  women	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in	   the	   sample,	   competition	   aversion	   exerts	   substantial	   economic	   cost	   (Garratt,	  Weinberger,	  &	  Johnson,	  2011).	  
Taking	   into	   account	   the	  previous	   results,	   it	   seems	   alluring	   to	   generalize	   that	   “men	  are	   more	   responsive	   to	   competition	   than	   women”.	   Nevertheless,	   many	   open	  questions	  still	  remain.	  How	  sensitive	  are	  the	  results	  to	  the	  examined	  task?	  Does	  the	  gender	  composition	  of	  the	  group	  matter?	  	  Whereas	  women	  did	  react	  to	  competition	  in	  single	  sex	  groups	  in	  the	  maze	  study,	  they	  did	  not	  in	  groups	  of	  mixed	  gender.	  In	  the	  children’s	  school	  racing	  study	  gender	  composition	  of	  the	  group	  had	  no	  effects	  on	  the	  results.	   In	   Datta	   Gupta,	   Poulsen,	   and	   Villeval’s	   (2005)	   adapted	   maze	   study,	   men	  seemed	   to	   compete	   more	   against	   men	   than	   against	   women,	   unless	   a	   female	  competitor	  chose	  to	  compete	  as	  well.	  	  
4.2.	  Self-­‐selection	  
Both	  the	  maze	  and	  the	  school	  race	  studies	  focused	  on	  gender	  differences	  in	  reaction	  to	   competition.	   Given	   the	   fact	   that	   men	   and	   women	  may	   rationally	   anticipate	   the	  observed	  gender	  differences	   in	   competition	   aversion,	   they	  may	  base	   their	  decision	  whether	   to	   enter	   competitive	   settings	   on	   these	   assumptions	   and	   thus	   choose	  different	   environments.	   Several	   papers	   have	   examined	   gender	   differences	   in	   the	  choice	  of	  different	  compensation	  schemes	  by	  the	  use	  of	  experiments,	   in	  which	  each	  participant	   had	   the	   choice	   between	   a	   piece-­‐rate	   scheme	   or	   a	   competitive	   winner-­‐take-­‐all	  tournament.	   
M.	  Niederle	  and	  L.	  Vesterlund	  (2007)	  contribute	  to	  a	  literature	  trying	  to	  understand	  why	   women	   are	   underrepresented	   in	   many	   high-­‐profile	   jobs	   and	   across	   enitre	  professions	  by	  examining	  whether	  men	  and	  women	  of	  the	  same	  ability	  differ	  in	  their	  choice	   of	   entering	   a	   competitive	   environment.	   The	   objective	   of	   their	   paper	   is	   to	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investigate	   whether	   men	   and	   women	   differ	   in	   their	   preferences	   for	   competitive	  environments	   and	   how	   such	   gender	   differences	   impact	   economic	   outcomes.	   The	  researchers	  focus	  on	  self-­‐selection	  rather	  than	  on	  gender	  differences	  in	  performance	  under	   an	   exogenously	   given	   incentive	   scheme:	   they	   examine	   whether	   men	   and	  women	  of	  equal	  performance	  are	  equally	  willing	  to	  select	  into	  a	  competition.	  To	  do	  so,	  they	  use	  a	  controlled	  laboratory	  experiment,	  in	  which	  participants	  have	  to	  choose	  between	   a	   competitive	   and	   a	   noncompetitive	   compensation	   scheme	   in	   a	  nondiscriminatory	   environment.	   Such	   an	   environment	   enables	   the	   authors	   to	  objectively	   measure	   performance	   and	   it	   secures	   that	   the	   time	   commitment	   is	   the	  same	   under	   both	   compensation	   schemes.	   The	   researchers	   consider	   four	   different	  possible	  explanations	  to	  determine	  what	  may	  cause	  men	  and	  women	  of	  equal	  ability	  to	  differ	  in	  their	  propensity	  to	  enter	  a	  competitive	  environment:	  Men	  may	  enter	  the	  tournament	  more	  frequently	  than	  women	  as	  they	  may	  like	  to	  compete,	  as	  they	  may	  be	  more	  overconfident,	  as	  they	  may	  be	  less	  risk-­‐averse,	  or	  as	  they	  may	  be	  less	  averse	  to	  feedback.	   	  	  	  	  	  A	   total	   of	   twenty	   groups,	   each	   consisting	   of	   two	   men	   and	   two	   women,	   have	   to	  complete	   a	   real	   task,	   namely	   adding	   up	   sets	   of	   five	   two-­‐digit	   numbers	   for	   five	  minutes.	   Participants	   have	   to	   solve	   as	   many	   problems	   as	   they	   can.	   The	   authors	  selected	  this	  task,	  as	  it	  requires	  both	  skill	  and	  effort	  and	  research	  had	  not	  found	  any	  gender	   differences	   in	   ability	   on	   easy	   math	   tests.	   	   Participants	   are	   aware	   of	   their	  absolute	   performance	   throughout	   the	   experiment,	   however,	   they	   are	   not	   informed	  about	  their	  relative	  performance	  until	  the	  end	  of	  the	  experiment	  and	  so	  they	  do	  not	  know	   whether	   they	   perform	   better	   or	   worse	   than	   the	   other	   participants	   in	   their	  group.	   Participants	   have	   to	   complete	   four	   tasks:	   the	   first	   task	   with	   a	   piece-­‐rate	  compensation	  scheme,	  the	  second	  task	  with	  a	  tournament	  compensation	  scheme,	  in	  the	  third	  task	  participants	  select	  which	  of	  the	  two	  compensation	  schemes	  they	  want	  
	  	   63	  
to	   apply	   to	   their	   future	   performance,	   and	   in	   the	   forth	   task	   participants	   have	   to	  choose	  a	  compensation	  scheme	  for	  their	  past	  piece-­‐rate	  performance.	  This	  last	  task	  is	   used	   to	   determine	   whether	   the	   gender	   gap	   in	   tournament	   entry	   is	   caused	   by	  gender	  differences	  in	  preference	  for	  performing	  in	  a	  competitive	  environment,	  or	  if	  general	   factors	   such	   as	   differences	   in	   overconfidence,	   risk-­‐	   or	   feedback-­‐aversion	  account	  for	  this	  gender	  gap.	  At	  the	  end	  of	  the	  experiment,	  participants	  are	  asked	  to	  guess	   their	   rank	   in	   the	   piece-­‐rate	   of	   the	   first	   task	   and	   in	   the	   tournament	   of	   the	  second	  task,	  whereat	  participants	  receive	  a	  payment	  for	  each	  correct	  guess.	  	   	  	  	  	  	  The	  results	  reveal	  –	  as	  expected	  –	  no	  gender	  difference	  in	  performance	  under	  the	  piece-­‐rate	  or	  under	  the	  tournament.	  Both	  genders	  perform	  significantly	  better	  under	  the	   tournament	   than	  under	   the	  piece-­‐rate,	   however,	   this	   improvement	  may	  not	  be	  caused	  solely	  by	  the	  different	  performance	  incentives	  under	  the	  tournament,	  but	  by	  learning.	  The	  similar	  performances	  of	  men	  and	  women	  result	   in	  equal	  probabilities	  for	  both	  men	  and	  women	  to	  win	  the	  tournament.	  Regarding	  the	  decision	  whether	  to	  enter	  the	  tournament	  or	  not	  in	  task	  three,	  it	  has	  to	  be	  underlined	  that	  choosing	  the	  tournament	  depends	  on	  the	  participant’s	  beliefs	  in	  his	  or	  her	  own	  ability,	  but	  it	  does	  not	   depend	   on	   beliefs	   about	   other	   participants’	   choice	   of	   compensation	   schemes.	  Despite	   the	   absence	   of	   gender	   differences	   in	   performance,	   women	   and	  men	   differ	  significantly	   in	   their	  choices	  of	  compensation	  schemes:	  whereas	  only	  35	  percent	  of	  women	   opt	   for	   the	   tournament,	   73	   percent	   of	   men	   do.	   For	   women	   no	   significant	  differences	   in	   performance	   between	   those	   entering	   and	   those	   not	   entering	   the	  tournament	   can	   be	   found.	   For	   males,	   however,	   the	   tournament	   performance	   is	  slightly	   higher	   for	   those	   entering	   the	   tournament.	   A	   probit	   regression	   reveals:	   the	  performance	   of	   the	   participants	   under	   the	   two	   compensation	   schemes	   does	   not	  significantly	   affect	   the	   decision	   whether	   to	   enter	   the	   tournament,	   yet	   the	  participant’s	   gender	   does.	   Controlling	   for	   past	   performance	   indicates	   that	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performance	  has	  at	  most	  a	  small	  effect	  on	  tournament	  entry,	  and	  for	  every	   level	  of	  performance,	   men	   are	   more	   likely	   to	   enter	   the	   tournament.	   Even	   women	   in	   the	  highest	  performance	  quartile	  have	  a	  lower	  propensity	  to	  opt	  for	  the	  tournament	  than	  men	   in	   the	   lowest	   performance	   quartile.	   Thus,	   low-­‐performing	   men	   enter	   the	  tournament	   too	   often,	   whilst	   high-­‐performing	   women	   enter	   it	   too	   rarely.	  Furthermore,	   concerning	   the	   costs	   associated	   with	   payoff-­‐inferior	   choices	   of	  compensation	   schemes,	  more	  women	   than	  man	   fail	   to	   enter	   the	   tournament	  when	  they	  should,	  and	  more	  men	  than	  women	  enter	  when	  they	  should	  not.	  Therefore,	  the	  cost	  of	  under-­‐entry	   is	  higher	   for	  women,	  whilst	   the	  cost	  of	  over-­‐entry	   is	  higher	   for	  men.	  As	  the	  cost	  of	  over-­‐entry	  is	  lower	  than	  the	  cost	  of	  under-­‐entry,	  the	  total	  costs	  of	  payoff-­‐inferior	   decisions	   are	   higher	   for	  women	   than	   for	  men.	   The	   results	   thus	   far	  show	   that	   equally	   performing	   men	   and	   women	   differ	   substantially	   in	   their	  tournament-­‐entry	   decision:	   whilst	  men	   seem	   to	   embrace	   competition,	   women	   shy	  away	  from	  it.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Regarding	  the	  rank-­‐guessing	  question	  at	  the	  end	  of	  the	  experiment,	  both	  men	  and	  women	  are	  overconfident	  relative	  to	  their	  actual	  rank.	  Whereas	  75	  percent	  of	  males	  think	   they	   are	   best	   in	   their	   group,	   only	   43	   percent	   of	   females	   share	   this	   view.	  Tournament	   entry	   decisions	   are	   positively	   correlated	  with	   the	   participant’s	   beliefs	  on	   relative	   performance,	   though	   substantial	   gender	   differences	   remain.	   After	  controlling	  for	  both	  absolute	  and	  believed	  relative	  performance,	  women	  still	  remain	  significantly	  less	  likely	  to	  enter	  the	  tournament.	  Men’s	  greater	  overconfidence	  helps	  to	   explain	  why	   equally	   performing	  women	   and	  men	   select	   different	   compensation	  schemes,	  however,	  most	  of	  the	  gender	  gap	  still	  remains	  unexplained.	   	  	  	  	  	  Although	  there	  are	  no	  gender	  differences	  in	  performance,	  men	  are	  more	  than	  twice	  as	  likely	  than	  women	  to	  enter	  the	  tournament.	  The	  authors	  suggest	  that	  there	  may	  be	  two	  additional	  reasons	  why	  women	  may	  not	  be	  well	  represented	  in	  competitive	  jobs.	  
	  	   65	  
Firstly,	  in	  mixed-­‐gender	  competitions	  under	  some	  circumstances	  men’s	  performance	  is	   superior	   to	   that	   of	   women.	   Secondly,	   even	   if	   men	   and	   women	   are	   equally	  successful	  in	  competitive	  environments,	  women	  may	  not	  enter	  the	  competition	  at	  the	  same	  rate	  as	  men	  given	  they	  have	  a	  choice.	  The	  researchers	  conclude	  that	  the	  gender	  gap	   in	   tournament	   entry	   seems	   to	   be	  primarily	   caused	  by	  men	  being	   substantially	  more	  overconfident	   than	  women,	   and	  by	   gender	  differences	   in	   the	  preferences	   for	  performing	  in	  a	  competitive	  environment	  (Niederle	  &	  Vesterlund,	  2007).	  
4.3.	  Bargaining	  
Bargaining	  represents	  another	  area	  in	  which	  avoiding	  competition	  may	  have	  strong	  impacts	   on	   the	   outcomes.	   Competitiveness	   involves	   concerns	   about	   one’s	   own	  outcomes	   in	   a	   conflict	   by	  making	   large	   demands	   of	   one’s	   opponent,	   whilst	   on	   the	  contrary,	   cooperativeness	   involves	   concerns	   for	   the	   outcomes	   of	   the	   other	   party.	  Thus	  cooperativeness	   implies	  some	  sort	  of	  a	  social	  preference	  as	  already	  discussed	  above.	  These	  two	  motivations	  are	  not	  mutually	  exclusive	  so	  that	  many	   interactions	  may	   involve	   both.	   	   Some	   psychological	   research	   documents	   small	   but	   significant	  gender	   effects	   in	   negotiation	   performance.	   However,	   similar	   to	   the	   selection	   into	  more	   or	   less	   competitive	   settings,	   the	   decision	  whether	   to	   initiate	   or	   take	   part	   in	  negotiation	  may	  helps	  to	  understand	  economic	  outcomes	  (Croson	  &	  Gneezy,	  2009).	  
L.	  Babcock	  and	  S.	  Laschever	  (2003)	  claim	  that	  women	  avoid	  competitive	  negotiation	  situations	  compared	  to	  men.	  Whereas	  directly	  asking	  for	  what	  you	  want	  is	  a	  rather	  male	   strategy,	   women	   tend	   to	   use	   other	   strategies	   to	   achieve	   what	   they	   want:	  women	   use	   collaborative	   approaches	   more	   frequently	   than	   men,	   or	   they	   asks	   for	  things	  indirectly	  which	  sometimes	  has	  the	  disadvantage	  in	  our	  male-­‐dominated	  work	  culture,	   that	   women’s	   strategies	   are	   misinterpreted	   and	   thus	   leaves	   them	  misunderstood.	  In	  addition	  to	  this,	  many	  women	  avoid	  negotiations	  sometimes	  even	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in	   situations	   in	   which	   they	   know	   that	   negotiations	   are	   appropriate	   and	   expected.	  Babcock’s	  (2003)	  internet	  survey	  reveals	  that	  many	  women	  feel	  more	  uncomfortable	  than	  the	  average	  man	  to	  use	  negotiations	  to	  advance	  their	  interests.	  The	  penalties	  for	  not	  negotiating	  exceed	  the	  monetary	  ones:	  women	  may	  not	  only	  sacrifice	  additional	  income,	   they	   may	   also	   sacrifice	   some	   of	   their	   employer’s	   regard	   too	   (Babcock	   &	  Laschever,	  2003).	  
Small	  et	  al.	  (2007)	  examine	  how	  gender	  and	  frames	  differentially	  affect	  the	  initiation	  of	  negotiations.	  The	  researchers	  conduct	  a	  laboratory	  experiment	  where	  participants	  are	  told	  that	  they	  will	  receive	  between	  $3	  and	  $10	  for	  their	  participation.	  At	  the	  end	  of	   the	   experiment,	   an	   experimenter	   gives	   $3	   to	   each	  participant	   and	   asks	  whether	  this	   is	   OK.	   Each	   participant	   may	   receive	   $10,	   but	   only	   if	   he	   or	   she	   initiates	   a	  negotiation	   with	   the	   experimenter.	   If	   the	   participant	   accepts	   the	   offer,	   or	   just	  complains	  about	  the	  offer	  without	  asking	  for	  more	  money,	  then	  the	  payment	  remains	  at	  the	  minimum	  of	  $3.	  Whereas	  only	  2.5	  percent	  of	  women	  request	  more	  money,	  23	  percent	   of	   men	   do	   so.	   Moreover,	   participants	   are	   asked	   about	   their	   thoughts	   and	  feelings	   about	   negotiating	   and	   about	   asking	   for	   things	   for	   themselves.	   The	  researchers	   find	   that	   women	   have	   a	   much	   more	   negative	   view	   of	   negotiating	   for	  things	  than	  of	  asking	  for	  things,	  whereas	  men	  do	  not	  behave	  differently	  in	  these	  two	  frames	  (Small,	  Babcock,	  Gelfand,	  &	  Gettman,	  2007).	   	  
Hence,	   in	   bargaining	   situations,	   women	   tend	   to	   exhibit	   less	   competitive	   behavior	  than	  men.	  Once	  females	  are	  in	  a	  negotiation	  situation	  their	  behavior	  does	  not	  differ	  than	   much	   from	   that	   of	   males,	   however,	   females’	   propensity	   to	   engage	   in	   a	  negotiation	  at	  all	  differs	  significantly	  from	  that	  of	  males’	  (Croson	  &	  Gneezy,	  2009).	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4.4.	  Why	  are	  Men	  More	  Competitive	  than	  Women?	  
Even	  after	  reviewing	  gender	  differences	  in	  social,	  risk	  and	  competition	  preferences,	  the	  question	  why	  we	  observe	   this	   gender	  difference	   in	   attitudes	   and	  behavior	   still	  remains.	   The	   remainder	   of	   this	   section	   briefly	   presents	   some	   further	   possible	  explanations.	  
H.	   Bowles,	   L.	   Babcock,	   and	   L.	   Lai	   (2007)	   conduct	   experiments	   showing	   that	   the	  differential	   treatment	  men	   and	  women	   face	  may	   explain	   gender	   differences	   in	   the	  propensity	   to	   initiate	   negotiations	   when	   they	   attempt	   to	   negotiate.	   Their	   results	  show	  that	  participants	  penalize	  female	  job	  candidates	  more	  than	  male	  candidates	  for	  initiating	   negotiations.	   Whereas	   male	   evaluators	   are	   found	   to	   penalize	   female	  candidates	  more	  than	  male	  candidates	  for	  initiating	  negotiations;	  female	  evaluators	  penalize	  all	  candidates	   for	   initiating	  negotiations.	  Due	  to	  nervousness,	  women	  tend	  to	   be	   less	   inclined	   than	  men	   to	   negotiate,	   when	   facing	  male	   evaluators.	   However,	  when	   the	   evaluator	   is	   a	   woman,	   no	   gender	   differences	   are	   observed	   (Bowles,	  Babcock,	  &	  Lai,	  2007).	  
Furthermore,	   women	   tend	   to	   make	   choices	   with	   greater	   consideration	   of	   the	  circumstances	  surrounding	   the	  decision.	  Men	  are	  more	   likely	   to	  make	  decisions	  on	  principle,	  whilst	  women	  seem	  to	  be	  more	  responsive	  to	  changes	  in	  the	  parameters	  of	  the	   decision-­‐making	   process.	   Eckel	   and	   Grossman	   (1996)	   argue	   that	   if	   women’s	  social	   norms	   differ	   significantly	   from	   those	   of	   the	   „economic	   man“,	   then	   we	   may	  observe	   substantial	   differences	   in	   their	   economic	   behavior.	   	   Their	   results	   suggest	  that	   if	   men	   are	   more	   rigid	   in	   their	   reservation	   wage,	   they	   stick	   to	   a	   given	   wage	  regardless	  of	  general	  economic	  circumstances,	  such	  as	  the	  unemployment	  rate	  or	  the	  economic	  well	  being	  of	  the	  industry	  in	  general.	  Quite	  on	  the	  contrary,	  women	  may	  be	  more	  flexible	  and	  thus	  adjust	  their	  reservation	  wage	  to	  reflect	  these	  economic	  factors,	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so	   that	   this	   difference	   in	   behavior	   may	   result	   or	   contribute	   to	   lower	   wages	   for	  women	  on	  average	  (Eckel	  &	  Grossman,	  1996).	  
W.	  Harbaugh,	  K.	  Krause,	  and	  S.	  Liday	  Jr.	  (2002)	  offer	  an	  additional	  set	  of	  data	   from	  bargaining	   experiments	   with	   children.	   The	   authors	   study	   the	   development	   of	  bargaining	  behavior	  of	   children	  aged	   from	  seven	   to	  eighteen	  by	   the	  use	  of	  dictator	  and	  ultimatum	  games.	   Significant	   difference	   in	   behavior	   in	   both	   games	   across	   age,	  sex,	   and	   height	   are	   found.	   In	   both	   the	   dictator	   game	   and	   the	   ultimatum	   game,	  children	  make	  and	  accept	  substantially	  smaller	  proposals	  relative	  to	  adults.	  Despite	  acting	  strategically,	   the	  youngest	  children	  are	   found	  to	  make	  and	  accept	  the	   lowest	  proposals	   and	   thus	   exhibit	   the	   highest	   acceptance	   rates.	   Bargaining	   behavior	  changes	  systematically	  with	  age,	  whereas	  the	  bigger	  part	  of	  this	  change	  seems	  to	  be	  related	  to	  changes	  in	  preferences	  for	  fairness,	  rather	  than	  bargaining	  ability.	  	  Whilst	  younger	   boys	   and	   girls	   make	   the	   same	   dictator	   offers,	   older	   girls	   make	   more	  generous	   proposals	   than	   older	   boys	   do.	   The	   researchers	   thus	   conclude,	   that	   these	  gender	  differences	  may	  have	  an	  environmental	  cause	  as	  they	  only	  exhibit	  later	  in	  life	  (Harbaugh,	  Krause,	  &	  Liday	  Jr.,	  2002).	  
U.	  Gneezy,	  K.	  Leonard,	  and	  J.	  List	  (2006)	  use	  an	  experimental	  task	  to	  explore	  whether	  there	   are	   gender	   differences	   in	   the	   decision	   to	   enter	   a	   competitive	   environment	  across	   two	   distinct	   societies:	   the	   Maasai	   in	   Tanzania	   and	   the	   Khasi	   in	   India.	   The	  unique	   aspect	   of	   these	   two	   civilizations	   is	   that	   the	   Maasai	   represent	   a	   textbook	  example	   of	   a	   patriarchal	   society,	   whilst	   the	   Khasi	   are	   a	   matrilineal,	   monogamous	  society	   where	   inheritance	   and	   clan	   membership	   always	   follow	   the	   female	   lineage	  through	  the	  youngest	  daughter.	  The	  Khasi	  women,	  however,	  do	  not	  generally	  assume	  the	  roles	  held	  by	  men	  in	  patriarchal	  societies,	  such	  as	  becoming	  warriors	  or	  hunters,	  yet	   they	   always	   live	   in	   households	   in	  which	   they	   themselves	   or	   their	  mother	  have	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authority	   over	   most	   household	   decisions.	   The	   Khasi	   husband	   has	   no	   authority	   or	  property	  and	  they	  are	  expected	  to	  work	  for	  the	  gain	  of	  his	  wife’s	  family.	  An	  important	  feature	   of	   the	   Khasi	   society	   is	   that	   the	   return	   to	   unverifiable	   investment	   in	   girls’	  human	   capital	   is	   retained	   within	   the	   household,	   whilst	   in	   other	   cultures	   only	   the	  verifiable	  component	  of	  investment	  can	  be	  retained	  through	  bride	  price	  or	  dowry.	  	   	  	  	  	  	  Contrary,	   among	   the	   Maasai,	   age	   and	   cattle	   dominate	   the	   social	   structure.	  Polygamy	   is	   the	   most	   common	   form	   of	   marriage	   and	   wives	   are	   said	   to	   be	   less	  important	   to	   a	  man	   than	   his	   cattle.	  Moreover,	   women	   receive	   less	   education	   than	  men,	   and	   when	   a	   Maasai	   wife’s	   husband	   is	   absent,	   she	   is	   even	   required	   to	   seek	  permission	   from	   an	   elder	   male	   before	   she	   travels	   any	   significant	   distance,	   seeks	  health	  care,	  or	  makes	  any	  other	  important	  decision.	   	  	  	  	  	  The	  researchers	  conduct	  the	  experiment	  in	  similar	  conditions	  within	  both	  societies.	  The	   participants’	   task	   is	   to	   toss	   a	   tennis	   ball	   ten	   times	   into	   a	   bucket	   that	   is	   set	   3	  meters	  from	  them,	  and	  a	  successful	  shot	  requires	  the	  tennis	  ball	  to	  enter	  and	  stay	  in	  the	  bucket.	  This	  task	  was	  chosen	  as	  no	  gender	  differences	   in	  ability	  were	  expected,	  and	   it	   is	   simple	   to	  explain	  and	   implement.	  Participants	  are	  matched	   into	  groups	  of	  two	  anonymously	  and	  then	  each	  of	  them	  has	  to	  decide	  in	  which	  manner	  they	  would	  like	  to	  be	  paid	  for	  their	  performance.	  The	  first	  option	  is	  that	  participants	  are	  paid	  X	  per	   successful	   shot,	   regardless	   of	   the	   other	   participant’s	   performance.	   The	   second	  option	  is	  that	  participants	  are	  paid	  3X	  per	  successful	  shot	  if	  they	  outperform	  their	  co-­‐participant.	  Across	  both	  societies	  the	  X	  is	  set	  equally	  to	  the	  average	  day	  wage	  rate	  of	  roughly	  $0.50.	   	  	  	  	  	  Roughly	  half	   of	   the	  Khasi	   subjects	   choose	   the	   competitive	   environment,	  whereas	  only	  38	  percent	  of	  the	  Maasai	  opt	  to	  compete.	  Among	  the	  Maasai,	  half	  of	  the	  men	  and	  only	   a	   quarter	   of	   the	   women	   select	   to	   compete,	   whilst	   among	   the	   Khasi,	   women	  choose	   the	   competition	   much	   more	   often	   than	   Khasi	   men:	   54	   percent	   of	   Khasi	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women	   compared	   to	   39	   percent	   of	   Khasi	   men	   opt	   for	   the	   competitive	   incentive	  scheme.	  Surprisingly,	  even	  more	  Khasi	  women	  (54%)	  compared	  to	  50	  percent	  of	  the	  Maasai	   men	   select	   the	   competition.	   The	   data	   provides	   a	   piece	   of	   evidence	   that	  existing	  societal	  structure	  and	  socialization	  is	  crucially	  linked	  to	  the	  observed	  gender	  differences	   in	   competitive	   behavior	   and	   thus	   the	   authors	   argue	   that	   “nurture	  matters”.	  Furthermore,	  the	  authors	  conclude	  that	  if	  the	  social	  stigma	  is	  that	  females	  are	   inferior	   in	   competitive	   environments,	   then	   females	   will	   avoid	   competitive	  situations	  	  (Gneezy,	  Leonard,	  &	  List,	  2006).	  
S.	   Colarelli,	   J.	   Spranger,	   and	  M.	   Hechanova	   (2006)	   offer	   a	   piece	   of	   evidence	   for	   an	  opposing	   view,	   namely	   that	   gender	   differences	   are	   based	   on	   genetic	   differences,	  hence	  “nature”	  plays	  an	  important	  role	  as	  well.	  Females	  have	  always	  been	  the	  scarcer	  reproductive	  resource	  and	  at	  any	  given	  time,	  there	  are	  more	  reproductive	  viable	  men	  than	  women	  in	  a	  population.	  Furthermore,	  women’s	  reproductive	  capacity	  is	  limited	  by	  gestation,	  birth,	   lactation,	  and	  menopause.	  Whilst	  physiological	  constraints	   limit	  women	   to	   bearing	   a	   maximum	   of	   about	   ten	   to	   fifteen	   children,	   men	   may	   father	  dozens	   of	   children,	   such	   as	   in	   polygamous	   societies.	   Thus,	   females’	   reproductive	  interests	   are	  more	   selective	   than	  males	   and	   they	   try	   to	   select	   “high	  quality”	  males	  whenever	  possible.	  In	  order	  to	  gain	  a	  desirable	  woman,	  men	  had	  to	  and	  still	  have	  to	  compete	  with	  one	  another	  to	  display	  their	  qualities	  that	  females	  value	  in	  a	  mate,	  such	  as	  good	  genes,	  and	   the	  ability	   to	  provide	  protection	  and	  provisioning	   for	  offspring.	  Under	   these	   conditions,	   women	   depend	   on	   men	   as	   providers	   and	   protectors,	  whereas	  men	  are	  used	  to	  competition	  (Colarelli,	  Spranger,	  &	  Hechanova,	  2006).	   	  	  
Many	  evolutionary	  biologists	  and	  psychologists,	  from	  Charles	  Darwin	  through	  today,	  view	   that	   the	  basic	   structure	  of	   the	  human	  brain	   is	  genetically	  determined,	   so	   that	  the	  regularities	  of	  human	  behavior	  and	  the	  consistent	  differences	  between	  male	  and	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females	   psychology	   may	   be	   inherited	   characteristics.	   According	   to	   this	   approach,	  men	   and	   women	   adopted	   different	   strategies	   at	   some	   point	   in	   human	   history	   in	  order	   to	  maximize	   the	   fitness	  of	   their	  genes.	  Thus,	  genetic	  or	  hormonal	  differences	  could	   possibly	   result	   in	   women’s	   lower	   competitiveness	   relative	   to	   that	   of	   men	  (Croson	  &	  Gneezy,	  2009). 
Considering	   mammals,	   intra-­‐sexual	   selection	   involves	   the	   competition	   between	  members	   of	   one	   sex	   for	  mates.	   It	   is	   generally	   assumed	   that	   intra-­‐sexual	   selection	  almost	   invariably	   involves	   competition	   between	   males,	   whilst	   females	   exercise	   a	  choice,	   and	   not	   the	   reverse.	   Thus,	  males	   are	   eager	   to	   pair	  with	   any	   female,	  whilst	  females	  exert	  at	  least	  a	  passive	  choice.	  A.J.	  Bateman	  (1948)	  concludes	  that	  this	  intra-­‐masculine	  selection	  and	  related	  effects	  may	  have	  influenced	  the	  evolution	  of	  animals	  and	  plants	  in	  various	  ways	  (Bateman,	  1948).	  
J.	  Manning	  and	  R.	  Taylor	  (2001)	  draw	  a	  parallel	  between	  abilities	  that	  are	  useful	   in	  intra-­‐sexual	  competition	  and	  those	  that	  are	  associated	  with	  success	  in	  sport.	  Football	  players	   and	   other	   sportsmen	   enjoy	   high	   status	   and	   frequently	   also	   substantial	  earnings,	  so	  this	  high	  status	  and	  wealth	  are	  attributes	  of	  interest	  to	  women	  in	  their	  choice	   of	   a	   mate.	   The	   researchers	   find	   ability	   in	   sports,	   high	   sperm	   counts	   and	  testosterone	  concentrations	  to	  be	  positively	  correlated.	  Moreover,	  they	  suggest	  that	  prenatal	  and	  adult	  testosterone	  promotes	  the	  development	  and	  maintenance	  of	  traits	  that	   are	   useful	   in	   sports,	   in	   athletics	   disciplines	   as	   well	   as	   in	   male:male	   fighting	  (Manning	  &	  Taylor,	  2001).	  
Further	   support	   for	   this	   explanation	   is	   offered	   in	   studies	   of	   the	   effect	   of	   biological	  measurements	  on	  behavior.	  Human	  hormones,	  such	  as	  testosterone	  and	  cortisol,	  are	  produced	   differently	   in	   the	   male	   and	   female	   bodies.	   These	   hormones	   both	   play	   a	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substantial	  role	  in	  behaviors	  important	  in	  competition.	  H.	  Bateup	  et	  al.	  	  (2002)	  offer	  a	  good	   overview	   about	   the	   hormonal	   differences	   between	   men	   and	   women.	  Considering	  males,	  testosterone	  develops	  the	  male	  brain	  for	  aggressive	  or	  dominant	  behavior,	   improves	   men’s	   psychomotor	   function	   and	   coordination,	   increases	  cognitive	   performance	   and	   individuals	   are	   willing	   to	   take	   more	   risk.	   Cortisol	  influences	   aggression,	   arousal,	   and	   the	   mobilization	   of	   physiological	   resources	   to	  deal	  with	  impending	  threat	  or	  challenge.	  As	  far	  as	  women	  are	  concerned,	  it	  is	  known	  that	   women	   produce	   five	   to	   seven	   time	   less	   testosterone	   than	   man.	   Moreover,	  women’s	   responses	   to	   challenges	   are	  more	   defensive	   in	   nature	   than	  men’s:	  whilst	  women	   tend	   to	   befriending	   and	   creating	   networks	   providing	   resources	   and	  protection	  for	  them	  and	  their	  offspring,	  men	  are	  more	   likely	  to	  be	  more	  aggressive	  (Bateup,	  Booth,	  Shirtcliff,	  &	  Granger,	  2002).	   	  
D.	  Wozniak	  et	  al.	  (2010)	  argue	  that	  the	  observed	  gender	  differences	  in	  competitive,	  risk,	   and	   investment	   behavior	  may	   arise	   from	   hormonal	   differences	   between	  men	  and	   women.	   Neuroendocrinology	   has	   demonstrated	   the	   existence	   of	   hormonal	  effects	   on	   brain	   activity.	   Hormones	   stimulate	   certain	   areas	   of	   the	   human	   brain,	  whereat	  these	  areas	  have	  been	  linked	  with	  mood,	  memory,	  and	  the	  anticipation	  and	  receipt	   of	  monetary	   rewards.	   Thus	   occurring	  hormonal	   fluctuations	  may	   affect	   the	  evaluation	  of	  outcomes	  and	  consequently	  the	  decision-­‐making	  process.	   	   In	  addition	  to	   this,	   female	   steroid	   hormones	   have	   large	   predictable	   fluctuations	   across	   the	  menstrual	   circle.	   The	   researchers	   find	   that	   women	   in	   the	   low-­‐hormone	   phase	   are	  less	   likely	   to	   enter	   competitive	   environments	   than	   women	   in	   a	   non-­‐low-­‐hormone	  phase	   of	   the	   menstrual	   cycle	   (Wozniak,	   Harbaugh,	   &	   Mayr,	   2010).	   Hormonal	  fluctuations	  also	  contribute	  to	  the	  premenstrual	  syndrome	  effects	  having	  substantial	  economic	   consequences.	   By	   the	   use	   of	   detailed	   employee	   data	   from	   a	   large	   Italian	  bank	  it	  could	  be	  shown	  that	  absences	  for	  women	  below	  the	  age	  of	  45	  tend	  to	  follow	  a	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28-­‐day	  cycle,	  while	  the	  absences	  of	  men	  and	  women	  older	  than	  45	  do	  not.	  These	  28-­‐day	   cycle	   absences	   account	   for	   about	   one	   third	   of	   the	   gender	   gap	   in	   employment	  absences	  at	  the	  firm	  (Ichino	  &	  Moretti,	  2009).	  
Y.	  Chen,	  P.	  Katuščák,	  and	  E.	  Ozdenoren	  (2009)	  examine	  whether	  gender	  differences	  and	   menstrual	   cycle	   affect	   female	   auction	   behavior.	   They	   find	   that	   women	   bid	  significantly	  higher	  and	  earn	  significantly	   less	   than	  men	  do	   in	   the	   first-­‐price	  sealed	  bid	   auctions,	  whilst	   there	   are	  no	   gender	  differences	   in	  bidding	   in	   the	   second-­‐price	  auctions.	  A	  sine-­‐like	  pattern	  of	  bidding	  in	  the	  first-­‐price	  auction	  is	  found	  throughout	  the	  menstrual	   cycle,	  with	   higher	   bids	   in	   the	   follicular	   phase	   and	   lower	   bids	   in	   the	  luteal	   phase.	   Their	   results	   reveal	   that	   the	   menstrual	   cycle	   really	   affects	   female	  decision-­‐making	  behavior	  as	  well	  in	  strategic	  and	  non-­‐strategic	  environments.	  Thus	  it	  might	  be	  beneficial	  for	  women	  to	  know	  how	  their	  decision-­‐making	  systematically	  varies	  during	  the	  cycle,	  so	  that	  they	  can	  time	  key	  decisions	  better.	  This	  may	  lead	  to	  better	  decisions	  in	  investment,	  negotiations	  and	  other	  competitive	  situations,	  so	  that	  women’s	   earnings	   and	   social	   positions	  may	   increase.	  Women	  using	   the	  pill	   as	   oral	  contraceptive	   even	   exhibit	   a	   much	   more	   variable	   sine-­‐like	   bidding	   behavior	  throughout	   the	  menstrual	   cycle	  with	   significant	   higher	   bids	   in	   the	   follicular	   phase	  and	  significantly	  lower	  bids	  in	  the	  luteal	  phase	  of	  the	  cycle	  relative	  to	  the	  mean	  bids	  (Chen,	  Katuščák,	  &	  Ozdenoren,	  2009).	  
Thus,	   this	   study	   demonstrates	   once	   again	   that	   ”nature	   matters”	   as	   well.	  Considering	  all	  these	  findings	  from	  above,	  one	  has	  to	  conclude	  that	  both	  natures	  as	  well	   as	  nurture	  are	   responsible	   for	   the	  observed	  gender	  differences	   in	   competitive	  behavior.	   Further	   research	   will	   be	   needed	   to	   disentangle	   these	   two	   factors,	   to	  quantify	  the	  weight	  of	  each	  factor	  and	  to	  examine	  the	  interaction	  of	  the	  two	  forces.	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5.	  Conclusion	  
This	   work	   gives	   insights	   into	   gender	   differences	   in	   preferences,	   in	   risk	   and	  competition	  behavior	  that	  lead	  to	  the	  observed	  differences	  in	  the	  labor	  market,	  such	  as	   the	   gender	   gap	   in	   top	   management	   positions	   and	   to	   the	   glass	   ceiling	   effect.	  Experimental	   studies	   have	   been	   reviewed	   and	   with	   some	   exceptions	   fundamental	  differences	  between	  men	  and	  women	  have	  been	  documented.	  
Several	  studies	  indicated	  that	  female	  social	  preferences	  were	  different	  from	  those	  of	  males;	  however	   the	  results	  of	   these	  studies	  were	  somewhat	   inconsistent.	  Women’s	  increased	  context-­‐sensitivity	  was	   found	   to	  cause	   inconsistent	  gender	  differences	   in	  social	   preferences.	   As	   the	   utility	   functions,	   which	   players	   of	   both	   genders	   aim	   to	  maximize,	  differ	  across	  the	  sexes:	  male	  utility	  functions	  seem	  to	  be	  less	  sensitive	  to	  the	   conditions	   of	   the	   experiment,	   information	   about	   the	   other	   party	   and	   the	   other	  party’s	   action	   than	   those	   of	   women.	   Thus	   inconsistent	   results	   were	   observed:	  sometimes	   men	   appeared	   more	   altruistic	   than	   women	   and	   other	   times,	   women’s	  behavior	   was	   more	   other-­‐regarding,	   but	   primarily,	   women’s	   behavior	   was	   more	  context-­‐dependent	  than	  that	  of	  men.	  In	  a	  nutshell,	  women’s	  behavior	  was	  observed	  as	  more	  sensitive	  to	  social	  cues	  and	  thus	  more	  variable	  than	  men’s.	  
Concerning	   risk	   behavior,	   most	   laboratory	   experiments	   and	   field	   studies	   revealed	  that	   women	   are	   more	   risk-­‐averse,	   with	   important	   exceptions	   for	   managerial	  population.	  A	   list	   of	   possible	  mechanisms	  behind	   these	   findings,	   such	   as	   emotions,	  overconfidence,	  and	  framing,	  were	  presented	  above.	  	   	  	  	  	  	  It	  was	  shown	  that	  the	  stereotypical	  view	  that	  women	  are	  more	  risk-­‐averse,	  which	  has	  been	  derived	  from	  the	  observation	  of	  non-­‐managerial	  populations,	  may	  not	  apply	  to	  the	  managerial	  population,	  consisting	  of	  men	  and	  women	  who	  exhibit	  similar	  risk-­‐
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propensity	  and	  take	  decisions	  of	  equal	  quality.	  Still	  women	  are	  often	  excluded	  from	  managerial	  positions	  of	  authority	  and	  leadership	  due	  to	  these	  stereotypes.	  	  
The	   third	   section	   reviewed	   competition	   behavior	   and	   found	   that	   women’s	  preferences	  for	  competition	  are	  lower	  than	  men’s	  in	  purely	  competitive	  situations	  as	  well	  as	  in	  bargaining	  settings.	  As	  much	  modern	  economic	  life	  involves	  competition	  in	  some	   form	  or	   another,	   differences	   in	   the	  willingness	   to	   compete	  may	  have	   a	   large	  impact	  on	  economic	  outcomes	  and	  thus	  result	  in	  the	  observed	  gender	  wage	  gap	  and	  women’s	   underrepresentation	   in	   positions	   of	   authority	   and	   leadership.	   Extant	  research	   does	   not	   allow	   to	   answer	   the	   important	   question	   whether	   the	   observed	  gender	   differences	   in	   competitive	   behavior	   are	   ingrained	   (nature)	   or	   taught	  (nurture)	   satisfactorily.	   This	   study	   has	   presented	   evidence	   in	   favor	   of	   both	  explanations.	  Future	  research	  should	  try	  to	  identify	  the	  relative	  weights	  of	  these	  two	  factors.	  	  
In	   summary,	   three	   types	  of	  preferences	  which	  differ	  between	  men	  and	  women	  are	  identified	  and	   reviewed.	  Each	  of	   these	  has	   implications	   for	   the	   economic	  decisions	  taken	   by	   men	   and	   women	   in	   the	   labor	   and	   product	   markets.	   Further	   research	   is	  needed	   to	   get	   a	   closer	   insight	   in	   gender	  differences	   in	  preferences	   and	   thus	   in	   the	  underlying	  utility	  functions	  in	  order	  to	  understand	  the	  economic	  outcomes	  on	  labor	  and	  product	  markets	  better.	  
This	  work	  has	  used	  laboratory	  experiments	  as	  well	  as	  field	  studies	  to	  gain	  insight	  in	  gender	  differences	  in	  risk	  and	  competition	  behavior.	  Therefore,	  it	  is	  important	  to	  be	  aware	  of	  the	  limitations	  of	  this	  methodological	  approach:	  both	  experiments	  only	  hold	  internal	   validity	   but	   are	   (still)	   lacking	   external	   validity,	   so	   that	   the	   results	   can	   not	  simply	  be	  generalized	   to	   the	  entire	  population.	  This	  may	  also	  represent	   the	  reason	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why	  the	  extant	  literature	  does	  not	  provide	  a	  clear	  answer	  to	  the	  question	  why	  there	  is	  only	  a	  smaller	  number	  of	  women	  in	  high	  management	  positions.	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  M.A.	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  -­‐	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  an	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  lecture	  notes	  and	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  –	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  of	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